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This research sets out to examine the effect that the Cold War had on the 
development of public international law – namely, on the development of 
treaties. To do this, this thesis first identifies and explains three geopolitical 
tensions of the Cold War: peace and security, mutual distrust, and resources. 
With the tensions identified, this thesis goes on to apply these tensions to 
three international treaties which were concluded during the Cold War.  
 
The tensions of peace and security and mutual distrust come through 
strongly Antarctic Treaty’s key provisions regarding territory, 
denuclearisation and open inspections. The disarmament provisions of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty were a clear peace and security measure, while the 
weaknesses of the safeguards regime is indicative of mutual distrust. Finally, 
the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation principle and partial 
demilitarisation provisions were crucial in maintaining peace in outer space 
at the time the Treaty was concluded.  
 
Following the case studies, the final section of the thesis analyses the current 
threats facing each of the treaties today, and their ability to respond to these 
threats. For example, all three treaties face the threat of new players to their 
respective areas of application; however, each treaty has different strengths 
and weaknesses when combating this new threat. The thesis concludes with 
a final analysis of the effect of the Cold War on these treaties, finding that 
whether to the treaties’ benefit or detriment, the geopolitical tensions of the 
Cold War certainly affected the treaties’ negotiation, development and 




This thesis would not have been possible without my fantastic support network of friends, 
family and academic supervisors.  
 
Firstly to my supervisor, Karen Scott, I am eternally grateful for your wisdom and guidance 
through this process. I greatly appreciated your continued enthusiasm for this topic, and this 
thesis would not be the same without your valuable insight.  
 
Thank you to my associate supervisor, Evgeny Pavlov, for your essential knowledge of the ins 
and outs of the Cold War.  
 
To my family, and especially mum and my grandmothers, thank you for your endless love and 
support – and thank you for listening to my many and varied rants about this topic.  
 
To Lucy and Charlie, as always, your friendship is invaluable to me. Thank you for your 
encouragement and belief in me.  
 
To the UC librarians, particularly the Law librarians, thank you for always being available to 
answer my many pedantic, and sometimes anxious, queries about research, formatting and 
referencing styles.  
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 3 
A. AIM ........................................................................................................................... 3 
B. STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................... 4 
C. SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................................................................ 5 
II. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................... 6 
A. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 6 
B. HISTORY .................................................................................................................... 6 
1. Start of the Cold War ............................................................................................. 7 
2. Ideology ................................................................................................................ 8 
3. Bipolar division of power, Third World countries and proxy wars ......................... 9 
4. Nuclear weapons ................................................................................................. 11 
5. Surveillance and espionage .................................................................................. 12 
6. Summary ............................................................................................................. 12 
C. SOVIET APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ............................................................ 13 
D. TENSIONS ................................................................................................................ 17 
1. Peace and security ............................................................................................... 17 
2. Mutual distrust .................................................................................................... 19 
3. Resources ............................................................................................................ 20 
E. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 21 
III. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY ............................................................... 22 
A. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 22 
1. The Antarctic Treaty ............................................................................................ 22 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 22 
3. The International Geophysical Year ..................................................................... 23 
4. Chapter overview ................................................................................................ 25 
B. PEACE AND SECURITY .............................................................................................. 26 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 26 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 26 
3. Articles I and V: demilitarisation and denuclearisation ........................................ 28 
4. Article IV: sovereignty and territorial claims ....................................................... 30 
5. Article XI: Dispute resolution .............................................................................. 32 
6. Other articles ....................................................................................................... 33 
7. Concluding notes ................................................................................................. 34 
C. MUTUAL DISTRUST .................................................................................................. 37 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 37 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 37 
3. Article VII: open inspections and openness of activities....................................... 39 
4. Article XII: withdrawal and termination provisions ............................................. 43 
5. Other articles ....................................................................................................... 44 
6. Concluding notes ................................................................................................. 46 
D. RESOURCES.............................................................................................................. 48 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 48 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 49 
3. Article IV: sovereignty and territorial claims ....................................................... 50 
4. Current regimes for resource management in Antarctica ...................................... 51 
5. The Minerals Convention and Madrid Protocol.................................................... 52 
 
6. Tourism and bioprospecting ................................................................................ 54 
7. Concluding notes ................................................................................................. 55 
E. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 57 
1. Summary ............................................................................................................. 57 
2. The Antarctic Treaty in the present day ............................................................... 57 
3. A closer look at the Treaty as a whole.................................................................. 58 
4. Problems facing the Treaty today ......................................................................... 59 
5. Can the Treaty survive in a post-Cold War world? ............................................... 60 
IV. THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS ...................................................................................................... 62 
A. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 62 
1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty............................................................................... 62 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 63 
3. Chapter overview ................................................................................................ 64 
B. PEACE AND SECURITY .............................................................................................. 65 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 65 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 66 
3. Articles I and II: non-proliferation ....................................................................... 67 
4. Article VI: disarmament obligations .................................................................... 70 
5. Article VIII: conference and review ..................................................................... 73 
6. Other articles ....................................................................................................... 75 
7. Concluding notes ................................................................................................. 76 
C. MUTUAL DISTRUST .................................................................................................. 78 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 78 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 79 
3. Article III: the safeguards regime ......................................................................... 80 
4. Articles VIII and X: amendment and withdrawal ................................................. 83 
5. Concluding notes ................................................................................................. 86 
D. RESOURCES.............................................................................................................. 87 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 87 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 87 
3. Articles IV and V ................................................................................................ 89 
4. Concluding notes ................................................................................................. 92 
E. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 93 
1. Summary ............................................................................................................. 93 
1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty in the present day .................................................. 94 
2. A closer look at the Treaty as a whole.................................................................. 95 
3. Problems facing the Treaty today ......................................................................... 96 
4. Can the Treaty survive in a post-Cold War world? ............................................... 96 
V. THE TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, 
INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES.................. 98 
A. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 98 
1. The Outer Space Treaty ....................................................................................... 98 
2. Before the Treaty ................................................................................................. 99 
3. Chapter overview .............................................................................................. 100 
B. PEACE AND SECURITY ............................................................................................ 101 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 101 
 
2. Before the Treaty ............................................................................................... 101 
3. Articles I and II: sovereignty and the province of all mankind ........................... 102 
4. Article IV: nuclear weapons and peaceful purposes ........................................... 106 
5. Article III: application of international law to outer space .................................. 109 
6. Articles IX and XIII: dispute resolution ............................................................. 109 
7. Concluding notes ............................................................................................... 111 
C. MUTUAL DISTRUST ................................................................................................ 113 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 113 
2. Before the Treaty ............................................................................................... 113 
3. Article X: tracking facilities ............................................................................... 114 
4. Articles XI and XII: information and inspection ................................................ 117 
5. Art VI, VII and VIII: international responsibility ............................................... 121 
6. Articles XIV(3), XV and XVI: administrative provisions................................... 122 
7. Concluding notes ............................................................................................... 123 
D. RESOURCES............................................................................................................ 125 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 125 
2. Before the Treaty ............................................................................................... 125 
3. Articles I and II – resources and the CHM ......................................................... 126 
4. Moon Treaty ...................................................................................................... 129 
5. Concluding notes ............................................................................................... 132 
E. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 132 
1. Summary ........................................................................................................... 132 
2. The Outer Space Treaty in the present day ......................................................... 133 
3. A closer look at the Treaty as a whole................................................................ 134 
4. Problems facing the Treaty today ....................................................................... 135 
5. Can the Treaty survive in a post-Cold War world? ............................................. 135 
VI. FUTURE AND CONCLUSION .......................................................... 137 
A. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 137 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 137 
2. Peace and security ............................................................................................. 137 
3. Mutual distrust .................................................................................................. 138 
4. Resources .......................................................................................................... 139 
B. ANTARCTIC TREATY .............................................................................................. 141 
1. Threats .............................................................................................................. 141 
2. Ability to respond .............................................................................................. 144 
3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 152 
C. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ................................................................................ 154 
1. Threats .............................................................................................................. 154 
2. Ability to respond .............................................................................................. 157 
3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 163 
D. OUTER SPACE TREATY ........................................................................................... 165 
1. Threats .............................................................................................................. 165 
2. Ability to respond .............................................................................................. 169 
3. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 173 
E. FINAL CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 175 
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................ 179 
VIII. APPENDICES .................................................................................. 200 
 
A. APPENDIX I: THE ANTARCTIC TREATY .................................................................... 200 
B. APPENDIX II: TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS .......... 210 
C. APPENDIX III: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE 
EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL 





Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (signed 
December 18 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984). 
 
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space (signed 19 December 1967, entered into force 3 December 
1968). 
 
The Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961). 
 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (opened for signature 
1 August 1980, entered into force 1 April 1982). 
 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (signed 1 June 1972, entered into force 11 
March 1978). 
 
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (opened for 
signature 29 march 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972). 
 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (opened for signature 14 
January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976). 
 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (opened for signature 
2 June 1988, not in force). 
 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, USA-Russia (signed 8 April 2010, entered into force 5 
February 2011).  
 
North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949). 
 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (signed 6 August 1985, entered into force 11 
December 1986). 
 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty USA-Russia (signed 3 January 1993, entered into force 14 
April 2000).  
 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 
(opened for signature 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963). 
 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions, USA-Russia (signed 24 May 2002, entered into force 1 June 2003). 
 
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, USA-USSR 
(December 8 1987). 
 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, USA-USSR (signed 31 July 
1991, entered into force 5 December 1994). 
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Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (14 May 1955). 
 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 20 September 2017, not 
yet in force). 
  
 3 
I. Introduction  
 
That the Cold War impacted the development of public international law is assumed, but 
modern literature tends to focus largely on international law in the post-Cold War era.1 It seems 
inevitable that a decades-long war, waged in large part by the two “superpowers”2 of the period, 
would have an effect at an international legal level. In order to investigate this assumption, my 
thesis has focused on three treaties which were concluded during a period of considerable Cold 
War tension.3 These are the Antarctic Treaty;4 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (“Non-Proliferation Treaty”);5 and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 




The main purpose of my research was to discover to what extent the Cold War impacted the 
development of public international law. As this is a broad topic, I identified three relevant 
treaties and applied the following questions when undertaking my research: 
                                               
1 For literature whichdoes consider the impact of the Cold War on international law, see generally Tatiana Iu 
Borisova and William B Simons (eds) The Legal Dimension in Cold-War Interactions: Some Notes from the Field, 
(BRILL, eBook ed, 2014); Edward McWhinney “‘Coexistence’, the Cuba Crisis, and Cold War International 
Law” (1962) 18(1) International Journal 18 67-74; Edward McWhinney “International Law Making in Times of 
Competing Ideologies or Clashing Civilizations: Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-Western Legal Dialogue in the 
Cold War Era” (2006) 44 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 421 – 436; or see literature about post-Cold 
War international law, which does touch on the way the Cold War affected its development: Alison Pert 
“International Law in a Post-Post-Cold War World – Can It Survive?” (2017) 4(2) Asia & the Pacific Policy 
Studies 362 – 375; Edward McWhinney From Coexistence to Cooperation : International Law and Organization 
in the Post-Cold War Era (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1991). 
2 The “superpowers” referred to in this proposal are the United States of America (“United States”), and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (“Soviet Union”).   
3 See discussion of the 1950s and 1960s in Odd Arne Westad “The Cold War and the international history of the 
twentieth century” in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War 
(Cambridge University Press, eBook ed, 2010) at 2. 
4 The Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961). 
5 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 1 July 1968, entered into force 5 
March 1970). 
6 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967).  
 4 
a) How did the Cold War impact the negotiation and implementation of the treaties? 
b) To what extent did the Cold War shape the rights, obligations, structure and institutions 
under the treaties?  




To narrow the scope of my thesis, I have identified three key geopolitical tensions present 
during the Cold War: peace and security, mutual distrust, and resources.7  
 
The first substantive chapter of my thesis is the background chapter, which provides an 
overview of the Cold War, the Soviet approach to international law, and sets out the meaning 
of the geopolitical tensions mentioned above. The following chapters make up the case studies 
of the thesis. I examine the background, negotiation and substance of the treaties in the context 
of each of the tensions. Where relevant, I include comparisons between the treaties.  
 
The final substantive chapter is the future chapter. There, I consider what I have discovered in 
the case studies in light of the post-Cold War era. In particular, I identify the main threats facing 
the treaties today, whether the treaties are equipped to respond to these threats, and how the 
treaties’ ability to respond are shaped by the geopolitical tensions. Finally, I use this analysis 
to consider the case studies together, with the aim of examining whether any wider conclusions 
can be made across the three case studies. 
 
                                               
7 I expand on what I mean by these tensions in the following chapter.  
 5 
C. Significance  
 
Understanding the context behind international treaties is crucial. If the Cold War did indeed 
affect the development of the relevant treaties, what does this mean for their future? The 
international political climate of today is far different from that of the Cold War. It has been 
taken for granted that the Cold War altered public international law’s development in some 
way; my research aims to find out, in more detail, how and why it had this effect. As noted by 
Michael Reisman:8  
The Cold War deformed the traditional international law that had developed over 
centuries …. It could hardly have been otherwise. For almost half a century, the 
world lived in a state of neither war nor peace. 
 
The effect of the Cold War in this field has continued relevance in the present day: all three 
treaties are still in force and hold legal power. In my research I have sought to discover whether 
the Cold War backdrop of these three treaties has bearing on their use today and their continued 
existence.  
                                               






Before launching into the case studies, it is necessary to consider the historical backdrop to the 
treaties’ negotiations. To do this, I will first provide a brief overview of the Cold War, 
identifying key themes to give an historical context to the treaties. I will then consider the 
Soviet approach to international law. I will not consider this approach in my case studies, as it 
is not the focus of my thesis; however, it is important to understand the Soviet point of view 
when entering into treaty negotiations. I will then introduce the three chosen tensions which I 
use in my case studies: peace and security, mutual distrust and resources. The aim of this 





Calvororessi claims “The Cold War dominated world affairs for a generation and more.”9 The 
Second World War resulted in a largely bipolar distribution of power, with the United States 
and the Soviet Union arising as the world’s “superpowers”. This superpower conflict impacted 
the majority of the world. The vast history of the Cold War cannot be condensed into this 
background chapter; as such, I have identified some of its key themes in order to provide the 
historical context behind the case studies.  
 
                                               
9 Peter Calvocoressi World Politics 1945-2000 (8th ed, Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain, 2001) at 3. 
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1. Start of the Cold War 
 
The World War II alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States was not strong; it 
was borne of necessity.10 After the Second World War, “[relations] between the Soviet Union 
and the Western powers grew steadily worse.”11  
 
One of the primary concerns arising out of World War II was the post-war division of Europe 
– and in particular, of Germany. At meetings which took place near the end of World War II, 
concerning the post-war division of Europe,12 the negotiators “agreed to divide Germany into 
four occupation zones – one each for the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and 
France”.13 After attempts at reunifying Germany failed, the Western powers “decided on an 
independent policy in their occupation zones that would lead to a separate West German 
state”.14 The Soviets responded by implementing the Berlin blockade, which blocked off its 
area of Berlin, separating it from what was supposed to be a joint occupation.15 The tension 
over Germany eventually culminated in the division of Germany into two States: the Western 
occupation zones of Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and 
the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).16 
                                               
10 The United States and Soviet Union were not the only Allied Powers; however for the purposes of my thesis, I 
will mainly consider the relationship between these two states.  
11 David Holloway “Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962” in Melvyn P Leffler and 
Odd Arne Westad (eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) 
at 379. 
12 Most notably in Yalta, Potsdam and Tehran. See generally P M H Bell Twelve Turning Points of the Second 
World War (Yale University Press, eBook ed, 2011) at 147 – 165, 188 – 209; Geoffrey Roberts “Stalin at the 
Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences.” (2007) 9(4) Journal of Cold War Studies 6 – 40; Wilson D 
Miscamble The Most Controversial Decision : Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge 
University Press, eBook ed, 2011) at 54 – 78. 
13 Lee Edwards and Elizabeth Edwards Spalding A Brief History of the Cold War (Regnery Publishing, eBook 
ed, 2016) at 18. 
14 Daniel Harrington “United States, United Nations and the Berlin Blockade” 52(2) The Historian 262 at 263. 
15 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009, online ed) Berlin 1945-91 at [1]; Harrington at 
263.  
16 Lorenz M Luthi “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973” (2016) 18(4) Journal of Cold 





Another key factor of the Cold War was the major difference in the ideologies of each 
superpower. The weight of the role that ideology played in the Cold War has been debated,17 
but the fact that it played a role at all cannot be denied. David Engerman claims that “at its root 
[the Cold War was] a battle of ideas: American liberalism vs. Soviet Communism”.18  
 
This ideological tension could certainly be seen in the superpowers’ foreign policies, and in 
particular the early United States doctrine, put forward by President Truman, of the global 
containment of communism (“the Truman Doctrine”).19 In his address before congress, 
Truman declared that “nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life”, with 
one way “based upon the will of the majority … distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government …” and the other “based upon the will of a minority forcibly 
imposed upon the majority [relying] upon terror and oppression”.20 He went on to declare that 
the United States would “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation” from 
the Soviet Union. This battle of ideology played a role in superpower influence in the Third 




                                               
17 Mark Kramer “Ideology and the Cold War” (1999) 25(4) Review of International Studies 539 at 539.  
18 David Engerman “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War” in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) 
The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) at 20. It is beyond the 
scope of my thesis to discuss in detail the ideological views of each superpower; this source, alongside Kramer, 
above n 17, provide excellent analyses of this aspect of the Cold War. 
19 Harry S Truman “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress” (Washington, 12 March 1947).  
20 Ibid.   
21 Lee Edwards and Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, above n 13, at 55 – 56; Engerman, above n 18, at 40 and 42.  
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3. Bipolar division of power, Third World countries and proxy wars 
 
Post-World War II, the international community changed significantly. The United States and 
the Soviet Union arose as the world’s superpowers, despite the fact that the Soviet Union had 
suffered badly during the war; Cameron Thies argues that the Truman Doctrine helped to foster 
the creation of this bipolar division of power: immediately post-World War II, “the Soviets did 
not have material capabilities equivalent to those of the United States … The Truman Doctrine 
constructed the ideational structure [of material bipolarity] which would not become a reality 
until the end of the nuclear monopoly in 1949”.22  
 
In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union’s new superpower status, a number of 
new States emerged as they shook free of colonial control – making decolonisation one of the 
hallmarks of the post-War era. Prasenjit Duara describes decolonisation in this context as:23 
… the process whereby colonial powers transferred institutional and legal control 
over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, 
nation-states. The political search for independence often began during the inter-
war years and fructified within fifteen years of the end of World War II in 1945. 
 
The post-World War II world could therefore be divided into three main groups: the United 
States and United States-aligned countries (“the First World”); the Soviet Union and the 
Communist bloc (“the Second World”); and new, developing countries with no alignment to 
either superpower (“the Third World”). 
 
                                               
22 Cameron G. Thies “The Roles of Bipolarity: A Role Theoretic” (2013) 14 International Studies Perspectives 
269 at 275.  
23 Prasenjit Duara Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then (Routledge, eBook ed, 2003) at 2. It should 
be noted that the battle over the third world did not begin immediately – Joseph Stalin was more interested in 
extending his influence in Eastern Europe; see generally Odd Arne Westad The Global Cold War: Third World 
Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, eBook ed, 2007) at 39 – 72.  
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Engerman explains that “the rapidly expanding Third World would remain contested terrain 
for the remainder of the Cold War”.24 Rather than engage in direct confrontation, the two 
superpowers instead “contested their resolve in a number of costly interventions and proxy 
wars”, in places such as the Middle East, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic and Latin 
America.25 These wars were waged for a number of reasons connected to the desire for power 
and control; in the Middle East, for example, “the region’s rich petroleum reserves, central 
location … and political instability made it a prime target for United States-Soviet battles for 
influence …”26 
 
Connected to superpower interference in Third World countries, as well as the bipolar division 
of power discussed earlier, was the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (“NAM”) 
and the Group of 77 (“G-77”). The NAM was established by a number of developing countries 
in 1961, and its original aim was to “promote decolonisation and to avoid domination by either 
the Western industrialised world or the Communist bloc”.27 During the Cold War, the NAM 
was particularly involved in United Nations peacekeeping efforts, particularly as international 
conflicts primarily affected non-aligned states.28 
 
Connected to this was the G-77, which came into being at the first session of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) after 77 developing countries issued a 
joint declaration.29 The basic objective of the G-77 was similar to that of the NAM: it was to 
                                               
24 Engerman, above n 18, at 40.  
25 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009, online ed) Cold War (1947-91) at [26]. 
26 Julian Ubriaco “The Middle East’s Cold War” (2017) 38(3) Harvard International Law Review 6 at 6.  
27 D S Lewis and Wendy Slater (eds) Annual Register, Volume 254 : World Events 2012 (ProQuest, eBook ed, 
2012) at 390.  
28 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2018, online ed) Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at 
[23].  
29 Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (Geneva, 15 June 1964). 
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“complete the liberation of Third World countries from external domination”.30 The G-77 
“became an integral part of UNCTAD and was one of the most important agents for the 
socialisation of the developing countries in matters relating to international political 
economy”.31  
 
4. Nuclear weapons 
 
The United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons until 1949, when the Soviet Union 
tested its first atomic bomb.32 Calvocoressi explains that “for nearly half a century the chief 
outward expression of the Cold War was not advances or retreats but the accumulation and 
refinement of the means by which the two sides tried to intimidate each other: that is to say, 
their arms race”.33 The Cold War simply as an arms race is a popular conception. The reality 
is not so simple; however, the superpowers’ efforts to build their respective nuclear arsenals, 
while discouraging and legislating against the spread of nuclear weapons, were hallmarks of 
the Cold War. 
 
Due to the high secrecy surrounding nuclear stockpiles, it is difficult to provide an accurate 
number of the amount of nuclear weapons each superpower held.34 However, by one measure, 
the Soviet Union lagged behind in nuclear weapons numbers until 1978; at that stage, the 
United States appeared to be reducing its nuclear stockpile – potentially in response to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty – while the Soviet Union continued to grow their arsenal.35 
                                               
30 Karl Sauvant “The Early Days of the Group of 77” (2014) 51(1) UN Chronicle 27 at 29.  
31 At 28.  
32 Lester Machta “Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test in 1949” (1992) 73(11) Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society 1787 at 1798. 
33 Calvocoressi, above n 9, at 4.  
34 For an estimate, see Robert S Norris and Hans M. Kristensen “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-
2010” (2010) 66(4) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77. 
35 At 81. 
 12 
 
Though there were many other elements of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remained at the 
forefront. It was not confined to the two superpowers: the threat of one superpower unleashing 
a nuclear attack on another would have had devastating effects on a number of countries caught 
in the fallout. 
 
5. Surveillance and espionage   
 
Due to the necessary secrecy around intelligence, it is “probably the least understood aspect of 
the Cold War”.36 Nevertheless, it played an important role during this time period. Covert 
operations using human spies,37 reconnaissance airplanes,38 and reconnaissance satellites39 
were rife. Richelsen states that “the United States [explored] various methods for conducting 
reconnaissance over Soviet territory. The Soviets … at least with respect to events in the United 
States, … had to depend heavily on human sources”.40 Intelligence activities were crucial in 
obtaining information about new weapons technologies, keeping up to date with one another’s 
military and technological developments, and obtaining information about each State’s 




                                               
36 Christopher Andrew “Intelligence in the Cold War” in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arned Westad (eds) The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, eBook ed, 2010) at 417.  
37 Jeffrey T Richelson A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, eBook 
ed, 1997) at chapter 16.  
38 See discussion of the U-2 Incident below.  
39 See generally Laurence Nardon “Cold War Space Policy and Observation Satellites” (2007) 5(1) The 
International Journal of Space Politics & Policy 29–62. 
40 Richelson, above n 37, at chapter 16. 
41 Dino A Brugioni Eyes in the Sky : Eisenhower, the CIA, and Cold War Aerial Espionage (Naval Institute 
Press, eBook ed, 2011) at 1.  
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The Cold War was “fought” under a number of different heads, be it through the arms race, 
espionage, or by proxy wars through Third World countries; its scale meant that the superpower 
rivalry had lasting effects across the globe. This section did not aim to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the Cold War. Instead, I aimed to touch on a few of its identifiable aspects, so that 
the case studies can be read with some background context. Where relevant, in my case studies 
I have provided further historical context which directly relates to the treaties in question.  
  
C. Soviet Approach to International Law 
 
The Soviets faced an innate issue when attempting to conceptualise international law. 
Traditional Marxist theory states that law is a centralised and coercive force, used by the State 
to uphold the norms of said State.42 These norms, explains YA Korovin, are “legal rules 
suitable and advantageous to the ruling class in the given society”.43 This gives law a “class 
character”, meaning that the class or group which holds the means of production is able to 
assert domination over another class.44  
 
This definition of law put forth by Marx45 and developed by Soviet scholars appears 
incompatible with international law. International law is not centralised, but horizontal;46 the 
subjects of international law (States) are the same entities which enforce it.47 Additionally, 
                                               
42 Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, Great Britain, 1955) at 148. For more 
discussion on the Marxist theory of domestic law, see generally Kelsen; Evgeny B. Pashukanis Law and Marxism: 
A General Theory trans. Barbara Einhorn (Ink Links Ltd., London, 1978); P. I. Stuchka “The Revolutionary Part 
Played by Law and the State - A General Doctrine of Law” in Soviet Legal Philosophy, trans. Hugh W. Babb 
(Harvard University Press, USA, 1951); V. I. Lenin “The State” in Soviet Legal Philosophy, trans. Hugh W. Babb 
(Harvard University Press, USA, 1951). 
43 Y. A. Korovin “The Conception, Souces and System of International Law” in International Law: A Textbook 
for Use in Law Schools (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961) at 10. 
44 Kelsen, above n 42, at 148. 
45 Letter from Karl Marx to Friedrich Bolte (23 November, 1871).   
46 Kelsen, above n 42, at 148. 
47 Korovin, above n 43, at 11. 
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international law by nature cannot defend the interests of the State – and by extension, those 
of the ruling class – as it must serve to protect the interests of all States which are engaged at 
the international level.48  
 
In attempting to align international law with the Marxist doctrine of law, Korovin asserts that 
coercion is a factor in international law, but it is executed in a different way.49 This coercion is 
implemented by a State or States against another State which has violated international law.50 
Korovin goes on to argue that international law has a class character, even though it does not 
express the rule of the ruling class – which appears to be a distinct necessity under the Marxist 
doctrine.51 Korovin offers no explanation as to why international law does have a class 
character. However, his claim about coercion holds merit: a State can, for example, use 
measures such as sanctions to push another State to comply with international law.  
 
On the other hand, Hans Kelsen dismisses the argument that international law has a class 
character. He explains that international law embodies the opposite of Marx’s conception of 
law, as it “guarantees by the principle of sovereign equality of all states … that no state or 
group of states ought to exercise a domination over another group of states.”52 Kelsen cynically 
states that the only reason for this is the political interests of the Soviets, and that Soviet 
attempts to align international law with Marxist doctrine are “futile”.53  
 
                                               
48 At 10. 
49 At 11. 
50 At 11. 
51 At 11. 
52 Kelsen, above n 42, at 149. 
53 At 150. 
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Regardless of how the issue is approached, however, the conclusion is the same: the Soviet 
Union accepted that international law was a valid form of law. In accepting international law 
as law, the Soviets developed their own jurisprudence surrounding it, as discussed below.  
Leading Soviet jurist, G.I. Tunkin, divides the tenets of Soviet international law into three 
groups: the principles of socialist internationalism; the principles of equality and self-
determination of nations and peoples; and the principles of peaceful co-existence.54 The most 
relevant of these groups for the purposes of this thesis is that of peaceful co-existence. 
 
The third tenet put forth by Tunkin, peaceful coexistence, was an integral aspect of Soviet 
international law and foreign policy during much of the Cold War. It was particularly important 
during the era of Nikita Khrushchev, which lasted from 1953 until his deposal in 1964.55 When 
addressing the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Khrushchev 
described peaceful coexistence as both the “general line”56 and “the central feature” of Soviet 
foreign policy.57  
 
According to the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (PCPSU), “peaceful 
coexistence of the socialist and capitalist countries is an objective necessity for the 
development of human society.”58 The PCPSU outlines seven key principles of peaceful 
coexistence:59  
                                               
54 G I Tunkin Theory of International Law (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, Great Britain, 1974) at 4. 
55 Khrushchev served as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953-1964, and 
served as the Soviet Premier from 1958-1964.  
56 N S Khrushchev Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 22nd 
Congress of the CPSU (Soviet Booklets, London, 1961) vol 80 at 23. 
57 At 24. 
58 Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (22nd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1961). 
59 Ibid. For further information on the specific tenets of peaceful coexistence, see Victor P Karpov “The Soviet 
Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and Its Implications for International Law” in Hans W Baade (ed) The Soviet 
Impact on International Law (Oceana Publications, Inc., USA, 1965) at 19–20; Tunkin, above n 54, at 14–19; 
James L Hildebrand Soviet International Law: An Exemplar for Optimal Decision Theory Analysis (Western 
Reserve Distributors, USA, 1968) at 46–51.  
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a) Renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by 
negotiation; 
b) Equality, mutual understanding and trust between countries; 
c) Consideration for each other’s interests; 
d) Non-interference in internal affairs; 
e) Recognition of the right of every people to solve all the problems of their country by 
themselves; 
f) Strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and 
g) Promotion of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and 
mutual benefit.  
According to Tunkin, the principle of peaceful co-existence is “aimed first and foremost at 
relations between states with different social systems”.60 The core concept is that the different 
social systems are irreconcilable with one another, but this does not mean that armed conflict 
is inevitable.61 Given the vastly different social systems between the superpowers, it is 
understandable that “peaceful co-existence” became a common approach by the Soviet Union 
when engaging at the international legal level with the United States.  
 
This subject is not the focus of this thesis. However, it is important to gain some insight into 
the way the Soviet Union approached its engagement with other States at the international legal 
level. In particular, Khrushchev’s doctrine of peaceful coexistence provides insight into how 
the Soviets justified entering into legal agreements with States whose politics and ideologies, 
                                               
60 Tunkin, above n 54, at 4. 
61 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2010, online ed) Peaceful Coexistence at [1].  
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at times, seemed diametrically opposed with the Soviet Union’s. As the case studies look into 
the negotiating history of the treaties, the purpose of this section was to provide further context 
for the Soviet Union’s actions during negotiations.  
 
D. Tensions  
 
In order to adequately assess the impact of the Cold War on the three treaties, I have identified 
three particular geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. While the tensions are not the sole 
tensions present during that time period, they are the most identifiable, and had considerable 
impact on the three treaties. This section sets out what I mean when I refer to the tensions in 
the case studies.  
 
1. Peace and security  
 
Peace and security was the primary tension of the Cold War, and was the driving cause of the 
treaties I will discuss in this thesis. “Peace and security” in this context means the superpowers’ 
concern over ensuring their territory was secure, that their military and weapons capabilities 
were strong, while still ensuring that the Cold War did not erupt into direct hostilities – that is, 
finding a balance between developing defensive strength while still “keeping the peace”.  
 
Many of the events of the Cold War show the peace and security tension, but the most striking 
was the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.62 Through the use of a spy plane, the United States 
                                               
62 For literature about the Cuban Missile Crisis, see generally Laurie Collier Hillstrom Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Omnigraphics Incorporated, eBook ed, 2015); Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law (2010, online ed) 
Cuban Missile Crisis.  
 18 
discovered a Soviet ballistic missile site being constructed in Cuba.63 This caused dire security 
concerns for the United States, as nuclear weapons launched from Cuba could reach “virtually 
any city” in the United States.64 The United States responded to the discovery by quarantining 
Cuba with its Navy, as the superpowers attempted to discuss the situation with one another.65 
The Missile Crisis has been described as the height of the Cold War,66 and for good reason: 
there was a very real risk that weapons could be launched, turning the Cold War hot.  
 
The Missile Crisis also exemplified the superpowers’ desire for peace – or, at least, a lack of 
outright conflict. Neither superpower wanted to start a nuclear war, meaning it was necessary 
to communicate with one another “to negotiate a deal to end the crisis peacefully”.67 A bargain 
was eventually struck: the United States would remove its quarantine and promised it would 
not invade Cuba, and the Soviet Union would remove the weapons from Cuba.68 Khruschev, 
in a letter accepting the United States proposal, noted his concerns about a war; however, he 
felt “that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and security of the 
peoples will be insured”.69 
 
The Missile Crisis epitomised the fragile relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as well as the disastrous consequences which would occur should that relationship break 
down completely. The tension of peace and security was ever-present throughout the Cold War, 
especially with the added layer of both superpowers having nuclear weapons in their arsenal: 
                                               
63 Max Planck Cuban Missile Crisis at [1].  
64 Hillstrom, above n 62, at 38.  
65 At 53. 
66 Max Planck Cuban Missile Crisis, above n 63, at [1].  
67 Hillstrom, above n 62, at 53. 
68 Ibid: see John F Kennedy’s proposal at 188, and N Khrushchev’s acceptance at 195 – 196.  
69 At 196. 
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peace was essential for protecting the world from a nuclear war, but equally important was the 
desire to ensure their respective territories were defended.  
 
2. Mutual distrust 
 
The second tension I have identified is mutual distrust. This is the most insidious tension, as it 
coloured every interaction between the superpowers during the Cold War: whether over nuclear 
weapons, their conflicting ideology, or the activities taking place in their respective territories 
and spheres of influence, distrust was more than present between the Soviet Union and the 
United States.  
 
An example of mutual distrust manifesting as a specific event is the U-2 Incident. On 1 May 
1960, Soviet Union anti-aircraft rockets shot down a U-2, a United States reconnaissance 
airplane.70 In its initial note to the Soviet government, the United States claimed that the U-2 
was an unarmed weather research plane piloted by a civilian.71 This position was soon refuted 
by Premier Khrushchev, who announced that he had “both the wreckage of the spy plane and 
the pilot”, with the pilot himself alive and well.72  
 
After this statement, the United States conceded that while it was not aware of any authorisation 
of such a reconnaissance flight over Soviet territory on that day, that “in endeavouring to obtain 
information … a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian 
U-2 plane”.73 After some back and forth on this issue, former President Eisenhower admitted 
                                               
70 Thomas R Phillips “The U-2 Incident” (1960) 16(6) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 222 at 222. 
71 Note from the United States to the Soviet Union (6 May 1960). 
72 Richard Damms The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953 – 1961 (Routledge, eBook ed, 2002) at chapter 5.  
73 United States State Department “The U-2 Incident” (press release, 7 May 1960).  
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to the reconnaissance activities, arguing that to avoid another Pearl Harbour and because of the 
Soviet Union’s “fetish of secrecy and concealment”, such “distasteful” intelligence collection 
activities were a necessity.74 
 
Eisenhower’s defence of these covert activities speaks to the tension of mutual distrust: the 
United States wanted further information about the strength or limitations of the Soviets’ 
military and arsenal, and as it could not obtain this information through open communication, 
it resorted to “under the radar” measures. Additionally, the Soviet Union shooting down what 
could have simply been a weather plane furthers this tension: such reconnaissance flights had 
been taking place for four years before the Soviets finally took action, with the action 
confirming their suspicions of the United States’ spying.75 
 
3. Resources  
 
The final tension I have identified is the tension surrounding resources. With technology 
rapidly developing, and new areas of the universe being explored, the question arose: where 
new resources were available, who would get them? How would they be shared, acquired, 
transferred or sold? As noted by David Painter:76 
Modern warfare generated an unprecedented demand for oil and other resources, 
and modern industrial society consumed massive amounts of energy and raw 
materials. The United States and the Soviet Union were continent-spanning 
countries rich in oil and strategic minerals, and their control of these resources 
helped underpin their power. Both also sought to gain access to resources outside 
their borders. 
 
                                               
74 Dwight D Eisenhower “News Conference Statement by the President” (press release, 11 May 1960). 
75 Damms, above n 72, at chapter 5. 
76 David S Painter “Oil Resources and the Cold War, 1945-1962” in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arned Westad 
(eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, eBook ed, 2010) at 486.  
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Painter also explains the tension in the early years of the Cold War around the acquisition of 
uranium, the main ingredient for the atomic bomb.77 During World War II and shortly after the 
end of the war, the United States and its allies controlled an estimated 97% of the world’s 
uranium supply.78 This meant that the Soviet Union had to explore its options within the Soviet 
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, with “uranium from East Germany [becoming] a key 
source for the Soviet atomic project”.79 The tension of resources can therefore be closely 
connected with control of territory, as well as political influence over other States.  
 
E. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided some historical background to the chosen case studies. The Cold 
War was so dominant in international relations for decades that it is highly improbable that it 
did not impact on international law in some way. Conflict over ideology, economics, and 
spheres of influence, layered over the backdrop over the possibility of a nuclear war, provided 
a dark outlook for the development of international law. Despite the constant tension, however, 
the superpowers managed to come to agreement on key concerns of the time: three of these 
concerns are the subjects of my case studies. Agreement was reached on the activities of States 
in Antarctica and outer space, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty helped to lessen the threat of 
nuclear war. With the historical background explained and having introduced the tensions, I 
now turn to the case studies.
                                               
77 At 487.  
78 At 487.  
79 At 487.  
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1. The Antarctic Treaty 
 
The Antarctic Treaty1 entered into force on 23 June 1961, with 12 signatories. Currently, there 
are 53 Parties to the Treaty. All 12 of the original signatories are Consultative Parties. This 
means that they are able to participate in decision making in the meetings provided for in the 
Treaty.2 There are currently 29 Consultative Parties.3 Amongst other things, the Antarctic 
Treaty declares that Antarctica is to be used for peaceful purposes only,4 continued the practice 
of freedom of scientific investigation,5 and froze territorial claims to the continent.6 The 
Antarctic Treaty applies to the area south of 60 degrees latitude.7 
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
In 1948, the United States put forward a proposal for the internationalisation of Antarctica.8 
The United States did not consider it necessary to include the Soviet Union in these talks.9 It is 
unlikely it would have been possible to include the Soviet Union in talks in any case, as they 
                                               
1 The Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961). 
2 Article IX. A Non-Consultative Party can be elevated to Consultative Party status by conducting substantial 
research in Antarctica, art IX(2).  
3 “Parties” (2011) Antarctic Treaty Secretariat <https://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e>.  
4 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art I. 
5 Article II. 
6 Article IV. 
7 Article VI.  
8 John Hanessian “The Antarctic Treaty 1959” (1960) 9(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
436 at 436. 
9 At 439.  
 23 
coincided with the Berlin blockade and “a general deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations.”10 
This early initiative was ultimately unsuccessful, however; the claimant states in Antarctica 
were not prepared to give up their claims, and the Korean War became a warranted distraction 
from the matter.11 Following the failure of the initiative, the Soviet Government issued its 
memorandum.  
 
In early 1949, a Resolution of the All-Soviet Geographical Society (“ASGS”) declared that the 
Soviet Union had an “indisputable right … to participate in the solution of problems of the 
Antarctic …”12 Following this, in 1950 the Soviet Union forwarded a memorandum to key 
states13 declaring that it “cannot agree to such a question as that of the Antarctic regime being 
settled without its participation.”14  
 
Boleslaw Boczek noted that the exclusion of the Soviet Union from negotiations could have 
been a catalyst for the Cold War to spread to Antarctica15 – but how could the Soviets be 
included in negotiations when tensions were so high? Beck noted that “opportunity came 
during … general improvement in east-west relations.”16 This, in combination with the success 
of the International Geophysical Year, paved the way for Antarctic Treaty negotiations to 
occur.  
 
3. The International Geophysical Year 
 
                                               
10 Boleslaw A Boczek “The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime” (1984) 78(4) The American Journal of 
International Law 834 at 836. 
11 At 837. 
12 Peter A Toma “Soviet Attitude Towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic” (1956) 50 
American Journal of International Law 611 at Appendix 2. 
13 These states were the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, Argentina and New 
Zealand. Chile, which also made a territorial claim in the Antarctic, was not forwarded this message. 
14 Toma, above n 12, at Appendix 1. 
15 Boczek, above n 10, at 837. 
16 Peter J Beck “Preparatory Meetings for the Antarctic Treaty 1958-59” (1985) 22(141) Polar Record 653 at 663. 
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The International Geophysical Year (“the IGY”) spanned from July 1957 to December 1958, 
and was an integral reason for the Antarctic Treaty’s negotiation and ultimate success. The 
IGY was a “programme of global cooperation”17, covering a number of endeavours to measure 
the physical nature and forces of the earth.18 The science of the IGY is outside of the scope of 
this chapter.19 The United States and Soviet permanent Antarctic stations were established 
during the IGY, officially bringing the superpowers into the continent.20 From a legal and 
political perspective, the IGY successfully put a hold on political tensions in the Antarctica for 
its duration.  
 
This was done by way of a “gentleman’s agreement” between the states who were involved in 
the scientific endeavours. It was not a written agreement;21 Ambassador Paul Daniels described 
it as the relevant governments “[reaching] a sort of gentleman’s agreement not to engage in 
legal or political argumentation during [the IGY], in order that the scientific program might 
proceed without impediment.”22 The gentleman’s agreement was a broader, less formal 
continuation of the 1948 Escudero Declaration put forth by Chile, which “advocated at least a 
five-year moratorium on the Antarctic sovereignty dispute”23 in order for effective scientific 
research to take place. The IGY was a chance to see this Declaration work in practice.24 The 
main aspect of the gentleman’s agreement – the moratorium on territorial disputes – became 
the cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty.  
                                               
17 F M Auburn Antarctic Law and Politics (C. Hurst & Company, London, 1982) at 87. 
18 J Wartnaby The International Geophysical Year (H.M.S.O, London, 1957) at 1.  
19 For more information on the results of the IGY, see generally, Auburn, above n 17, at 84–93; Wartnaby, above 
n 18; Roger D Launius, David H DeVorkin, and James Roger Fleming Globalizing Polar Science: Reconsidering 
the International Polar and Geophysical Years (Palgrave Macmillan, eBook ed, 2010); Walter Sullivan The 
International Geophysical Year (1959) 1 International Conciliation 521. 
20 Auburn, above n 17, at 90. 
21 At 90.  
22 Paul C Daniels “The Antarctic Treaty” (1970) 26(1) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 11 at 12. 
23 Deborah Shapley The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age (Resources for the Future, Inc., USA, 
1985) at 89. 
24 At 89. 
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The IGY fostered scientific cooperation and openness between states. Vasili Kuznetsov, Soviet 
delegate to the Antarctic Conference, noted that “exceptionally warm relations have 
developed” between states in Antarctica, and asserted that because of this cooperation, 
“mankind has learned more about Antarctica in the last three or four years than in all the 130 
years since the day of its discovery,”25 a claim which, when set against the success of the IGY, 
appears true.   
 
4. Chapter overview 
 
In this chapter, I will consider how each of the three tensions (peace and security, mutual 
distrust, and resources) came through in the Antarctic Treaty. To do this, in each subsection I 
will briefly discuss the existence of the tension before the Treaty was concluded, before 
examining particular articles which express the tension. I will go on to look at how the tension 
was expressed in the Antarctic Treaty as a whole, before coming to a preliminary conclusion. 
Finally, I will evaluate the findings from each chapter and bring them together in a final 
discussion in both the chapter and thesis conclusion.  
 
  
                                               
25 Vasili Kuznetsov “The Conference on Antarctica” (Washington, October 15–December 1, 1959) at 23. 
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The Antarctic Treaty established Antarctica as a nuclear-free, demilitarised continent in a 
decade where East-West rivalries were at an all-time high. While the text of the Treaty indicates 
that the primary concern was to ensure continued freedom of scientific investigation,26 the 
provisions also touch on a deeper concern of the spread of the Cold War onto the continent.27 
The Antarctic Treaty also created a framework for dealing with territorial claims in art IV,28 
which is widely regarded as the cornerstone of the Treaty – the article which led states to agree 
to be bound in the first place. The demilitarisation provisions of the Antarctic Treaty are of 
particular interest when considering the wider global context; test ban and arms control talks 
between states were taking place around the time of the Antarctic Treaty’s negotiation. 
 
In this subsection, I will examine how articles I, IV and V clearly express the peace and security 
tension. I will then go on to consider other articles of interest, particularly the dispute resolution 
clauses, before analysing how this tension came through in the Antarctic Treaty as a whole. 
Finally, I will come to some preliminary conclusions which will be developed in the chapter 
conclusion.  
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
                                               
26 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, preamble and art II. 
27 The demilitarisation articles also tie in with the ‘mutual distrust’ tension; however, I will consider them under 
this heading as weapons control is one of the primary concerns of peace and security issues.  
28 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IV.   
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Prior to the IGY and the Antarctic Treaty, there had been great superpower conflict in the 
Arctic. While the Arctic held more strategic relevance than Antarctica given its geographical 
closeness to the superpowers, there were still fears that if the United States and the Soviet 
Union both involved themselves in the Antarctic, the same or similar rivalries would travel 
south with them.29 Francisco Vicuna noted that before the Treaty, “[t]he tensions and 
difficulties of the cold war began to express themselves in Antarctica just as they became 
evident in the Arctic region,”30 and described the relationship between the superpowers in 
Antarctica as “sensitive.”31  
 
With no regulations in place regarding nuclear or military activities before the Treaty,32 it is 
easy to see this particular tension being present in Antarctica before the Treaty. The nuclear 
arms race had accelerated rapidly following the Soviet Union’s first successful nuclear bomb 
test in 1949. Hanevold explains that the Soviet Union was making “mammoth detonations” in 
the Arctic, and the United States had used Christmas Island as a testing site;33 there were 
rumours that the United States was looking to Antarctica as a possible site for further testing.34    
The states involved in Antarctica during the IGY saw a deep need to establish Antarctica as a 
zone of peace so as to ensure scientific exploration in the area.35 Southern hemisphere states in 
particular expressed great concern about nuclear weapons in Antarctica, particularly regarding 
                                               
29 Peter J Beck “Antarctica as a Zone of Peace: A Strategic Irrelevance?” in R A Herr, H R Hall, and M G Haward 
(eds) Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or Change?, (Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia, 1990) 
at 200. 
30 Francisco Orrego Vicuna “Antarctic Conflict and International Cooperation” in National Research Council 
(U.S.) Polar Research Board (ed) Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at 
Beardmore, South Field Camp, Antarctica, January 7-13, 1985, (National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1986) 
55 at 59. 
31 At 60. 
32 At 60. 
33 Truls Hanevold “Inspections in Antarctica,” (1971) 6(1) Cooperation and Conflict 103 at 104. 
34 At 104. 
35 This can be seen in the Gentleman’s Agreement discussed in the introduction to this chapter, where political 
divisions were temporarily put aside in order for scientific exploration to flourish, and the continuation of that 
agreement in art IV of the Treaty.  
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nuclear fallout.36 These events and concerned created a “policy priority to prevent Antarctica 
from becoming the test center of the world”.37  
 
Nuclear weapons aside, there were general security concerns about Antarctica as a whole. 
There were a number of states active in the area, and the superpowers had both established 
permanent bases in the area. States had abided by the gentleman’s agreement during the IGY, 
but there was no guarantee of this continuing. The situation regarding territorial claims was 
unstable at best, and if those conflicts flared up again, there could be serious military 
repercussions. Finding a solution for this issue was imperative for continuing the IGY spirit of 
scientific cooperation as well as the temporary peace brought about by the IGY.  
 
3. Articles I and V: demilitarisation and denuclearisation  
 
Article I of the Antarctic Treaty declares that Antarctica is to be used for peaceful purposes 
only, and that “any measures of a military nature” are prohibited on the continent.38 This 
provision was established early on in negotiations, with a Press Release on 20 October 1959 
declaring that all states were in agreement on this principle.39 Article V builds on art I, by 
explicitly prohibiting nuclear explosions and the disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica.40 The 
justification for these demilitarisation and arms control provisions can be found in the Preamble 
of the Treaty: they were included in order to ensure scientific investigation in Antarctica could 
be conducted freely, following the success of the International Geophysical Year.41  
 
                                               
36 Hanevold, above n 33, at 104. 
37 At 104. 
38 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art I(1). 
39 “Conference on Antarctica” (press release, 20 October 1959).  
40 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art V(1). 
41 Preamble. 
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Almond explains that the Antarctic Treaty, through these articles, expresses the common 
interest of the superpowers of “deterring or preventing any war that might lead to the use of 
[nuclear] weapons”.42 This interest was shared by all of the original parties to the Treaty – and, 
indeed, globally. In 1960, Geneva played host to disarmament meetings which were focused 
on nuclear weapons.43 Both superpowers were parties to these meetings, but it has been noted 
that “expectations of agreement [were] low”.44 The Soviets argued for complete disarmament, 
which the United States would not entertain until the Soviets would agree to a system of 
ensuring state compliance with any agreement45 - a system like the open inspection provisions 
in the Antarctic Treaty, for example. The parties to the meetings were in deadlock.46 The failure 
of these meetings is in sharp contrast to the Treaty, where both superpowers agreed to 
provisions in Antarctica which they were ultimately opposed to in a different arena.  
 
It could be argued that both the United States and the Soviet Union saw Antarctica as irrelevant 
or unimportant enough that they were willing to accept provisions they would otherwise 
oppose; however, this does not fall in line with the superpowers’ marked interest in Antarctica 
and heavy involvement in Antarctic Treaty negotiations. The more likely answer is that both 
powers were committed to ensuring stability and peace on the continent. The fact that the 
superpowers agreed to these provisions indicated to the global community that future 
demilitarisation and arms control negotiations may not meet the same fate as those prior to the 
Antarctic Treaty.47 The efforts of the other original signatories should also not be undermined. 
Moore noted that “the claimant nations in the southern hemisphere unanimously opposed any 
                                               
42 Harry H Almond Jr “Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica” (1985) 17 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L.  229 at 
280. 
43 John King “The Spirit of Geneva and Disarmament” (2007) 26(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 226 at 226. 
44 Joseph L Nogee “Propaganda and Negotiation: The Case of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee” (1963) 
7(3) The Journal of Conflict Resolution 510 at 513. 
45 At 513. 
46 At 511. 
47 Jason Kendall Moore “Particular Generalisation: The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 in Relation to the Anti-Nuclear 
Movement” (2008) 44 Polar Record 115 at 121. 
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nuclear testing whatsoever”,48 a stance which is entirely unsurprising since those states would 
be at real risk of nuclear fallout with their proximity to Antarctica.  
 
In 1960, the Antarctic Treaty was one of a kind with regards to arms control. No other treaty 
had declared such a large area free from nuclear weapons or any military measures. Article V 
contains the first nuclear test ban in history. In addition to their primary goal of ensuring 
freedom of scientific investigation, the demilitarisation provisions were instrumental in 
keeping the Cold War from spreading into Antarctica.49  
 
4. Article IV: sovereignty and territorial claims  
 
The most pressing issue facing the states parties to the Antarctic Treaty was the issue of 
territorial sovereignty. Claims overlapped; the United States and Soviet Union refused to 
recognise any claims but reserved the right to make their own;50 the claimant states refused to 
recognise each other’s overlapping claims.51 How could an agreement be reached when it was 
clear that there could be no consensus on the issue?  
 
The answer came in the form of article IV,52 considered to be the cornerstone of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Article IV states that by agreeing to the provisions of the Treaty, states parties were not 
renouncing any of their previous claims,53 nor were they renouncing any basis of claim.54 The 
                                               
48 At 121. 
49 Essential to these provisions are the inspection rights under art VII, which will be discussed in the mutual 
distrust subsection. 
50 Christy Collis “Critical Legal Geographies of Possession: Antarctica and the International Geophysical Year 
1957-1958” (2010) 75(4) GeoJournal: New Directions in Critical Geopolitics 387 at 391.  
51 At 393.  
52 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IV. The claimant States in Antarctica are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, 
New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. The United States and the Soviet Union have “reserved the right” 
to make a claim. 
53 Article IV(1)(a), which applies to the claimant states.  
54 Article IV(1)(b), which relates to the United States and the Soviet Union. 
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Treaty’s provisions could not be taken as “prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as 
regards its recognition or nonrecognition of any other State’s right of or claim or basis of claim 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica”.55 Finally, art IV(2) of the Treaty establishes that any 
activities taking place during the Treaty’s duration could not be taken as constituting “a basis 
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim.”56 No new claims or alterations to existing claims 
can be made while the Treaty is in force.57 These provisions have thrown the continent into an 
odd state of permanent limbo, where territorial claims are legitimate but cannot be enforced.  
It appears that these provisions were drafted in order to preserve the status quo of Antarctica. 
It would have been impossible to effectively negotiate a treaty which explicitly accepts or 
denies territorial sovereignty, particularly given the overlapping claims. It was clear, however, 
following the IGY that some sort of framework needed to be put into place to ensure stability 
in Antarctica. 
 
As I explore in the mutual distrust subsection, the American expedition had planned to leave 
Antarctica after the end of the IGY, but stayed because of the Soviets’ continued presence on 
the continent.58 While the gentlemen’s agreement had been successful, it ended with the IGY, 
and it was agreed that “an agreement to prevent political conflict must be on a more permanent 
basis, and should be binding on governments.”59  
 
Keith Suter makes an important note regarding this article: it avoided “embarrassing political 
divisions over the claims since all the claimants are … identified with [the United States].”60 
In addition to making the Treaty possible in the first place, art IV managed to avoid what would 
                                               
55 Article IV(1)(c). 
56 Article IV(2). 
57 Article IV(2). 
58 This is discussed below.  
59 Beck “Preparatory Meetings for the Antarctic Treaty”, above n 16, at 660. 
60 Keith Suter Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage? (Pluto Press Australia, Australia 1991) at 21. 
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otherwise be inevitable “intra-alliance tensions”61 between the claimant states. With the Cold 
War a running constant in the background of international relations at this time, it was 
important for Western states to maintain friendly relationships with each other wherever 
possible. 
 
Reaching an agreement on territorial sovereignty was integral to the existence of the Antarctic 
Treaty. It was a necessity for the negotiating parties to reach an agreement on this matter so 
that they could continue forward in establishing a legal framework for Antarctica. The success 
of the negotiating parties in settling this problem, at least temporarily, meant that significant 
provisions like the ban on nuclear weapons,62 the ban on military activities except for scientific 
purposes,63 and the dedication of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only64 could not have come 
into being.  
 
The tension of peace and security can be found twofold in art IV. By maintaining the status 
quo, it both avoided conflict between states over territory, and allowed the negotiating parties 
to ensure Antarctica would remain a continent of peace. 
 
5. Article XI: Dispute resolution 
 
The Antarctic Treaty includes a dispute resolution clause.65 If there is a dispute between any 
Contracting Parties about the interpretation or application of the Treaty, those Parties “shall 
consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own 
                                               
61 At 21. 
62 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art V. 
63 Article I. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Article XI.  
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choice.”66 Should this prove unsuccessful, provided all parties involve consent, the dispute will 
be referred to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).67 If one or more parties does not agree 
to the referral to the ICJ, then they must endeavour to reach settlement through the methods 
provided for under art XI(1).68  
 
Aside from art XI, there is the possibility of bringing up points of contention in the ATCMs,69 
one of the purposes of which is to adopt measures furthering the use of Antarctica for peaceful 
purposes.70  
 
Article XI is soft, and it is easy to see how it would be difficult for a conflict to be resolved if 
the parties are steadfast in their dispute, or if another party becomes involved in the dispute.71 
There is no possibility of applying sanctions against another Party if there is a dispute; Auburn 
argues that the only “sanction” of art XI is “at best … psychological in the form of pressure 
from the possible adverse opinion from other States.”72 There is “not a shred of compulsory 
jurisdiction.”73 It is likely that art XI was deliberately drafted to be weak so that the original 
parties to the Treaty were more likely to ratify it. 
 




                                               
66 Article XI(1). 
67 Article XI(2). 
68 Article XI(1). 
69 Article IX. 
70 Article IX(1)(a). 
71 For an example of how the dispute resolution could quickly become complex regarding interpretation of art IV, 
see Auburn, above n 17, at 139 where he dubs art XI to be “the worst solution imaginable”.  
72 At 139.  
73 Robert D Hayton “The Antarctic Settlement of 1959” (1960) 54(2) AJIL 348 at 363. 
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The peace and security tension can also be witnessed in the Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty, 
in which states parties recognised “that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica … 
shall not become the scene or object of international discord.”74 The Antarctic Treaty had two 
interconnected main purposes: to preserve Antarctica as a continent of peace, and to facilitate 
scientific cooperation in the area. This part of the preamble clearly expresses a dedication to 
the former purpose, and is a nod to the conflict which had existed in Antarctica prior to the 
IGY. 
 
(b) Open inspections 
 
 
I have already covered the inspection provisions in another part of this chapter, as they hold 
more relevance there. However, it is worth noting that art VII provides no remedy if an 
inspection reveals that a state is breaching the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, making it 
unclear what would happen in this situation.75 To aid in keeping the peace, the Treaty has made 
it so that all states in Antarctica are “equally defenceless,” and Hanevold argues that inspections 
“have helped to create the feeling of safety which is a prerequisite to [peace in Antarctica].”76 
The lack of measures provided for under the Treaty for dealing with a breach, however, is 
concerning from a peace and security standpoint. While it is true that art VII has been highly 
important in maintaining peace in the continent, it can only do so while all states continue to 
comply with the provisions of the Treaty. 
 
7. Concluding notes  
 
                                               
74 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, preamble. 
75 Hanevold, above n 33, at 111. 
76 At 113. 
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Simply owing to geography, Antarctica did not hold the same level of possible strategic use 
for the superpowers as other areas,77 such as the Arctic. This may explain why the superpowers 
managed to agree to the establishment of Antarctica as a nuclear-free zone. However, as Jeffrey 
Myhre notes:78 
At the height of the Cold War, the Treaty bound the United States and Soviet Union 
to demilitarisation of the entire continent, to ban nuclear testing in the region, and 
to allow on-site inspection of their respective facilities. 
 
As both superpowers became more involved in Antarctica after the Second World War, 
concerns over Cold War rivalries spreading to the continent increased.79 When looking at the 
Antarctic Treaty as a whole, it is easy to find the tension of peace and security. The Treaty 
emphasises the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only, and it was written with this 
primary goal in mind. The concerns of southern hemisphere states about nuclear fallout, as well 
as the general fear of the tenuous Soviet-American relationship moving south, helped to further 
entrench the principle of peaceful purposes in the Treaty. This principle is often discussed in 
relation to the second key aim of the Treaty, which was to facilitate freedom of scientific 
investigation. This aim is certainly highly important, but when viewing the Treaty and Treaty 
negotiations in a wider Cold War context, the peaceful purposes principle is a reflection of 
world-wide security concerns of the time.  
 
Regarding specific articles, arts I and V are obvious examples of the peace and security tension 
manifesting itself in the Treaty. However, art IV represents the tension most clearly. It is the 
Treaty’s greatest success, and made the Treaty possible in the first place. Not only did it help 
to ease tensions – at least temporarily – by claimant states,80 the United States and the Soviet 
                                               
77 Emilio Sahurie The International Law of Antarctica (New Haven Press, Netherlands, 1992) at 95. 
78 Jeffrey D Myhre The Antarctic Treaty System: Politics, Law, and Diplomacy (Westview Press, United States, 
1986) at 23. 
79 Beck, “Antarctica as a Zone of Peace: A Strategic Irrelevance?”, above n 29, at 200. 
80 Notably, between Argentina and Chile.  
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Union managed to bar one another from making a territorial claim in Antarctica by denying it 
to themselves. Given that both superpowers have “reserved the right” to make a claim, and 
were both heavily involved in Antarctica during the IGY, giving up the possibility of making 
a claim for at least 30 years81 was a concession for both of them. Both states knew there was a 
need to ensure stability in Antarctica – both between each other and with the other states – and 
a moratorium on claims was the solution palatable to everyone.  
 
Article IV lays out strict obligations on states regarding territorial claims. By contrast, the 
dispute resolution procedure to deal with a breach of the Treaty provisions (territorial or 
otherwise) is soft, and contains little in the way of conferring actual duties on states. It is 
possible that these provisions were drafted to be soft to make it more likely that states would 
agree to them. It is difficult to imagine, for example, the Soviet Union agreeing to an article 
which gives the United States the right to issue sanctions against it if it breached the Treaty. I 
will discuss these provisions further in the chapter conclusion. 
 
  
                                               
81 See discussion of the withdrawal and termination provisions in the mutual distrust subsection. 
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Out of the three tensions, mutual distrust is the most abstract. It is the deepest tension, and was 
in the background of every interaction between the superpowers during the Cold War period. 
As such, there is a great overlap between this tension and the others, particularly peace and 
security. It is worth being examined as a separate tension, however; in relation to the Antarctic 
Treaty, it expressed itself in places where peace and security was not so dominant. 
 
In this subsection I will cover some of the pre-Treaty issues facing states active in the Antarctic. 
I will then move on to analyse the open inspections provisions found in art VII, which is the 
clearest expression of this tension in the Antarctic Treaty. Following this, I will consider other 
articles of note and the Antarctic Treaty as a whole, before finally developing a preliminary 
conclusion.  
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
In 1957, Australia expressed concern about Soviet activity in Antarctica.82 At this time, there 
was no limitation on weapons being tested or placed in Antarctica; this left the possibility of 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) being stored in a place where they could 
reach Australia. As a Western capitalist state and being friendly with United States, this seemed 
a real risk to Australia. Furthering Australia’s concern was the fact that the Soviet stations 
during the IGY were in “what Australia regards as part of its Capital Territory.”83 The 
                                               
82 “Russian Base in Antarctic: Australian Concern” Times (England, February 7, 1957) at 7. 
83 Walter Sullivan “Antarctica in a Two-Power World” (1957) 36(1) Foreign Affairs 154 at 154. 
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Australians were not the only ones concerned; many Southern Hemisphere states, including 
New Zealand, were apprehensive about ICBMs and other powerful weapons being in such 
close proximity to them.84  
 
The Soviets’ presence in the continent was an instrumental reason for the United States to push 
for treaty negotiations to take place.85 As the IGY drew to a close, the United States State 
Department declared “the American Expedition will withdraw from Antarctica at the end of 
the IGY … or shortly afterwards …”86 Clearly, this did not occur, and one of the key reasons 
for the United States maintaining a presence in the continent is attributable to the fact that the 
Soviets had decided to stay.87 Additionally, the Soviets had barred any international agreement 
being made about Antarctica which did not involve them.  
 
The divide between the Soviets and the other states active in the Antarctic became immediately 
apparent in the preparatory meetings for the Treaty.88 In an act of ‘intransigence’ according to 
the other states, the Soviet delegate dissented on what the preparatory meetings and 
negotiations should cover.89 In his article outlining the preparatory meetings, Peter J Beck 
claims that the form of this dissent “suggested that the Soviet government had characteristic 
reservations and suspicions about the United States government’s original intentions in calling 
the conference.”90 This is not an unreasonable claim for Beck to make. Despite the late 50s 
experiencing a slight lull in Cold War tensions,91 the superpowers were far from allies. It 
                                               
84 Hanevold, above n 33, at 104. 
85 Auburn, above n 17, at 89. 
86 L F E Goldie “International Relations in Antarctica” (1958) 30(1) The Australian Quarterly 7 at 23. 
87 Hayton, above n 73, at 353. 
88 These took place from 2 May 1958 until October 1959.  
89 Beck, “Preparatory Meetings for the Antarctic Treaty”, above n 16, at 656. 
90 At 655. 
91 At 663.  
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would, perhaps, be sensible for the Soviet delegation to have its reservations about United 
States intentions.  
 
In September 1958, James Mooney92 stated that the Soviet delegation had shown “minus” 
compatibility with the other delegations; he was not alone in this, with “several delegations 
[appearing] to share this critical view.”93 Luckily for the fate of the conference, the Soviets had 
a “transformation in attitude” in April 1959 which “proved decisive in clearing the way for the 
conference.”94 Mutual distrust had, however, made itself known during the IGY and in the 
build up to treaty negotiations.  
 
3. Article VII: open inspections and openness of activities 
 
During negotiations, a great concern of many of the delegates was whether the superpowers 
could be trusted to abide by the demilitarisation and denuclearisation provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty.95 As such, the inspection procedures were initially discussed with regard to 
the proposed demilitarisation articles.96 The delegates eventually moved away from this,97 but 
the implication is clear: the use of inspections would be a useful tool in ensuring states – 
particularly the superpowers, who were engaged in a major rivalry at the time – were keeping 
with their obligations under the Antarctic Treaty. The United States insisted on unilateral 
inspection powers over international inspections;98 it also went as far to say that if there were 
no inspection provisions, “there would be no treaty”.99  
                                               
92 Mooney was the Deputy United States Antarctic Projects Officer from 1957-1966. 
93 Beck, “Preparatory Meetings for the Antarctic Treaty”, above n 16, at 663. 
94 At 663. 
95 Moore, above n 47, at 120.  
96 Peter Beck The International Politics of Antarctica (Croom Helm, Great Britain, 1986) at 73. 
97 At 73. 
98 United States Senate The Antarctic Treaty: hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations (86th Congress, 
Washington, 1960) at 69. 
99 Hanevold, above n 33, at 105. 
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Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides: 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of 
the present treaty, each [Consultative Party] shall have the right to designate 
observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. …  
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of 
Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within 
those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes 
or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers 
designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.  
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of 
Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 
…  
The article is remarkable in that it was the first instance in which the Soviet Union agreed to 
aerial inspection by treaty,100 something for which the United States Government had been 
pushing in regards to arms control and test ban negotiations in Geneva.101 Further, Hanevold 
explains that observers “felt that a treaty in which both superpowers accepted … inspections 
would have … effects on the international atmosphere at the time and on the Geneva talks”.102  
                                               
100 C Economides “Le statut international de l’antarctique resultant du traite du 1 decembre 1959” (1962) Revue 
Hellenique de droit International 76 at 82. 
101 United States Senate, above n 98, at 38.  
102 Hanevold, above n 33, at 105. 
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Under article VII, each Consultative Party can designate observers to carry out an inspection,103 
and those observers have “complete freedom of access” to Antarctica.104 All areas of Antarctica 
are open to inspection at any time;105 this includes inspection by aerial observation.106  
 
Article VII gives each contracting party the right to undertake inspections of other parties’ 
property and stations. The article is broad, and provides few limits as to what observers are 
able to inspect – but it is not completely unlimited.107 When signing the Antarctic Treaty, 
President Eisenhower declared that “[t]his Treaty guarantees that a large area of the world will 
be used only for peaceful purposes, assured by a system of inspection.”108 Given the purpose 
of art VII is to ensure the Treaty is being followed by the states parties, it is sensible that the 
inspection powers are so broad. Article IX(1)(d) provides that the facilitation and exercise of 
inspection rights are a topic which should be discussed in the ATCMs.109 
 
New Zealand carried out the first inspection in the 1962-1963 Antarctic summer, visiting 
United States stations and the Byrd Surface Camp.110 The United States undertook its first 
inspection season the following year. When the United States conducted inspections, it 
alternated which states’ stations and vessels to visit – with the exception of the Soviet Union, 
whose stations it consistently inspected.111 Between 1964 and 1983, the United States visited 
                                               
103 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, article VII(1). 
104 Article VII(2). 
105 Article VII(3). 
106 Article VII(4). 
107 For an explanation of the limitations of the inspection provisions, see Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics, 
above n 17, at 111–12. 
108 Dwight D Eisenhower “Statement by the President Concerning the Antarctic Treaty” (press release, December 
1 1959).  
109 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, article IX(1)(d). 
110 “Inspections Database” Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (2011) 
<https://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_governance_listinspections.aspx>. 
111 Ibid.  
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Soviet stations 12 times, meaning they visited the Soviet stations most frequently; second was 
Argentina with 9 visits.112  
 
Inspections still take place in the present day, with the most recent being undertaken by Norway 
in the 2017-2018 Antarctic summer period.113 It could be argued that article VII is merely a 
way to ensure the cooperative spirit of the IGY continues. While that was surely an aspect, the 
true reason behind this article ties into the tension of mutual distrust. It has been seen that 
original discussions around the inspection provisions took place in the context of finding a way 
to ensure states – particularly the superpowers – abided by the denuclearisation and 
demilitarisation provisions.  
 
The open inspections provisions came to be in large part because of mutual distrust, and this 
tension has had continued presence through the implementation of art VII. For example, 
Hanevold suggests that the timing of the first United States inspection season is relevant in 
terms of the “wider international relationship” of the time – specifically, the fact that it occurred 
not long after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis.114 This is sensible, and a strong 
argument when considering the Antarctic Treaty in the Cold War context. The Crisis involved 
Soviet nuclear weapons being secretly placed in close proximity to United States territory, and 
so an inspection of Soviet stations would fulfil the purpose of assuaging United States fears of 
secret weapons storage in Antarctica.  
 
                                               
112 Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, above n 96, at 75.  
113 Norway Summary of findings and reflections on trends from the Inspections undertaken by Norway under 
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Environmental Protocol (WP 26, XLI Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting, 2018).  
114 Hanevold, above n 33, at 105. I have discussed the Cuban Missile Crisis in the introduction of my thesis.  
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To compliment the open inspections regime, art VII(5) provides that each contracting party 
must give other parties advance notice of:115 
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and 
all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory; 
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into 
Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the 
treaty. 
 
This provision helps to solidify the principle of openness of activity in Antarctica, and ties into 
the tension of mutual distrust. Not only are States Parties open to inspection, there is a positive 
obligation to share information with the other States Parties about their planned and ongoing 
activities in Antarctica. As with the inspection process, art VII(5) reflects a concern of the 
negotiating States: that transparency of activities and operations between States Parties was 
essential in ensuring all complied with the other provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. The result 
of art VII as a whole is a robust system of inspection and openness of information, which 
solidifies the intent of the States Parties to reserve Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.   
 
4. Article XII: withdrawal and termination provisions 
 
The circumstances in which a Contracting Party can withdraw from the Antarctic Treaty are 
outlined in art XII.116 The Antarctic Treaty can be modified at any time by unanimous 
agreement of the Consultative Parties.117 The modification or amendment enters into force 
when the depositary Government118 has received notice from all of these Contracting Parties 
                                               
115 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art VII(5). 
116 Article XII. 
117 Article XII(1)(a). 
118 The United States, per art XIII(3). 
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that they have ratified it.119 It will enter into force for the other Contracting Parties when they 
give notice to the depositary Government,120 and the same two year date applies to them.121  
 
After 30 years of the Antarctic Treaty being in force, any Consultative Party is able to request 
a review of the Treaty by all Consultative Parties, by way of a Conference.122 Majority approval 
by Consultative Parties is necessary for a modification of the Treaty to occur.123 Again, 
Contracting Parties have two years to ratify this modification or amendment.124 If one or more 
Contracting Parties do not ratify the change within two years, this opens up the possibility for 
any other Contracting Party to give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty.125 The withdrawal 
takes effect two years after this notice.126  
 
One of the main concerns leading to the formation of the Antarctic Treaty was preserving the 
status quo regarding territory. Article XII(2)(a) protected the status quo for at least 30 years 
from the date the Treaty came into force, except by unanimous agreement.127 The United States 
Government did note, however, that if the Soviets breached the provisions of the Treaty it 
would have the right to withdraw.128    
 
5. Other articles  
 
(a) Articles I and V: demilitarisation and denuclearisation  
 
                                               
119 Article XII(1)(a). 
120 Article XII(1)(b). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Article XII(2)(a). 
123 Article XII(2)(b). 
124 Article XII(2)(c). 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid.  
127 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art XII(2)(a). 
128 United States Senate, above n 98, at 42. 
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This tension also comes through in the demilitarisation and denuclearisation provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty,129 as a large aspect of distrust arose from fears about weapons and the 
potential of a ‘hot war’. These discussions are better dealt with under peace and security, and 
as such I will not consider them in detail in this subsection. These articles play into one of the 
reasons for the open inspection provisions – as I have discussed, open inspections were 
originally discussed in conjunction with demilitarisation during the preparatory meetings to the 
Treaty.  
 
(b) Article IV: sovereignty and territorial claims 
 
 
I discussed article IV of the Treaty130 in the peace and security subsection, as that is where it 
is most relevant, but it merits a mention here. It is arguable that art IV aided in easing this 
tension in Antarctica, since neither superpower would need to be concerned about the other 
making a territorial claim while the Treaty was still in force.  
 
(c) Article X: obligation to abide by the purposes of the Treaty 
 
 
The Antarctic Treaty places an obligation on states parties to “exert appropriate efforts … to 
the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes 
of the present Treaty.”131 It is one of the few instances where the Antarctic Treaty confers a 
positive obligation. This article shows the tension of mutual distrust by ensuring that the 
superpowers comply with the Treaty, but it also indicates a wider determination of all the states 
parties to establish Antarctica as an area of peace. 
 
                                               
129 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, arts I and V. 
130 Article IV. 
131 Article X. 
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6. Concluding notes 
 
The most insidious of the tensions, mutual distrust could – and likely did – make itself known 
in a majority of the Antarctic Treaty provisions. In this subsection I isolated the articles which 
appear to express the tension most clearly for the purposes of my exploration, with a focus on 
the open inspections provisions.   
 
Article VII is often overshadowed by art IV, but it should not be underestimated. The addition 
of this article was made easier by the fact that the states would not be agreeing to open 
inspections on their own territory, but it is nonetheless an undeniable success that both the 
United States and Soviet Union agreed to be bound by a treaty with open inspection provisions.  
I also discussed the use of art VII since the Antarctic Treaty was concluded. Open inspections 
continue to take place regularly. As I discuss in the final chapter of this thesis, inspections have 
uncovered breaches of environmental protocols; however, to date inspections have not 
uncovered any Antarctic Treaty breach. Overall, art VII helped to keep states honest about their 
activities in Antarctica regardless of other conflicts which existed at the time.  
 
The withdrawal provisions appear to aim to avoid an easy exit for states who no longer wish 
to be bound, which is why I consider them to be an example of mutual distrust in action. Neither 
superpower could withdraw from the Antarctic Treaty until 30 years had passed; while the 
United States stated it could still do so if a breach occurred, this has not happened.  
 
Mutual distrust is certainly present in the Antarctic Treaty, but it appears that the Treaty has 
taken steps to mitigate this distrust, such as through the use of art VII. This falls in line with 
the overarching goal of the Antarctic Treaty: establishing peace and peaceful relations on the 
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continent. By including provisions which require states to remain honest with one another, the 










At first glance, it appears as though the tension of resources is absent from the Antarctic Treaty. 
Aside from a brief mention of living resources in art IX, there is no mention of resources. Upon 
further inspection, however, it is clear the tension is present through its explicit omission from 
the Treaty.  
 
This was not a simple oversight. Firstly, in 1959 the possibility of mineral resource extraction 
appeared to be a difficult task with contemporary technology. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the question of how to deal with resources under the Treaty could not be answered 
without first solving even tougher questions about sovereignty and territory.  
 
In this subsection, I will consider why resources may have been omitted from the Antarctic 
Treaty. Following this, I will discuss some of the main issues this omission raises. I will focus 
largely on mineral resources, as they are the main source of tension today. Tourism and 
bioprospecting also merit a mention. On the whole, however, living resources are the subject 
of successful conventions which form part of the Antarctic Treaty System. In the chapter 
conclusion, I will use this information in my analysis of the Antarctic Treaty as a whole. 
 
This subsection will focus largely on mineral resources, as they remain a key source of tension 
today. In this subsection, I will consider why resources may have been omitted from the 
Antarctic Treaty. Following this, I will briefly consider current regimes for living resources, 
before going on to examine the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (“the Minerals Convention”) and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
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Antarctic Treaty (“Madrid Protocol”). In the chapter conclusion, I will use this information in 
my analysis of the Antarctic Treaty as a whole.  
 
2. Before the Treaty  
 
One aspect to be considered is that, at the time the Antarctic Treaty was being negotiated, the 
possibility of effectively extracting mineral resources from Antarctica seemed a difficult – or 
impossible – concept. While explorer Richard E. Byrd entranced the American public with 
promises of a “future bonanza of Antarctic resources,”132 the reality turned out to be far more 
complex. 
 
Mineral resources were not given serious attention by the Consultative Parties until the sixth 
ATCM, which took place in Tokyo in 1970. Resource exploitation in Antarctica would need 
to be highly specialised. James Zumberge wrote that the practical problems facing resource 
exploitation were “the meagre geophysical and geological data base, the technological 
problems, the extreme environmental hazards, and the long distances from civilization.”133 
This, Zumberge argues, made the concept of further exploration “economically 
unattractive.”134 
 
Writing in 1983, Vicuna noted that “The fact that evidence of the presence of minerals may 
have been found does not necessarily mean that exploitation would be feasible.”135 He goes on 
                                               
132 James Spiller Frontiers for the American Century: Outer Space, Antarctica, and Cold War Nationalism 
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University Press, Great Britain, 1983) at 6. 
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to explain that there is a “significant technological gap” regarding Antarctic resource 
exploitation.136 Given that Vicuna has identified the technological limitations as late as 1983, 
it is clear that adequate technology had not yet been developed during the IGY or when the 
Treaty was negotiated. As such, it is sensible to consider the physical obstacles, lack of 
knowledge of Antarctica’s resource potential, and a subsequent lack of interest led to the 
omission of resources from the Treaty.  
 
3. Article IV: sovereignty and territorial claims  
 
The above argument, however, cannot satisfactorily explain why resources were omitted from 
the Antarctic Treaty. As a comparison, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (“the Moon Treaty”)137 makes explicit reference to 
resource exploration, exploitation and allocation.138 These articles were included despite the 
fact that States Parties had no way of extracting resources from the moon or other celestial 
bodies. These provisions were drafted in anticipation of the day when such activities became 
possible.139 If such a consensus could be reached regarding the moon, why is there not a similar 
provision in the Antarctic Treaty?   
 
The crux of the issue lies in art IV of the Antarctic Treaty. I have discussed this article in detail 
in the “Peace and Security” subsection of this chapter. Article IV, the article which made 
conclusion of the Treaty possible in the first place, is the key reason that resource management 
was omitted. Exploitation, especially of mineral resources, is inextricably linked with territory. 
The Moon Treaty declared that “the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
                                               
136 At 6.  
137 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (signed December 18 
1979, entered into force 11 July 1984).  
138 Article 11.  
139 Preamble. 
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of mankind”,140 meaning, among other things, they cannot be subjected to any claim of 
sovereignty.141 As I have already explored, the situation in Antarctica is far more complex – 
and far more delicate.  
 
The question of mineral resources in particular is difficult to resolve without first establishing 
a definitive answer to the problem of territory and sovereignty. Without such answers, which 
states are entitled to extract minerals from Antarctica, and where are they allowed to carry out 
such activities? Attempts at mineral resource management have been made, which I will 
consider in part V, but none have satisfactorily answered the question.  
 
4. Current regimes for resource management in Antarctica  
 
Since the Antarctic Treaty was concluded, there has been considerable success in implementing 
resource management agreements within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System. These 
agreements largely concern the protection and conservation of such resources, as opposed to 
exploitation.  
 
The Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora were successfully 
negotiated and established in 1964, only a few short years from the Treaty entering into 
force.142 The Agreed Measures have since been superseded by the Madrid Protocol, which 
makes provisions for the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora.143 
 
                                               
140 Article 11(1). 
141 For a comprehensive overview of this concept, see Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2009, online ed) Common Heritage of Mankind.  
142 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (ATCM III-VIII, Brussels, 1964). 
143 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 
January 1998).  
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The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (“CCAS”) concerns the capturing and 
killing of Antarctic seals, and strictly regulates the activities of states in this area.144 The 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (“CCAMLR”) 
establishes rules regarding the exploitation of these resources, for the purposes of ensuring 
their conservation.145  
 
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty establishes the ATCMs, and contains the only reference to 
resources in the Treaty.146 Both the CCAS and CCAMLR help to further the goal of 
“preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.”147  
 
Living resources are largely removed from the question of territory, and therefore the ATCPs 
have had more success in their regulation. However, there is still no adequate management 
scheme for mineral resources. In part V, I will consider the attempts which have been made to 
solve the issue, and the current protocol on mineral resources. 
 
5. The Minerals Convention and Madrid Protocol 
 
Keith Suter noted that “there has been growing international interest in the exploration and 
exploitation of … resources of Antarctica. … But the Treaty makes no provision for this 
situation.”148 As technology continues to rapidly advance, and as states start to look to 
alternative sources of important resources, it is concerning that the Antarctic Treaty System 
still has no viable method of regulating resource extraction in the Antarctic. 
                                               
144 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (signed 1 June 1972, entered into force 11 March 1978).  
145 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (opened for signature 1 August 1980, 
entered into force 1 April 1982).  
146 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IX(1)(f). This provision only relates to living resources. 
147 Ibid 
148 Suter, above n 60, at 24. 
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(a) Minerals Convention 
 
 
Attempts have been made to resolve this issue. One of the most promising attempts was the 
Minerals Convention.149 This Convention aimed to regulate Antarctic mineral resource activity 
so that “Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall 
not become the scene or object of international discord.”150   
 
Beeby noted that the Minerals Convention filled a “potentially very disruptive gap” in the 
Antarctic Treaty.151 However, the Convention never came into force. It could not do so until 
all ACTP states deposited “instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession”.152 
In June 1989, Australia and France announced that they would not sign nor ratify the 
Convention, aborting its progress.153 The Minerals Convention aimed to ban mineral resource 
activities outside of the Convention,154 and would have put in place particular measures to 
ensure that mineral exploitation did not cause too much harm to the Antarctic environment,155 
and to carry out further research on the topic before concluding whether or not mineral resource 
activities were “acceptable”.156  
 
(b) Madrid Protocol 
 
                                               
149 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (opened for signature 2 June 1988, not 
in force).  
150 Article 2(1). 
151 Christopher Beeby, “The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and Its 
Future,” in R A Herr, H R Hall, and M G Haward (eds) Antarctica’s Future: Continuity or Change?, (Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, Australia, 1990), 57. 
152 Minerals Convention, above n 149, art 23.  
153 Davor Vidas The Antarctic Treaty system and the law of the sea: a new dimension introduced by the 1991 
Madrid Protocol (Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway, 1993) at 12. For insight into Australia’s reasons for not 
ratifying the Minerals Convention, see S. K. N. Blay and B. M. Tsamenyi “Australia and the Convention for the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)” (1990) 26(158) Polar Record 195 at 198. 
154 Minerals Convention, above n 149, art 3. 
155 Article 4. 
156 Article 2(1)(b). 
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The Minerals Convention was superseded by the Madrid Protocol.157 The Madrid Protocol 
explicitly prohibits “any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific 
research”.158 However, art 25(5)(a) provides that:  
The prohibition on Antarctic mineral resource activities contained therein shall 
continue unless there is in force a binding legal regime on Antarctic mineral 
resource activities that includes an agreed means for determining whether, and, if 
so, under which conditions, any such activities would be acceptable. 
 
Article 25(5)(a) makes reference to art IV of the Antarctic Treaty, stating that any regime 
regarding minerals must “fully safeguard the interests of all States referred to in Article IV of 
the Antarctic Treaty.”159 This leaves us in essentially the same position as before the Protocol: 
how can resource exploitation be managed in a way which respects the interests of the claimant 
States Parties, as well as providing for States with no claims to territory?  
 
The Madrid Protocol has accomplished temporary peace regarding mineral resource activities 
through this moratorium, much like art IV of the Antarctic Treaty regarding sovereignty. By 
leaving open the possibility of a future minerals regime, however, it has not settled the matter.  
 
6. Tourism and bioprospecting  
 
While this section focuses on mineral resources, there are other forms of resources which were 
not adequately dealt with under the Antarctic Treaty. The first is tourism. Tourism is a resource 
issue in two ways: firstly, it is profitable; and secondly, it has the potential to harm the Antarctic 
environment. The Antarctic tourism industry is growing: 44,000 Antarctic tourists were 
estimated for the 2016/2017 season, with an estimated 12,400 tourists “expected to be involved 
                                               
157 Madrid Protocol, above n 143.  
158 Article 7.  
159 Minerals Convention, above n 149, art 25(5)(a).  
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in site landings.”160 Beck notes that Antarctic tourism adds into the “concern for conservation 
in general and the protection of the allegedly fragile and pristine polar environment in 
particular.”161 The implementation of the Madrid Protocol provides some guidance, as it 
applies to tourism activities.162 However, a comprehensive regulatory framework for Antarctic 
tourism has not yet been established. 
 
The second issue is biological prospecting (“bioprospecting”). Bioprospecting “involves the 
search for, and examination of, diverse biological resources … for commercially valuable 
biochemical and genetic resources.”163 Bioprospecting is prevalent in Antarctica – many 
patents have already been taken out on Antarctic substances.164 Although there has been 
“considerable discussion” between the Antarctic Treaty States Parties on the topic, there has 
not yet been a consensus about what sort of legal framework could, or should, apply to these 
activities.165 
 
7. Concluding notes 
 
It is difficult to see a solution to this problem without first addressing the issue of sovereignty. 
During the negotiation stage of the Antarctic Treaty, it would have been impossible for a hard-
line stance on resources to be established given that all states agreed to skirt around the issue 
of territory. This again links back to the other tensions I have discussed. A delicate balance 
                                               
160 Zach Butters, Anna Cox, Peggy Cunningham-Hales and Nicolette Marks “Tourism in Antarctica: Exploring 
the future challenges of regulating the Deep South” (Syndicate Report, University of Canterbury, 2017) at 3. 
161 Peter J Beck “Managing Antarctic Tourism: A Front-Burner Issue” (1994) 21(2) Annals of Tourism Research 
374 at 375.  
162 Madrid Protocol, above n 143, arts 3(4), 8(2) and 15(1).  
163 Bernard P Herber “Bioprospecting in Antarctica: the search for a policy regime” (2006) 42(221) Polar Record 
139 at 139.  
164 Morten Walløe Tvedt “Patent law and bioprospecting in Antarctica” (2011) 47(240) Polar Record 46 at 48.  
165 D W H Walton “Losing control – the future management of bioprospecting in the Antarctic Treaty area” (2017) 
29(5) Antarctic Science 395 at 395.  
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needed to be struck between each state’s interests in order for the Treaty to come into being, 
and resources seemed to be an easy sacrifice to make.  
 
Now, however, the situation is far different, as can be seen by the multiple attempts post-Treaty 
to regulate resources. Particularly concerning is the status of mineral resources. A legal 
framework has been developed regarding living resources, and both the CCAMLR and CCAS 
form part of the Antarctic Treaty System; as I have explored, however, the status of mineral 
resources is not as steady. The extraction of mineral resources is currently prohibited under the 
Madrid Protocol, but this is not a permanent ban. Mineral resources are also clearly a source 
of contention between the Consultative Parties, as evidenced by Australia and France’s 
rejection of the Minerals Convention. There is also the issue of non-Consultative Parties and 








In this chapter, I examined how the three chosen tensions – peace and security, mutual distrust, 
and resources – came through in the Antarctic Treaty. I found that all tensions were present in 
one way or another. Peace and security and resources are both present in art IV of the Treaty; 
it was a major concern of the negotiating states to at least temporarily resolve the problem of 
territory, so much so that resources were unable to be dealt with in the original Treaty. Territory 
and resources remain two of the biggest threats to the Treaty. 
 
In this final section, I will briefly look at the status of the Antarctic Treaty today. I will go on 
to make a preliminary analysis of the Treaty as a whole, taking into account all of the tensions. 
Finally, I will use what I have discovered to see whether the Antarctic Treaty can “survive” in 
a post-Cold War world. The findings in this conclusion will be expanded upon in the final 
chapter of my thesis, where I analyse in more detail the threats facing the treaty today, and the 
treaty’s ability to respond to those threats.  
 
2. The Antarctic Treaty in the present day  
 
The Antarctic Treaty is still in force today, with a total of 53 parties, 29 of which are 
Consultative Parties. ATCMs are held annually, and the latest took place in Argentina in May 
2018.166 There appears to be a continuing commitment by the original signatories, as well as 
states which have arrived later in the game, to ensure the principles of the Treaty are upheld. 
                                               
166 Final Report of the Forty-first Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM XLI, Buenos Aires, 2018). 
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The Conventions and Protocol which form part of the wider Antarctic Treaty System are 
environmental in nature,167 and it appears that the Consultative Parties consider environmental 
protection to be of utmost priority in discussions about the continent.  
 
The Antarctic Treaty System has undergone great development in recent years. In 2003, the 
Consultative Parties passed a measure to institute a Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty.168 Its 
purpose is to assist the ATCM and the Committee for Environmental Protection169 in 
performing their functions.170 
 
3. A closer look at the Treaty as a whole 
 
The Antarctic Treaty is relatively sparse when it comes to institutions. The ATCMs provide 
some structure to the development of the Antarctic Treaty System,171 but there is no permanent 
body in place to deal with the governance of Antarctica. The open inspections process provides 
a good framework for verifying compliance, but again, these are conducted by representatives 
of States Parties themselves – there is no general inspectorate.  
 
The Antarctic Treaty was aspirational; it does not contain a complete, workable framework for 
governing Antarctica. It does, however, set up mechanisms for states to further develop a 
framework. As I discussed above, the law of Antarctica has certainly developed since 1959 
with the introduction of new laws supplementary to the Treaty. It was formed out of a perceived 
necessity to have something put in place to deal with increased activity in the continent, and it 
                                               
167 These are the Madrid Protocol, the CCAS and the CCAMLR, which I discussed briefly in the resources 
subsection of this chapter. They are otherwise outside of the scope of my research.  
168 Measure 1 (2003): Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty (ATCM XXVI, Madrid, 2003).  
169 Established by Madrid Protocol, above n 143, art II.  
170 Measure 1, above n 168, art II(1). 
171 The ATCM is set up under art IX of the Antarctic Treaty.  
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was required to make concessions in some areas in order for states to agree to be bound by its 
terms.  
 
Connected to this is the fact that aside from the ATCM, there is little by way of enforcement 
techniques in the Antarctic Treaty. The main method of ensuring compliance with the Treaty 
is the open inspections regime, which I examined in the ‘mutual distrust’ subsection. Knowing 
that at any time another state could elect to exercise its rights under art VII would likely make 
a state hesitate if it were contemplating breaching the Treaty in some way.  
 
I mentioned in the ‘peace and security’ subsection that the dispute resolution provisions of the 
Treaty are weak, and do not include any real deterrent if a state breaches the Treaty. This adds 
to the perception of the Treaty as a “sparse” treaty: full of ideas about how things should be 
done in Antarctica, but with a barebones approach to actually enforcing these ideas.  
 
4. Problems facing the Treaty today 
 
One of the biggest problems facing the Antarctic Treaty is the issue of territory, which only 
becomes more relevant when connected with increasing interest in Antarctic resources. It is 
unlikely that the status quo which has been upheld for the past 60 years will be able to continue 
indefinitely: at some stage, a different approach will need to be taken to the question of 
territory. 
 
Connected to territory is resources. As I outlined in the resources subsection, this is one of the 
most pressing issues facing the Treaty today. The Madrid Protocol’s prohibition on mineral 
resource activities is not permanent, and allows the possibility of the ATCM putting a regime 
into place to deal with mineral resource management. Resources have been seen to have a 
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divisive effect on the ATCM, however. It is difficult to see a solution which does not also deal 
with sovereignty issues, especially as new players make themselves known in Antarctica.   
 
5. Can the Treaty survive in a post-Cold War world?  
 
The Antarctic Treaty is not in immediate danger. However, its influence is not as strong as it 
once was. For example, in a 2017 article, Jacob A. Reed predicts the end of the Antarctic Treaty 
System.172 He indicates three ways that this could happen: armed conflict,173 competing 
territorial claims,174 and “economic activities and regulatory incongruence”.175 I have not 
discussed the possibility of armed conflict ending the Treaty, as it is always a possibility in 
international relations that disputes between states will escalate in this way – it is not specific 
to the Antarctic Treaty. The other two possibilities – territory and resources – have been the 
subject of extensive discussion in this chapter, and Reed is right in saying that these are two of 
the key stressors facing the Antarctic Treaty. It is impossible to look into the future, but it is 
highly likely that any threat to the Treaty will come by way of interest in Antarctic resources 
increasing to the extent that states will no longer be willing to accept the Treaty and the Madrid 
Protocol. As an example, China, which acceded to the Treaty in 1983 and achieved consultative 
states in 1985,176 was in 2010 expressing “an increasing dissatisfaction with the current order” 
about the management of Antarctica and its resources.177  
 
                                               
172 Jacob A. Reed “Cold War Treaties in a New World: The Inevitable End of the Outer Space and Antarctic 
Treaty Systems” (2017) 42 Air & Space Law 463. He also discusses the Outer Space Treaty, which is the subject 
of my final case study. I will consider this article in more depth in the final chapter of this thesis.  
173 At 482. 
174 At 483. 
175 At 484. 
176 Wei-chin Lee “China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near” (1990) 30(6) Asian Survey 576 at 576. 
177 Anne-Marie Brady “China’s Rise in Antarctica?” (2010) 50(4) Asian Survey 759 at 773. 
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While the Antarctic Treaty’s influence may have diminished since the 1960s, its reach should 
still not be understated. New States Parties to the Treaty still comply with the Treaty, and States 
with active Antarctic scientific programmes still work towards the goal of Consultative Party 
status. The Antarctic Treaty, as a whole, remains recognisable as the cornerstone of the 
Antarctic Treaty System. Weight should also be given to the Treaty for the fact that it aided in 









1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the Non-Proliferation Treaty”) 
opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and came into force in 1970.1 The Treaty differentiates 
between nuclear-weapon States (“NWS”) and non-nuclear-weapon states (“non-NWS”). NWS 
are defined under the Treaty as states which have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon 
or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967;2 the five NWS under the Treaty are 
the UK, United States, France, the Soviet Union and China.3    
 
The Treaty rests on three “pillars”, which originate from a 1953 address by former United 
States President Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”), known as 
the “Atoms for Peace” speech.4 The first is the prevention of the spread of atomic weapons 
(non-proliferation); the second, research into the peaceful applications of atomic energy 
(peaceful uses); and the third, reduction of the world’s existing atomic stockpiles 
(disarmament).5 It is these pillars which form the purpose of the Treaty.  
 
                                               
1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 1 July 1968, entered into force 5 
March 1970).  
2 Article IX(3).  
3 When the Treaty came into force, there were only three NWS parties to the Treaty – the United Kingdom, United 
States and the Soviet Union. China and France both acceded to the Treaty in 1992.  
4 Dwight D Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace” (December 8, 1953), United Nations General Assembly 
5 Ibid.  
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2. Before the Treaty 
 
(a) The International Atomic Energy Agency  
 
 
In his “Atoms for Peace” speech at the UNGA, Eisenhower proposed that there be an 
international atomic energy agency. The purpose of the agency would be to encourage the 
“three pillars” I discussed above – non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses.6 
Following Eisenhower’s speech, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) was 
established in 1957, after its Statute came into force.7 While this was far from the first attempt 
to mitigate the dangers of nuclear weapons,8 the IAEA is integral in discussion of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  
 
(b) The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
 
 
The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (“ENDC”) was established by the United 
Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) in 1961,9 after the United States and Soviet Union 
submitted a “Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations”.10 In the 
Joint Statement, the United States and Soviet Union “[called] upon other States to co-operate 
in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world”, in 
accordance with the principles they set out in the Joint Statement.11 The two superpowers were 
co-chairmen to the Committee.12 The ENDC met periodically, and was asked by the UNGA 
                                               
6 Ibid. 
7 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (approved 23 October 1956, entered into force 29 July 1957). 
8 See for example the Baruch Plan, discussed in the resources subsection of this chapter.  
9 Question of Disarmament GA Res 1722(XVI) (1961). The members of the ENDC were Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Soviet 
Union, the United Arab Republic, United Kingdom and the United States.  
10 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations UN Doc A/4879 (20 September 1961). 
11 At 3.  
12 P Terrence Hopmann “Bargaining in Arms Control Negotiations: The Seabeds Denuclearization Treaty” (1974) 
28(3) International Organisation 313 at 324. 
 64 
“to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”.13 A 
draft of the Treaty was produced to the UNGA by the ENDC in June 1968,14 and was opened 
for signature in July 1968.  
 
3. Chapter overview 
 
In this chapter, I will consider how each of the three tensions (peace and security, mutual 
distrust, and resources) came through in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To do this, in each 
subsection I will briefly discuss the existence of the tension before the Treaty was concluded, 
before examining particular articles which express the tension. I will go on to look at how the 
tension was expressed in the Treaty as a whole, before coming to a preliminary conclusion. 
Finally, I will evaluate the findings from each chapter and bring them together in a final 
discussion in my chapter conclusion.  
 
  
                                               
13 Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons GA res 2028(XX) (1965).  
14 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons GA res 2372(XXII) (1968). The final Treaty was in large 
part a collaborative effort between the Soviet Union and the United States, with the superpowers submitting 
identical final Treaty drafts.  
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B. Peace and Security 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Given the context of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race, it is clear that peace and security 
is the strongest tension found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While it overlaps with mutual 
distrust, the peace and security implications of an unfettered nuclear arms race could easily 
become disastrous. As I outlined in the chapter introduction, the Treaty was a result of multiple 
concerted efforts to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons and negotiate a nuclear arms control 
agreement. While the United States and the Soviet Union were – at least on the face of it – in 
agreement as to non-proliferation,15 neither were willing to make any concessions as to the 
production and control of their own nuclear weapons. The nuclear arms race also had serious 
implications for other states, regardless of their alignment with either superpower. After 
witnessing what happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world became aware of the 
catastrophic potential of nuclear weapons – and if a nuclear war broke out between the 
superpowers, it is likely that multiple states would be caught in the fallout.   
 
The Treaty, while preserving the right of NWS to continue with their nuclear weapons 
programmes, made important steps towards nuclear arms control. In this subsection I will 
briefly consider the arms race context which preceded the Treaty, before moving on to articles 
I and II, which relate to non-proliferation. I will then discuss article VI, which sets out an 
obligation on the States Parties to negotiate disarmament measures. Following this, I will 
consider the conference provisions of the Treaty; I will then look at any other articles of note 
before developing a preliminary conclusion. 
                                               
15 The obvious exception being nuclear sharing agreements, which I discuss below.  
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2. Before the Treaty 
 
The nuclear arms race was arguably the most pressing peace and security concern of the Cold 
War. After the Soviet Union successfully exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949,16 the 
possibility of a nuclear war breaking out between the superpowers became a real threat. There 
was a general fear that the proxy wars being undertaken by the two States would eventually 
turn into direct conflict, with devastating results.  
 
In the years preceding the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Europe had been effectively “divided” 
between the two superpowers; this was demonstrated by two multilateral Treaties – the North 
Atlantic Treaty17 and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (“the 
Warsaw Pact”).18 The purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent organisation, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”) was collective security against the Soviet 
Union.19 The Warsaw Pact was created as an Eastern European counterpart to NATO, in 
retaliation of West Germany becoming a member of NATO.20 This division played a role in 
the negotiation of the Treaty, particularly regarding East and West Germany.  
 
                                               
16 Lester Machta “Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test in 1949” (1992) 73(11) Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society 1787 at 1798. 
17 North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949). The original parties to the North Atlantic Treaty were Belgium, Britain, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States.  
18 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (14 May 1955). The original parties to the Warsaw 
Pact were the Soviet Union and seven of its satellite states: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania.  
19 Lawrence S. Kaplan The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years (Praeger Press, USA, 1999) 29. 
20 At 63. 
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E L M Burns explains that “Russia’s goal throughout [Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations] 
was designed primarily to prevent West Germany from becoming a nuclear power”.21 This goal 
was shared by the United States: Brands describes a potential nuclear West Germany as “a 
nightmare scenario” which would “severely upset the balance of power in Europe, and … shake 
the foundations upon which NATO rested”.22  
 
3. Articles I and II: non-proliferation  
 
Articles I and II contain the crux of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article I provides that each 
NWS agrees not to transfer any nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
these weapons or devices to any recipient; further, each NWS will not “assist, encourage, or 
induce” non-NWS to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices, or 
control over these weapons or devices.23 Article II is the complementary provision to art I, 
outlining non-NWS’s obligation not to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons, nuclear explosive devices, or control over these weapons or devices.24 As with art 
III(2) of the Treaty, which I discuss in the mutual distrust subsection, art I appears to apply to 
all non-NWS, irrespective of whether those States are States Parties to the Treaty.   
 
Prior to the Treaty, the United States had established nuclear sharing arrangements with the 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”): in the 1960s, around 7,000 
nuclear warheads were employed in a number of European states.25 After the Treaty came into 
                                               
21 E L M Burns “The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects” (1969) 24(4) International 
Organization 788 at 791. 
22 Hal Brands “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty” (2007) 7 Cold War History 389 at 392. 
23 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art I. 
24 Article II. 
25 Hans M. Kristensen U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and 
War Planning (Natural Resources Defence Council, 2015) at 24. 
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force, the number of nuclear warheads in Europe reached its peak – with about 7,300 nuclear 
warheads deployed in 1971.26 At first glance, this appears to be a clear deviance from the 
Treaty, where the United States and its allies bound itself to the terms of arts I and II. However, 
the negotiating history of the Treaty indicates nuclear sharing arrangements, by not being 
expressly prohibited by the Treaty, are permitted to continue.  
 
Superpower attitudes towards nuclear sharing dominated much of the early negotiations 
between the United States and Soviet Union regarding the Treaty.27 A 1965 Soviet draft treaty 
appeared to provide for a ban on nuclear sharing agreements.28 This was rejected by the United 
States, which “made it clear that no treaty was possible if the Soviets intended to change [the 
nuclear sharing arrangements]”.29 In a 1968 Congressional Hearing, concerns about the effect 
of the proposed Treaty on NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements were allayed by Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk’s explanation of articles I and II:30  
The Treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. … It does 
not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied 
territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over 
them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty 
would no longer be controlling. 
 
This interpretation came after lengthy debates with the Soviet Union, which pushed for a ban 
on nuclear sharing arrangements, but eventually conceded to United States’ pressure on the 
                                               
26 At 24. 
27 Brands, above n 22, at 390. 
28 Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Twentieth Session: Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons UN Doc A/5976 (24 September 1965) annex I. The relevant part of the proposed article I of 
this draft treaty reads: The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or 
over their emplacement and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear 
weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.  
29 George Bunn “Horizontal Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” in Bennett Boskey and Mason Willrich (eds) 
Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control, (Dunellen Publishing Company Inc, USA, 1970) at 32. 
30 United States Senate Nonproliferation Treaty Hearings (90th congress, Washington, 1968) at 5-6. 
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matter.31 The interpretation was further reiterated by President Johnson while submitting the 
Treaty to the Senate for ratification.32  
 
It appears at least somewhat contradictory that such arrangements could continue under a 
regime such as the Treaty, which was concerned with non-proliferation as a matter of 
paramount importance.33 However, it is understandable in the context of the time; relations 
between eastern and western Europe were strained at best, and were generally unpredictable. 
The Treaty did not compel any NWS to relinquish their nuclear weapons, meaning the non-
NWS western European States remained vulnerable to the Soviet Union’s growing nuclear 
arsenal. Articles I and II, both through what is prohibited and what is left unsaid, protected said 
States from the potential future danger caused by proliferation, while still protecting them from 
the immediate threat of the Soviet Union.  
 
While the existing nuclear sharing arrangements appear to have been protected, the Soviet 
Union did succeed in halting the United States’ plans for a Multi-Lateral Force (“MLF”) in 
Europe. Plans for the MLF included sea and land based missiles, as well as potential nuclear 
weapons, to be held in Europe under NATO’s control,34 effectively making NATO a “fourth 
nuclear power”.35 In the mid-1960s, the United States and Soviet Union came to a “private 
understanding” that plans for the MLF would be dropped, leading to a period of greater 
cooperation between the superpowers in negotiating the Treaty.36 
 
                                               
31 Daniel Khalessi “Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty” (2015) 22(3-4) The Nonproliferation Review 421 at 432. 
32 United States Senate Military implications of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons hearings 
(91st Congress, Washington, 1969) at 11-12. 
33 See Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, preamble and arts I and II. 
34 See generally J W Boulton “NATO and the MLF” (1972) 7(3-4) Journal of Contemporary History 275. 
35 At 278. 
36 Brands, above n 22, at 408. 
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4. Article VI: disarmament obligations  
 
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides:37 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control. 
 
(a) Scope of the obligation 
 
Under art VI, the obligation to pursue disarmament negotiations is on every State Party. The 
negotiation of the Treaty shows that this article was originally intended to only apply to the 
NWS.38 Shaker explains that there are three key reasons for this: the first is that the United 
States and the Soviet Union had both admitted that undertaking negotiations towards nuclear 
disarmament was their “primary responsibility”.39 Secondly, the non-NWS also viewed this 
obligation as the responsibility of NWS.40 Finally, giving the NWS such a responsibility can 
be considered “as a quid pro quo for the [non-NWS’s] renunciation of nuclear weapons”.41  
 
However, imposing the obligation on all States Parties – NWS and non-NWS alike – was a far 
more sensible option. David Fischer, in arguing against the common interpretation of art VI as 
a ‘bargain’ between NWS and non-NWS, correctly notes that “stopping the spread of nuclear 
weapons serves the security interests of all parties”.42 Further, in a 1996 Advisory Opinion, the 
International Court of Justice expressed that “any realistic search for general and complete 
                                               
37 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art VI. 
38 Mohamed I. Shaker The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, (Oceana 
Publications Inc., USA, 1980) vol II at 563. 
39 At 564. 
40 At 564. 
41 At 564. The exception to this renunciation are nuclear sharing agreements, which I discuss under the “Articles 
I and II” subheading of this subsection.  
42 David Fischer Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects (Routledge, USA 1992) 
at 16. 
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disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co-operation of all States”.43 
These arguments have merit, and work well together: all States are affected by the security 
implications of the spread of nuclear weapons, and co-operation between all States can be 
considered a necessary prerequisite of bringing “complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control”.  
 
(b) Interpretation  
 
A plain reading of this article suggests that it imposes an obligation on the States Parties to the 
Treaty to both pursue negotiations regarding the cessation of the nuclear arms race and a treaty 
on general and complete disarmament. However, Joyner explains that the “legal meaning and 
implications” of the article have “[remained] a constant source of debate between [NWS] and 
[non-NWS]”.44 Joyner outlines how NWS, relying on the drafting history and later 
clarifications, have been hesitant to consider art VI a binding legal obligation to conclude an 
agreement on disarmament; non-NWS on the whole have had no such qualms.45 This 
disagreement has not yet been entirely resolved; however, following a request from the 
UNGA,46 the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in a 1996 Advisory Opinion unanimously 
held:47 
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and 
effective international control. 
 
                                               
43 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 2 at 264.  
44 Daniel H. Joyner “The Legal Meaning and Implications of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” in Gro 
Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen, and Annie Golden Bersagel (eds) Nuclear Weapons Under International Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2014) at 397. 
45 See generally ibid, particularly at 397 – 404. An in-depth discussion of these interpretations are outside of the 
scope of my chapter; it is nevertheless important for my research to note the disparity in interpretation and 
approaches to art VI.  
46 General and Complete Disarmament GA Res 49/75 (1994). 
47 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), above n 43, at 267.  
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The ICJ described the obligation as “twofold”: States Parties had an obligation both to enter 
into negotiations, but to conclude these negotiations.48 The 2010 Treaty Review Conference 
noted the Advisory Opinion, but did not elaborate on it.49 The “correct” approach to art VI 
remains uncertain, particularly as an obligation to bring negotiations to a conclusion does not 
necessarily raise an obligation to conclude a treaty.  
 
(c) Article VI as custom? 
 
 
The Marshall Islands recently put forward the argument that art VI of the Treaty is an obligation 
as a matter of customary international law. In applications to the International Court of Justice 
in 2014, the Marshall Islands alleged that the United Kingdom, Pakistan and India were not 
fulfilling their obligations under art VI of the Treaty.50 While neither Pakistan nor India are 
parties to the Treaty, the Marshall Islands further alleged that the obligation under art VI applies 
to all States as a matter of custom.51 In support of this argument, reference is made to the 1996 
Advisory Opinion, specifically the unanimous finding of an obligation as quoted above.52 It 
appears that this was interpreted by the Marshall Islands as a finding of an obligation on all 
States, regardless of whether they were a party to the Treaty. Whether this is the correct 
interpretation of the 1996 Advisory Opinion, and whether art VI is a matter of custom was not 
considered by the ICJ; it held that the cases could not proceed due to jurisdiction issues.53 
                                               
48 At 264. 
49 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NPT/CONF.2010/50 vol I at [88].  
50 Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament 
(Marshall Islands v. Pakistan) (Application instituting proceedings) [2014] ICJ Rep 159; Obligations concerning 
negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India) 
(Application instituting proceedings) [2014] ICJ Rep 158; Obligations concerning negotiations relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) 
(Application instituting proceedings) [2014] ICJ Rep 160.  
51 Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament 
(Marshall Islands v. India) (Application instituting proceedings) at 6. 
52 At 6.  
53 Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament 
(Marshall Islands v. Pakistan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2016] ICJ Rep 552; Obligations concerning 
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However, it is worth noting the potential of art VI having some form of extra-Treaty legal force, 





Article VI clearly shows the tension of peace and security: attempting to find a way to halt the 
nuclear arms race was a concern of all States, including the United States and the Soviet Union. 
While complete disarmament has clearly not occurred, in the decades since the Treaty was 
concluded, a number of negotiations have been undertaken by NWS to decrease their nuclear 
arsenals.55 Nevertheless, the 2010 Treaty Review Conference noted “with concern” that the 
number of nuclear weapons in the world remained in the thousands, and “[expressed] its deep 
concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons 
could be used …”56 If the twofold interpretation is employed, the obligation in art VI remains 
unfulfilled as of 2018.  
 
5. Article VIII: conference and review 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty provides for two review conferences: the first was to take place 
five years after the Treaty entered into force, and the second 25 years after the Treaty entered 
into force. The purpose of the five year review conference was to “review the operation of [the] 
                                               
negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India) 
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2016] ICJ Rep 255; Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) (Preliminary 
Objections) [2016] ICJ Rep 833. The ICJ found that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter on the basis that 
it could not be established that the Marshall Islands had a dispute with the other States. Article 36(2) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice provides that there must be a dispute between States in order for it to have 
jurisdiction over the matter.  
54 I expand on this point in the chapter conclusion.  
55 For a comprehensive summary of such negotiations and agreements, alongside tables of NWS’s nuclear forces 
(as of 2015), see Jorge Morales Pedraza “How Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Understand Nuclear Disarmament” (2017) 17 Public Organization Review 211. 
56 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, above n 49. 
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Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the 
Treaty are being realised”.57 Following this conference, the Treaty provides that “at interviews 
of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties … may obtain … the convening of further 
conferences with the same objective”.58 The initial conference took place in Geneva in 1975,59 
and Review Conferences have since taken place at five year intervals.  
 
(a) Five-year Review Conferences 
 
 
The Review Conferences have had mixed success. The States Parties often cannot agree on a 
final document for the Conference, meaning no general consensus can be demonstrated 
regarding the operation of the Treaty. As an example, the latest Review Conference took place 
in 2015; no substantive final document was issued.60 By contrast, the 2010 Review Conference 
produced a comprehensive final document which highlighted the Treaty’s strengths and 
faults.61 The production of a final document is not an obligation under the Treaty,62 but such a 
document is a helpful way to analyse the continued operation of the Treaty. Its absence can be 
concerning, indicating a lack of agreement on the adequacy of the Treaty’s operations.  
 
Despite the difficulties in reaching an agreement, the Review Conferences remain an important 
aspect of the Treaty, particularly from a peace and security view. Regular Conferences ensure 
the Treaty is not neglected, and that its operations can be regularly assessed. Even if no 
consensus is reached, great consideration is still given to the Treaty at these Conferences.  
                                               
57 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art VIII(3). 
58 Ibid. 
59 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NPT/CONF/35. 
60 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NPT/CONF.2015/50 Part I at [29].  
61 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, above n 49. 
62 Jozef Goldblat “Analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its implementation” in Jozef Goldblat (ed) Non-
proliferation: The why and the wherefore (Taylor & Francis Group, Great Britain, 1985) at 17. 
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(b) Twenty-five year review conference 
 
 
The latter conference was to be convened to “decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force 
indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods”.63 This conference 
took place in 1995.64 While the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was unable to come 
up with a consensus on a final document reviewing the operation of the Treaty, it was 
nevertheless decided that the Treaty should continue indefinitely.65 
 
6. Other articles  
 
(a) Article VII: right to conclude regional treaties 
 
 
Article VII merits a mention as an important part of peace and security for non-NWS States 
Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It provides that the Treaty does not affect the right of a 
group of States to “conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear 
weapons in their respective territories”.66 States Parties have certainly utilised this: for 
example, such a treaty is currently in force in New Zealand. The South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty entered into force in 1986, prohibiting nuclear weapons in the area.67  
 
(b) Article III: the safeguards regime 
 
 
                                               
63 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art X(2). 
64 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons NPT/CONF.1995/32. 
65 At Part 3 at 13.  
66 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art VII.  
67 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (signed 6 August 1985, entered into force 11 December 1986).  
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While I believe the negotiation and implementation of safeguards are more characteristic of 
mutual distrust, they are certainly also a peace and security concern. Article III of the Treaty 
was an immensely important step in ensuring non-NWS fulfilled their obligations of not 
obtaining nuclear weapons in any way. The spread of nuclear weapons has serious implications 
for a nation’s security; safeguards have become at least one measure to attempt to protect states 
from others becoming nuclear powers. Although safeguards have been thoroughly criticised – 
as I have mentioned, and will discuss further in the chapter conclusion – they have arguably 
experienced more success than failure.  
 
(c) Article X: withdrawal  
 
 
As with safeguards, the withdrawal provisions fit well in the mutual distrust subsection of this 
chapter (and will be discussed there), but the peace and security implications are clear. 
Becoming eligible to withdraw if a State Party’s national security is under threat seems logical 
for an arms control agreement; ensuring a State is able to protect itself from a threat is 
paramount. 
 
7. Concluding notes 
 
Two of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty can be linked directly to peace and 
security: non-proliferation and disarmament. It is therefore unsurprising that peace and security 
is the dominant tension expressed in the Treaty. This tension can arguably be found in any of 
the articles in the Treaty, but I have isolated those which I feel express the tension most fully: 
articles I and II, the disarmament obligations, and the conference and review provisions.  
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Through the ambiguous wording of arts I and II, the United States and Soviet Union managed 
to come to a compromise about NATO’s nuclear sharing agreements – though the United 
States’ plan for the MLF became a casualty of the negotiations. Ensuring balance in a bipolar 
Europe, and particularly ensuring West Germany did not become a nuclear power, was a 
constant thread in negotiations. Conference and review provisions ensured the Treaty and the 
obligations within it were not neglected. Finally, the United States and Soviet Union bound 
themselves to pursuing a cessation of the nuclear arms race and agreements for total 
disarmament. These obligations have not been fulfilled, but as I will note in the chapter 
conclusion, the Treaty was followed by many arms control negotiations and agreements 
between the superpowers.  
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C. Mutual Distrust 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As I explained in the last chapter, mutual distrust is the deepest, most abstract tension. I have 
identified particular articles which express this tension, but there is still some overlap between 
mutual distrust and the other tensions. Mutual distrust regarding nuclear weapons was a key 
tension in the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1949, far earlier than the United States had 
predicted. It did this in secret – strangely, the Soviets did not publicise their incredible feat until 
after United States planes detected nuclear activity in the area.68 This can be seen as indicative 
of the high levels of secrecy around nuclear weapons – though both superpowers were aware 
the other had them, the exact number could only ever be estimated; there remained an element 
of the unknown. This helped fuel mutual distrust in that neither superpower was fully aware of 
the other’s capabilities, and given the severity of nuclear weapons, they could not afford to 
underestimate their opponent.  
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was one of the landmark agreements which was intended, at least 
in part, to allow for more open communication regarding nuclear weapons. In this subsection 
I will cover some of the issues between states regarding nuclear weapons. I will then move on 
to analyse the safeguards provisions in art III, as well as the amendment and withdrawal 
provisions of the Treaty. Following this, I will consider other articles of note, before finally 
developing a preliminary conclusion.  
                                               
68 Lester Machta, above n 16, at 1798. 
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2. Before the Treaty 
 
Holloway notes that the “role of nuclear weapons [in the deterioration of relations between the 
Soviet Union and the Western powers after World War II] was subtle but important”.69 The 
Soviet Union was concerned that the atomic bomb could be used by the United States to exert 
pressure, especially as tensions grew about the then-divided Germany.70 The Soviet Union’s 
demonstration that it could successfully manufacture and explode nuclear weapons added a 
new, dangerous level to the distrust between the superpowers. The Cuban Missile Crisis, which 
I discussed in the ‘background’ chapter to this thesis, provides a pertinent example. Not only 
were the Soviets acting in secret, they had done so in a way which posed a serious threat to the 
United States given Cuba’s proximity. With both superpowers becoming nuclear powers, the 
potential consequences of the distrust turned far more severe. 
 
That being said, despite their disagreements and often outright animosity, both superpowers 
engaged in multiple disarmament conversations with each other and with other States. They 
did this through committees such as the ENDC and the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee71 
which preceded the ENDC. The tension of mutual distrust can be found in this Treaty, but it 
may have been a contributing factor to the superpowers’ cooperation on this matter. The 
nuclear arms race was dangerous and expensive. The concept of “mutually assured destruction” 
had entered into United States-Soviet relations following the Cuban Missile Crisis; there was 
                                               
69 David Holloway, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962,” in The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010) 376 at 379. 
70 At 379. 
71 Joseph L Nogee “Propaganda and Negotiation: The Case of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee” (1963) 
7(3) Journal of Conflict Resolution 510 at 511. 
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a growing understanding that if a hot war started, there could be no winners.72 This, paired with 
a lack of trust between the superpowers, seems to lead to an understandable desire for 
cooperation in drafting a Treaty which could help ease tensions.  
 
3. Article III: the safeguards regime   
 
Article III contains the methods of verifying compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It 
outlines the obligation of non-NWS to negotiate and conclude safeguard agreements with the 
IAEA,73 integrating one of the IAEA’s powers into the Non-Proliferation Treaty.74 These 
safeguards must be designed to comply with art IV of the Treaty,75 which relates to the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy.76 Such agreements can be made either by individual States, or together 
with other States.77 Further, art III(2) provides for an obligation for all States Parties to not 
“provide … source or special fissionable material, or … equipment designed or prepared for 
the processing, use or production of special fissionable material” to any non-NWS for peaceful 
purposes unless such material or equipment is subject to a safeguard agreement.78 The wording 
of art III(2) suggests that it applies to all non-NWS, not only States Parties – for example, art 
II of the Treaty specifies “non-nuclear-weapon State Party”, but the same is not said in art 
III(2). It appears as though art III(2) is essentially reaching beyond the States Parties, and 
applying rules to every non-NWS, regardless of whether they are a party to the Treaty or not.  
 
                                               
72 Thérèse Delpech Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century : Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic 
Piracy (The RAND Corporation, eBook ed, 2012) at chapter 3. 
73 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art III(1). 
74 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, above n 7. One of the IAEA’s functions is “to establish and 
administer safeguards”, art IIIA(5). Article XII outlines how the IAEA should approach safeguard agreements.  
75 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art III(3). 
76 Article IV. 
77 Article III(4). 
78 Article III(2). 
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Article XI(3) states that for the purposes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, “a [NWS] is one 
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior 
to 1 January, 1967”.79 This means that States which manufacture and explode nuclear weapons 
after this date are still treated as non-NWS under the Treaty – and as such, are still subject to 
the provisions in art III(1) and art III(4). The reason for this definition is unknown, but it is 
likely to be an indication of the negotiating parties’ belief that by ratifying and implementing 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, no new nuclear weapons States would obtain or develop nuclear 
weapons – essentially preserving the nuclear status quo of the time.80  
 
I explained in the peace and security subsection that a joint concern of the Soviet Union and 
the United States was West Germany. Neither superpower wanted the country to become a 
nuclear power, and this was a key concern when drafting the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As such, 
it could be argued that it was at least one consideration of the superpowers to ensure West 
Germany remained subject to art III if it later became a nuclear power. 
 
The most likely reason for the wording of art III, however, was the Soviet Union’s refusal to 
accept safeguards in its own territory.81 This disagreement is illustrated in the text of the draft 
treaties submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1965, article III of the United 
States draft treaty provided that all of the States party to the Treaty were to undertake to accept 
safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities, making no distinction between NWS and non-
NWS,82 while a subsequent draft treaty submitted to the UNGA by the Soviet Union made no 
                                               
79 Article XI(3). 
80 Shirley V Scott “The problem of unequal treaties in contemporary international law: how the powerful have 
reneged on the political compacts within which five cornerstone treaties of global governance are situated” 
(2008) 4(2) Journal of International Law and International Relations 101.  
81 Shaker, above n 38, at 666. 
82 United States of America: Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons UN Doc A/5986 (17 August 
1965) annex I. 
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reference to safeguards.83 Article III of 1967 draft treaties by both superpowers simply stated 
“(International Control)”, which indicates the article was still under negotiation.84 After 1968 
revisions, a joint draft was submitted by the United States and Soviet Union which applied 
safeguard obligations to non-NWS.85 These revisions, alongside academic commentary,86 paint 
a picture of distrust at least on the part of the Soviet Union.  
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the inspection provisions in the Antarctic Treaty, noting 
that the Soviet Union allowed such provisions. There is a clear difference here, however: 
observers in Antarctica could inspect Soviet stations and other activities, but this was not Soviet 
territory. As a general rule, the Soviet Union did not appear to be amenable to any form of 
inspection on its territory at this time. The drafting history of article III of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, as well as its final text, certainly highlights the tension of mutual distrust. Mutual 
distrust here manifests in a different way to the equivalent provisions in the Antarctic Treaty. 
While the Antarctic Treaty’s inspection provisions showed mutual distrust in the way they 
facilitated transparency of activity in Antarctica, the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards 
indicate an unwillingness to encourage the same transparency, due to distrust when the method 
of doing so would involve allowing other States to enter a State Party’s territory.    
 
It must be noted that since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union have negotiated safeguard agreements with the IAEA, in 1977 and 1985 
respectively.87 Both agreements contain similar limitations on the IAEA’s powers: the United 
                                               
83 Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Twentieth Session: Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, above n 28, at 1. 
84 United States Draft Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons UN Doc ENDC/192 (24 August 1967); 
Soviet Union Draft Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons UN Doc ENDC/193 (24 August 1967).  
85 Text of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons UN Doc A/7072 (19 March 1968) annex I.  
86 See generally Shaker, above n 38 and Brands, above n 22. 
87 Text of the Agreement of 18 November 1977 Between the United States of America and the Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards in the United States of America IAEA Doc INFCIRC/288 (18 November 1977); Text 
of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the 
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States agreement permits the IAEA to apply safeguards on “all source or special fissionable 
material in all facilities within the United States, excluding only those facilities associated with 
activities with direct national security significance to the United States”,88 while the Soviet 
agreement accepts safeguards “on all source or special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear 
facilities to be designated by the Soviet Union within its territory”.89 As can be seen in the text 
of the agreements, both deny the IAEA the right to apply safeguards on non-peaceful nuclear 
material, which protects both States from having any type of restrictions on their nuclear 
weapons.  
 
The use of safeguards as a verification method of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
came under fire in 1991 with the discovery that Iraq, which is subject to a safeguards 
agreement, had been conducting a nuclear weapons programme which had not been uncovered 
through IAEA safeguards inspections; this was shortly followed by the discovery that North 
Korea had been doing the same.90 Further attempts have since been made to strengthen the 
verification methods, such as the introduction of the IAEA Additional Protocols, which provide 
more stringent tools for verification.91 
 
4. Articles VIII and X: amendment and withdrawal  
 
(a) Article VIII: amendment 
 
                                               
Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics IAEA Doc INFCIRC/327 (21 February 
1985).  
88 Text of the Agreement of Between the United States of America and the Agency, art I. 
89 Text of the Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency, above n 87, art I. 
90 David Fischer History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (IAEA, Austria, 1997) 
at 2, and discussed below.   
91 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards IAEA Doc INFCIRC/540 (May 1997). The Model Protocol is optional, and can 
be added to a State’s existing safeguards agreement.  
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Article VIII outlines the procedure for amendments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.92 Both 
NWS and non-NWS may propose amendments to the Treaty; if requested by at least one third 
of the States Parties, the Depositary Governments will convene a conference to consider the 
proposed amendment.93 Any amendment needs to be approved by majority vote, including the 
votes of all NWS and all Parties which are members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA 
on the date the amendment is circulated.94 Gardner explains that “the board of governors is a 
heterogeneous group of thirty-five nations with widely divergent views on nuclear issues”, 
which makes their unanimous agreement unlikely,95 and Fischer went as far to say that the 
Treaty was virtually “unamendable”.96 These strict requirements also demonstrate the “tiered” 
nature of the Treaty, in that all NWS must approve the proposed amendment: it is yet another 
way in which the NWS are treated far differently to the non-NWS, which make up the vast 
majority of the States Parties to the Treaty.  
 
(b) Article X: withdrawal  
 
The protocol to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty is found in art X:97 
 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give 
notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations 
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of 
the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
 
                                               
92 Specifically, Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, arts VIII(1) and (2). Article VIII(3), which relates to review 
conferences, are discussed in the ‘peace and security’ subsection of this chapter.  
93 Article VIII(1). 
94 Article VIII(2). 
95 Gary T Gardner Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., USA, 1994) at 89. 
96 Fischer, above n 42, at 112. 
97 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art X(1).  
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Article X can be considered an “escape clause”, as it allows States Parties to withdraw to 
protect national interests. However, Reiss notes that the clause “was never intended as a means 
for a state party to … escape the consequences of noncompliance [with the Treaty]”.98 This has 
become highly relevant in recent years, with North Korea’s announcement in 2003 that it was 
invoking art X.99  
 
Shaker explains that art X is “largely based on the withdrawal clause of the [Partial Nuclear] 
Test-Ban Treaty”.100 The text of that withdrawal clause has found its way into most major arms 
control treaties; as an example, as recently as 2017, an almost identical withdrawal clause can 
be found in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.101  
 
Looking at the superpowers specifically, this form of withdrawal clause helps to show the 
lingering uncertainty of concluding arms control agreements to which both the United States 
and Soviet Union were parties: while never at war with one another, the threat that the two 
would become outright adversaries was present for much of the twentieth century. Article X, 
and similar withdrawal clauses in other treaties, highlights the tension of mutual distrust in this 
way. Additionally, art X protected the many other States Parties who would be affected if the 
Cold War became hot; as tensions shifted after the end of the Cold War, art X and its 
counterparts remained a form of protection for States Parties.  
 
                                               
98 Mitchell B Reiss “Strengthening Nonproliferation: The Path Ahead” in Joseph F. Pilat (ed) Atoms for Peace: A 
Future after Fifty Years? (Johns Hopkins University Press, USA, 2007) at 46. 
99 I will discuss this further in the chapter conclusion.  
100 Shaker, above n 38, at 884. The Test-Ban Treaty he refers to is the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (opened for signature 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 
October 1963).  
101 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 20 September 2017, not yet in force), art 
17(2). I discuss this Treaty in later sections. 
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5. Concluding notes 
 
The tension of mutual distrust is certainly present in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
expresses itself most clearly in the provisions I identified in this subsection. The safeguards 
provisions found in art III are perhaps the most obvious demonstration of this tension. It took 
some time for the superpowers to agree on the safeguards measures, and when they did come 
to an agreement, they excluded themselves from the provisions.102 The Treaty provides no real 
means of testing whether the NWS were decreasing their nuclear stockpiles. Disarmament is 
considered one of the pillars of the Treaty, and each pillar in theory carries the same weight as 
the other – however, as far as verification, far more attention was paid to the other two pillars. 
The United States and in particular the Soviet Union’s distrust of allowing inspections of their 
nuclear facilities led to a Treaty where compliance with the disarmament pillar could not be 
fully assessed.103 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty’s strict amendment procedure indicates that the States Parties did 
not want amendment to be simple. The withdrawal provision, which has become almost 
standard for international arms control treaties, highlights mutual distrust: though the Treaty 
was a great step towards slowing down the arms race, the relationship between the superpowers 
remained tenuous at best.  
 
  
                                               
102 However, NWS need to comply with the safeguards agreements of non-NWS when engaging in the exchange 
of technology and information. 
103 Compliance with the disarmament provision can be assessed in other, more public ways, through the NWS 
engaging in disarmament negotiations and forming disarmament treaties. I covered the disarmament provision in 




1. Introduction  
 
The whole of the Non-Proliferation Treaty deals with the tension of resources – the resource 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The tension is mainly expressed through the pillar of 
non-proliferation, and the pillar of peaceful uses of atomic energy. For the purposes of this 
subsection, I will be largely focusing on peaceful uses of atomic energy, as the Treaty confers 
particular rights and obligations on states in this regard. These rights and obligations appear to 
mirror a growing trend of the time towards open transfer of knowledge between states. Further, 
they seem at least loosely connected to the “common heritage” approach to some resources 
which was also developing at this time.  
 
In this subsection, I will explore these trends in relation to the Treaty to see if a connection can 
be found. I will also cover arts I and II. These have been discussed in more depth in the “peace 
and security” subsection of this chapter, as they are more relevant there; however, these articles 
are important to examine in the context of resources as a tension.  
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was not the first attempt at controlling the use of nuclear weapons 
and atomic energy. Just months after the end of World War II, the leaders of the United States, 
United Kingdom and Canada proposed a United Nations commission to deal with the question 
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of atomic weapons and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which became the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission (“UNAEC”).104 They discussed a potential:105 
 
… three-power ‘trusteeship’ over the bomb, whereby the three … nations pledged 
to refrain from using the bomb and to coordinate the careful dissemination of 
technology for the peaceful use of atomic energy until, as Truman put it, 
‘international control can be achieved’. 
 
Following this, United States Ambassador Bernard Baruch put forward his controversial 
proposal to the UNAEC (“the Baruch Plan”). The Baruch Plan took its inspiration from the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which was produced by leading atomic scientists of the time – 
including Robert Oppenheimer.106 The Acheson-Lilienthal Report “called for international 
ownership of all ‘dangerous’ nuclear activities, which covered virtually the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle”.107 As such, the Baruch Plan proposed a nuclear resource management regime, in which 
an international organisation would “manage the development of atomic energy for the 
international community under the auspices of the United Nations”.108 Had the Baruch Plan 
been successful, it may well have been a great step towards the dissemination of information 
about the peaceful benefits of atomic energy.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Baruch Plan failed to take hold. The potential benefit of peaceful 
uses of atomic energy being available to all States could not outweigh the security risks posed 
by the relinquishing of nuclear weapons (or, in the Soviet Union’s case, the relinquishing of 
the right to develop nuclear weapons).109 This was especially so as the relationship between 
                                               
104 Randy Rydell “Looking Back: Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan That Refused to Go Away” (2006) 36(5) 
Arms Control Today 45 at 45.  
105 Craig, Campbell, and Sergey S Radchenko The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (Yale University 
Press, eBook ed, 2008) at 118.  
106 Rydell, above n 104, at 45. 
107 At 45. 
108 David W Kearn Jr “The Baruch Plan and the Quest for Atomic Disarmament” (2010) 2 Diplomacy & Statecraft 
21 41 at 42.  
109 Craig, Campbell, and Radchenko, above n 105, at 125.  
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the superpowers had grown steadily less stable post-World War II. However, one of the core 
values of the Baruch Plan – that peaceful uses of atomic energy be available to all States – 
found its feet once again in Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech and eventually, in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  
 
3. Articles IV and V 
 
(a) Overview  
 
 
Articles IV and V relate to the second pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. Article IV protects the “inalienable right” of all States Parties to “develop 
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.110 It goes further to 
place an obligation on all States Parties to facilitate and participate in “the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy” and “co-operate in contributing … to the further development of the 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.111 Such development should give 
particular focus to the non-NWS territories, and have “due consideration” for the developing 
areas of the world.112   
 
Article V provides a further obligation to ensure that NWS will make available potential 
benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions to non-NWS, with the charge being 
“as low as possible and [excluding] any charge for research and development”.113 
 
                                               
110 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art IV(1). 
111 Article IV(2). 
112 Ibid.  
113 Article V. 
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(b) Part of the bargain 
 
 
Articles IV and V form part of the “bargain” of the Treaty. Article IV protects the right of 
States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, meaning that non-NWS would not be 
further disadvantaged by renouncing nuclear weapons. Both arts IV and V contain obligations 
for NWS. Firstly, they must undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and information.114 This obligation is placed on all States Parties; however, it is 
sensible to assume that at the time the Treaty was concluded, the NWS held the most valuable 
knowledge about nuclear energy – and, as such, initially this obligation would rest primarily 
on them. Secondly, NWS must make available potential benefits from any peaceful nuclear 
explosions to all non-NWS.115 Again, while the obligation rests on all States Parties, non-NWS 
could not undertake peaceful nuclear explosions; the obligation therefore primarily rests on the 
NWS. 
 
Articles IV and V were the product of great advocacy by the non-NWS; the United States and 
the Soviet Union did not consider this in earlier drafts. Non-NWS held a fear of having to 
forfeit any civil nuclear energy programmes;116 owing to objections and concerns of non-NWS 
such as Italy, Chile and Nigeria, non-NWS were able to secure an “inalienable right” to 
research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.117  
 
(c) Inalienable right, transfer of knowledge and common heritage 
 
 
                                               
114 Art IV(1). 
115 Art V. 
116 Goldblat, above n 62, at 11. 
117 Mohamed I Shaker The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979 (Oceana 
Publications, Inc, United States, 1980) vol I, at 277. 
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Joyner explains that “the plain meaning of the term ‘inalienable right’ is a right which cannot 
be given, taken, or in any way transferred away from its holder”.118 The term has a firm basis 
in International Human Rights, but it is rare to find it when referencing the rights of States.119  
 
There exist two concepts which are arguably connected to the aforementioned inalienable right: 
technology transfer and common heritage of mankind. The former concept, technology 
transfer, is the notion of “the efficient and equitable allocation of existing technology in the 
world”.120 The term can be traced back to 1961, with a UNGA Resolution regarding patents 
and transferring technology to developing countries;121 it is often used with reference to 
developed countries transferring knowledge to developing countries.   
 
The precise meaning of common heritage of mankind is debated. However, Ambassador Arvid 
Pardo’s address to the UNGA is often cited when discussing the principle: he explains that 
areas such as the seabed and ocean floor “have a special status as a common heritage of 
mankind and as such should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and administered 
by an international authority for the benefit of all peoples and of present and future 
generations”.122 While common heritage of mankind is generally considered to apply only to 
particular territory and resources – such as outer space, the seabed or minerals – in the mid-
20th century, technology was considered by many States as a part of the common heritage of 
mankind.123  
 
                                               
118 Daniel H. Joyner Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oxford University Press, USA 2011), 80. 
119 At 80. 
120 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2014, online ed) Technology Transfer. 
121 The role of patents in the transfer of technology to under-developed countries GA Res 1713(XVI) (1961).  
122 Examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean 
floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the 
use of their resources in the interests of mankind: Address of Ambassador Arvid Pardo UN Doc A/C.1/PV1515. 
Common heritage of mankind will be explored further in the “Outer Space Treaty” chapter of this thesis.  
123 Technology Transfer, above n 120, at [4]. 
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Articles IV and V seem to be connected to the concept of technology transfer; in particular, art 
IV specifically notes that the intended international co-operation of developing nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes should show “due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of 
the world”.124 In addresses to the UNGA, both the United States and Soviet Union made it clear 
that article IV would be very important for developing countries.125 The Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic explained that art IV “will be of particular importance [for developing 
countries] … which … need assistance from powers that have amassed impressive knowledge 
in the application of nuclear energy”.126 These statements support the view that these articles – 
while also representing part of the “bargain” of the Treaty – are indicative of the notion of 
technology transfer which was steadily gaining recognition at the time.  
 
The connection to common heritage of mankind only holds weight if one is of the view that 
technology can be considered common heritage – which may not be correct. The common 
heritage principle is now generally only applied to physical areas, and the resources which can 
be found within those areas.127 Regardless of whether technology as common heritage has been 
carried through to present conceptions of the principle, however, it is possible that art IV in 
particular was influenced by these burgeoning ideas.  
 
4. Concluding notes 
 
                                               
124 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art IV(2). 
125 Address by Lyndon B Johnson, President of the United States of America UN Doc A/PV.1672 (12 June 1968) 
at 7; Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1577 (31 
May 1968) at 4. 
126 Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1577 at 4.  
127 See, for example, Kemal Baslar The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1998). Common heritage of mankind is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter V.  
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In the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the tension of resources seems to have been largely eclipsed 
by the tension of peace and security. While nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are resources 
in and of themselves, the primary concern of the Treaty was to slow down – and ultimately 
stop – the spread of nuclear weapons from a security standpoint.  
 
As I have explored in this subsection, however, the resources tension does express itself in arts 
IV and V of the Treaty. These provisions indicate a “Cold War” approach to resources: that is, 
the growing trend of the time towards knowledge transfer, especially in relation to developing 
nations. It also seems to touch on the concept of common heritage of mankind, particularly as 
– at the time – technology was considered by many to be part of this common heritage. It 
appears that in this Treaty, peaceful nuclear energy was treated in a way which aligned with 
these developing concepts.  
 




In this chapter, I explained how the three chosen tensions –peace and security, mutual distrust, 
and resources – came through in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I found that all tensions were 
present in one way or another. Peace and security appears to be the primary tension in this 
Treaty. The spread of nuclear weapons, and the need for their reduction, was a global concern. 
Mutual distrust impacted the scope of the safeguards in art III of the Treaty; although the NWS 
agreed through art VI to work towards a reduction of their nuclear stockpiles, there were no 
safeguards in place to ensure that “vertical” proliferation did not take place. It seems as though 
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particular Cold War approaches to resources – particularly the notion of knowledge transfer – 
are present in the Treaty.  
 
In this final section, I will briefly look at the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty today. I will 
go on to make a preliminary analysis of the Treaty as a whole, taking into account all of the 
tensions. Finally, I will use what I have discovered to see whether the Treaty can “survive” in 
a post-Cold War world. The findings in this conclusion will be expanded upon in the final 
chapter of my thesis, where I analyse in more detail the threats facing the treaty today, and the 
treaty’s ability to respond to those threats.  
 
1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty in the present day 
 
The Treaty is still in force today. It has gained near-universal acceptance with 191 States 
Parties. This includes all five States which are considered NWS under the Treaty, after France 
and China acceded to the Treaty in 1992.  
 
The success of the Treaty in limiting the number of States with nuclear weapons is 
questionable, which I explore further in the final chapter of this thesis. Pre-Non-Proliferation 
Treaty estimates of the number of States with nuclear weapons capabilities did not come to 
fruition,128 but the fact remains that there are at least three more nuclear-weapons States in 
2018 than there were in 1970.129 In addition, other States such as South Africa and Iran were 
                                               
128 George Bunn Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford University 
Press, USA, 1992) at 68. 
129 India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) are confirmed to have detonated 
atomic bombs. It is widely believed that Israel also has nuclear weapons in its arsenal, but the State has neither 
confirmed nor denied this. South Africa also has detonated a nuclear weapon, but destroyed its nuclear weapons 
facilities and acceded to the Treaty in 1991.  
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briefly nuclear weapons States, which casts doubt on the Treaty’s true non-proliferation 
capabilities.  
 
2. A closer look at the Treaty as a whole 
 
In essence, the Non-Proliferation Treaty strikes a bargain between the NWS and non-NWS. 
The non-NWS, particularly those with nuclear weapons capabilities, relinquished a great 
amount of potential power in the name of global security. It is clear that the Treaty was by and 
large a collaborative effort between the United States and the Soviet Union; they forged ahead 
despite unfavourable opinions from their respective allies.130 While the Treaty was an 
important fixture in negotiations to cease the arms race, it cannot be denied that the NWS 
benefitted greatly from the Treaty in the short term. If the Treaty was followed, they would 
remain exclusive nuclear powers.  
 
As I discussed in the ‘mutual distrust’ subsection, the safeguards provisions in art III are the 
only verification measure of compliance with the Treaty. Importantly, the Treaty contains no 
penalties for violations of the Treaty. This is concerning, especially in a situation where a State 
is found to have hidden nuclear weapons programmes from the IAEA’s view – a situation 
which has already occurred in the 1990s, when it was discovered that Iraq and the DPRK had 
been secretly developing nuclear weapons programmes.131 The Treaty is also virtually 
unamendable.132 The Treaty is unlikely to ever be amended to address issues like verification, 
or to adapt to the post-Cold War climate.  
                                               
130 Brands, above n 22, at 410. 
131 This is discussed in the following section.  
132 Fischer History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, above n 90, at 112. 
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Finally, there is a tiered approach to States Parties to the Treaty in the distinction between NWS 
and non-NWS. This can be seen in the amendment provisions of the Treaty, where any 
proposed amendment must have the approval of all NWS.133 This separation is not as stark as 
the Antarctic Treaty, where there is clear divide between States Parties and Consultative Parties 
which can take part in the review and decision-making process. However, the implication 
remains in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that NWS are at least slightly elevated over the non-
NWS.  
 
3. Problems facing the Treaty today 
 
Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty has gained near-universal acceptance, it is arguable that 
this is not enough for the Treaty to continue. It is of particular concern that there are now States 
with nuclear weapons stockpiles that are not governed by any international agreement, and 
which are not required to enter into any agreement with the IAEA.   
 
The Treaty also faces an issue in its distinction between NWS and non-NWS, as it does not 
seem to allow for a State which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon after 1967 to be 
considered a NWS.134 States which possess nuclear weapons in the present day are not treated 
as NWS under the Treaty.  
 
4. Can the Treaty survive in a post-Cold War world?  
 
                                               
133 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 1, art VIII(2). 
134 Article IX(3). 
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A criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is that its main goal was to preserve the “nuclear 
status quo” of the time.135 Aside from the disarmament obligations in art VI, this criticism holds 
merit: NWS were allowed to keep their nuclear weapons, but not share them; and non-NWS 
were not allowed to obtain nuclear weapons. The Treaty froze the situation as it was, attempting 
to keep it from worsening – but providing little in the way of improving it either.  
 
New treaties may also serve to threaten the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For example, in 2017, 
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (“Prohibition Treaty”) was opened for 
signature.136 The Prohibition Treaty, discussed in the final chapter, contains provisions about 
nuclear weapons which are far more wide-reaching than the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These 
provisions may well leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty defunct.  
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is ageing: it does not account for the few new nuclear weapons 
States, and contains little in the way of encouraging nuclear weapons States to decrease or 
destroy their nuclear arsenals. It has been established that the safeguards regime cannot be 
completely relied upon to uncover a breach of the Treaty. The obligations found in art VI have 
not yet been fulfilled, and competing interpretations over the true meaning of art VI inspires 




                                               
135 Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen, and Annie Golden Bersagel, eds., Nuclear Weapons Under International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 2014) at 393; Gardner, above n 95, at 55. 
136 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, above n 101.  
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V. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies  
A. Introduction 
 
1. The Outer Space Treaty  
 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (“the Outer Space Treaty”) opened for 
signature on 27 January 1967, and entered into force on 10 October 1967.1 The Outer Space 
Treaty ensured outer space would be explored and used for peaceful purposes only,2 and 
provides further rules and principles regarding the exploration and use of outer space. The 
Outer Space Treaty is considered the “magna carta” of space law, providing the “legal basis on 
which space activities have developed”.3 Strengthening current international outer space law 
are the Rescue Agreement,4 the Space Liability Convention,5 the Registration Convention6 and 
the Moon Treaty.7  
 
                                               
1 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including 
the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967). 
2 Article I.   
3 Fabio Tronchetti The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: A Proposal 
for a Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 2009) at 19. 
4 The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space (signed 19 December 1967, entered into force 3 December 1968).  
5 The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (opened for signature 29 march 
1972, entered into force 1 September 1972).  
6 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (opened for signature 14 January 1975, 
entered into force 15 September 1976).  
7 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (signed December 18 
1979, entered into force 11 July 1984). 
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2. Before the Treaty 
 
The successful launch of artificial satellite Sputnik I by the Soviet Union on 4 October, 1957,8 
proved that outer space exploration was no longer a fantasy. Reynolds explains that from 
September 1958, the United States began operations which would establish the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”).9 With both superpowers speeding up this 
“space race”, it was clear that there was an urgent need to regulate outer space in some way. 
As interest in space grew, and as both superpowers encountered more victories in outer space,10 
it became clear to the international community that the moon was the goal of this race: as such, 
Tronchetti explains, there was an “urgent need … to draft a treaty … before the expected 
manned lunar landing by the United States or the Soviet Union”.11  
 
The 1958 UNGA resolution on the peaceful use of outer space recognised “the common aim 
that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only”.12 With this in mind, the UNGA 
resolution further established an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(“COPUOS”). One of the purposes of the COPUOS was to consider legal problems which 
could arise in the exploration of outer space, and the future organisational arrangements which 
would facilitate international cooperation in outer space.13 Importantly, in 1963 COPUOS 
produced a Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space (“Declaration of Legal Principles”), which was adopted 
                                               
8 David Reynolds “Science, Technology, and the Cold War” in Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, (Cambridge University Press, 2010) vol III, at 385. 
9 At 385. 
10 See generally Piantadose Claude Mankind Beyond Earth: The History, Science, and Future of Human Space 
Exploration (Columbia University Press, eBook ed, 2013). 
11 Tronchetti, above n 3, at 19. 
12 Question of the peaceful use of outer space GA Res 1348(XIII) (1958).  
13 Ibid. The members of COPUOS at this point in time were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Arab 
Republic, the UK and the United States.  
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by the UNGA.14 The Declaration of Legal Principles served as the framework for the Outer 
Space Treaty, with many of the principles inserted mostly verbatim into the final Treaty text.  
 
3. Chapter overview 
 
In this chapter, I will consider how each of the three tensions (peace and security, mutual 
distrust, and resources) came through in the Outer Space Treaty. To do this, in each subsection 
I will briefly discuss the existence of the tension before the Outer Space Treaty was concluded, 
before examining particular articles which express the tension. I will go on to look at how the 
tension was expressed in the Treaty as a whole, before coming to a preliminary conclusion. 
Where relevant, I will identify and discuss points of comparison between the Outer Space 
Treaty and the other case studies (the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty). 
Finally, I will evaluate the findings from each chapter and bring them together in a final 
discussion in my chapter conclusion.  
  
                                               
14 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
GA Res 1962(XVII) (1963).  
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B. Peace and Security 
1. Introduction 
Of the three tensions, peace and security is the strongest in the Outer Space Treaty. Outer space 
exploration was not only a success for scientific and technological development; it had the 
potential to open up a new arena for Cold War rivalry. Military use of outer space was of great 
concern.  
 
The Outer Space Treaty established that outer space was to be used for peaceful purposes only. 
In addition, it provided for partial demilitarisation of outer space, and banned nuclear weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction on the moon or other celestial bodies. Most importantly, the 
Outer Space Treaty declared outer space, the moon and celestial bodies to be the province of 
all mankind, meaning it cannot be “subject to national appropriation”.15  
 
In this subsection, I will consider how the articles regarding sovereignty and nuclear weapons 
express the peace and security tension. I will then go on to consider article III, regarding the 
place of international law in outer space, and the dispute resolution clauses. Finally, I will come 
to some preliminary conclusions which will be developed in the chapter conclusion. 
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
To the United States, the successful launch of Sputnik I indicated a major security issue: Neal, 
Smith and McCormick describe a “climate of near-hysteria” in the United States after 
Sputnik.16 The success carried dangerous implications for the United States. Firstly, Sputnik 
                                               
15 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art II.  
16 Homer A. Neal, Tobin L. Smith, and Jennifer B. McCormick (eds) Beyond Sputnik: U.S. Science Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century (University of Michigan Press, eBook ed, 2010) at 3. 
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was an altered inter-continental ballistic missile (“ICBM”);17 it was clear proof that the Soviet 
Union had ICBMs which could travel a great distance – potentially reaching the United 
States.18 Secondly, Sputnik indicated the potential for bombs to be released from outer space, 
a possibility against which the United States could not yet defend itself.19  
 
As both superpowers developed their space-faring capabilities, the concern of a Cold War in 
outer space grew; this is evidenced by UNGA Resolution 1348 (XIII), where the General 
Assembly noted that it wished “to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new 
field”, and recognised that “outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only”.20 
Contributing to the setting aside of outer space for peaceful purposes was the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty,21 which banned the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere and 
underwater.22 
 
3. Articles I and II: sovereignty and the province of all mankind 
 
(a) The issue of sovereignty  
 
 
Article I declares that the exploration and use of outer space (including the moon and other 
celestial bodies) “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development”.23 It further states that “the 
                                               
17 Reynolds, above n 8, at 385. Specifically, Sputnik was an R-7 Missile.  
18 Yanek Mieczkowski Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Cornell 
University Press, eBook ed, 2013) at 16. 
19 Neal et al, above n 16, at 3. 
20 Question of the peaceful use of outer space, above n 12. 
21 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water )opened for 
signature 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963).  
22 Article 1(a).  
23 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art I. I will consider the “province of mankind” principle in the resources 
subsection of this chapter.  
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exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies … shall be 
the province of all mankind”.24 Connected to this is the non-appropriation principle in article 
II, which reads:25 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means. 
 
The wording of this article is lifted almost verbatim from the Declaration of Legal Principles.26 
The United States Draft Treaty originally only applied the prohibition on appropriation to 
celestial bodies,27 but the United States delegate quickly accepted the broadening of the article 
to include outer space.28 Non-appropriation is considered to be one of the most fundamental 
aspects of outer space law.29 However, art II has since caused controversy over its application 
and scope. 
 
Firstly, the Outer Space Treaty does not provide for the delimitation of outer space: the 
boundary between the atmosphere on Earth and outer space remains to be defined. Gal explains 
that under international law, “the state territory with its adjacent airspace is a delimited part of 
the earth under the exclusive jurisdiction of a state”:30 Airspace falls under a State’s territorial 
sovereignty, but there is no marked line where airspace becomes outer space; as such, the 
question remains where sovereignty ends and non-appropriation begins. Su argues that the lack 
of delimitation has not yet caused significant problems as “the spheres of aerial and space 
                                               
24 Ibid. 
25 Article II. 
26 Declaration of Legal Principles, above n 14, principle 3. 
27 United States Draft Treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies UN Doc 
A/AC.105/32 (17 June 1966), art 1. 
28 Summary Record of the 63rd Meeting of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 (20 October 1966) at 2-3. 
29 Ricky J Lee “Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: Prohibition of State Sovereignty, Private Property Rights, or 
Both?” (2004) 11 Australian International Law Journal 128 at 129; I H Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to 
Space Law, (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 1999) at 28. 
30 Gyula Gal Space Law (A. W. Sythoff-Leyden, Hungary, 1969) at 59. 
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activities do not overlap”.31 However, as technology continues to develop, and both air and 
outer space craft become more powerful, it may become a necessity to officially answer this 
question.  
 
Article II does not refer to private enterprise, and as such the second issue is whether art II is 
applicable here. Private exploration and use of outer space is a growing industry, and an 
understanding of the law here has become increasingly important.32 With reference to the use 
of the word “national” in art II, can a private enterprise, acting on its own account, appropriate 
territory?33 Gorove submits that, as it is not explicitly prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty, 
“an individual acting on his own behalf … could lawfully appropriate any part of outer 
space”.34 He is not alone in this view.35 However, the Treaty as a whole should be taken into 
account when considering the application of art II.  
 
By reference to both art VI, which I discuss in the “mutual distrust” subsection,36 and art I, 
mentioned above, a strong argument emerges that the non-appropriation principle does extend 
to private enterprise. Article VI requires States to authorise and supervise activities carried out 
by non-governmental agencies; further, States must ensure that the activities of non-
governmental agencies are carried out in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty.37 Lee asserts 
that because of art VI, “any act of national appropriation by private entities would be subject 
                                               
31 Jinyuan Su “The Delineation Between Airspace and Outer Space and the Emergence of Aerospace Objects” 
(2013) 78(2) Air L. & Com.  355 at 363. 
32 Timothy Justin Trapp “Taking up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with Nonappropriation Article 
of the Outer Space Treaty” (2013) 2013(4) U. Ill. L. Rev. 1681 at 1697. 
33 C. Wilfred Jenks Space Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, Great Britain, 1965) at 201. Here, Jenks considers the 
different methods of territorial appropriation on Earth; for example, a private adventurer may make a territorial 
claim while acting “on his own account”.  
34 Stephen Gorove “Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty” (1969) 37(3) Fordham Law Review 349 at 
351. 
35 See, for example, Kurt Anderson Baca “Property Rights in Outer Space” (1993) 58 J. Air L. & Com. 1041 at 
1065. 
36 Relating to international responsibility.  
37 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art VI. 
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to the direction or influence of the State, thus contravening Article II of the [Outer Space 
Treaty]”.38 It seems a natural consequence of art VI that private entities are indeed subject to 
art II.39 Also relevant are the principles of equality laid down in art I.40 By ensuring no State or 
private entity can appropriate territory to the detriment of another State, art II supports art I in 
establishing the “res communis omnium character of outer space”41 and protects the interests 
of all States in exploring outer space.42 It seems that to allow private appropriation would be to 
contravene these articles.43 
 
The final issue I will discuss is whether the non-appropriation principle in art II extends and 
resource exploitation. I will consider these questions in the resources subsection. Article II 
expresses the peace and security tension by reducing the risk of conflict in outer space.44 
Considering the tension present in Antarctica before the Antarctic Treaty was concluded, 
without the non-appropriation principle, it is likely that conflicting claims between States could 
threaten the “peaceful purposes” principle found in art I of the Outer Space Treaty.45  
 
(b) Comparison with the Antarctic Treaty 
 
Like the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty regulates the appropriation of territory. The 
Outer Space Treaty goes far further than the Antarctic Treaty: there is a complete ban on 
                                               
38 Note, however, in addition to the literature mentioned above, the school of thought which considers the opposite 
view to be correct: see, for example, Ricky J Lee, above n 29, at 129; John Adolph “The Recent Boom in Private 
Space Development and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to 
Encourage Investment” (2006) 40(4) The International Lawyer 961. 
39 Jenks, above n 33, at 201. Jenks is referencing the Declaration of Legal Principles.  
40 I discuss these below. 
41 Tronchetti, above n 3, at 27. Res communis omnium means “a territory which cannot be the subject of occupation 
(acquisition of territory)”: see Gal, above n 30, at 122.  
42 Tronchetti, above n 3, at 28.  
43 See for example PM Sterns and LI Tennen “Privateering and Profiteering on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies: Debunking the Myth of Property Rights in Space” (2003) 31(11) Adv. Space Res. 2433. 
44 Tronchetti, above n 3, at 28.  
45 Sterns and Tennen, above n 43, at 2434. 
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appropriation of outer space under art II of the Outer Space Treaty, while art IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty froze the status quo in the continent. While recognising the various territorial claims in 
Antarctica held by States, ensured that those interests could not be extended or modified, and 
stopped new States from establishing a claim. 
 
An understanding of the differences between Antarctica and outer space is important here. Both 
are remote and neither are the sole territory of any State; however, a great amount of activity 
had taken place in Antarctica by the time the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated and concluded. 
The Outer Space Treaty, on the other hand, was concluded as a pre-emptive measure after 
relatively little exploration of outer space had taken place. No State had managed to establish 
its presence in outer space long enough to make a territorial claim.  
 
It can be argued that in effect, art II of the Outer Space Treaty froze the status quo of outer 
space activities: no State had yet made a claim of sovereignty, and the Outer Space Treaty 
ensured that no State could. Despite their differences, the comparison between art IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty and art II of the Outer Space Treaty is strong in this regard.  
 
4. Article IV: nuclear weapons and peaceful purposes 
 
(a) Article IV: demilitarisation  
 
 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides for the partial demilitarisation of outer space. 
Per art IV, the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used for peaceful purposes only.46 
Military personnel are allowed as long as they are used for scientific research or “any other 
peaceful purposes”. Military bases, installations, fortifications and the conduct of military 
                                               
46 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art IV. 
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manoeuvres are forbidden, with the exception of equipment and facilities necessary for 
peaceful exploration.47 Further, States Parties must not place in orbit, install or station any 
“objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction”.48 The 
testing of any type of weapon is also banned on the moon and celestial bodies.49  
 
The article makes a distinction between banned activities in outer space and banned activities 
on the moon and celestial bodies. While the moon and celestial bodies are to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes, this does not extend to outer space as a whole. Article IV 
provides for “a total demilitarisation on the Moon and celestial bodies”,50 with language similar 
to the disarmament article in the Antarctic Treaty,51 but this demilitarisation does not extend to 
outer space as a whole. Pertinently, art IV does not establish a ban on military satellites or the 
travel of nuclear weapons through outer space.  
 
The reasons for drafting art IV in such a manner are reasonably clear. At the time of 
negotiations, both the Soviet Union and the United States had a number of military satellites 
launched in outer space.52 Additionally, neither superpower wished to limit their ability to test 
nuclear ballistic missiles, which required travel through outer space to reach their target.53 
During negotiations, both superpowers made it clear that they would not consider extending 
the “peaceful purposes” principle to outer space. Both draft treaties declared that only celestial 




50 E R C Bogaert Aspects of Space Law (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Netherlands, 1986) at 67. 
51 Discussed below. 
52 Paul G. Dembling “Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploiration and Use of 
Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” in Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S. K. Lee (eds) 
Manual on Space Law (Oceana Publications, Inc., USA, 1979) vol I at 14.  
53 Peter Jankowitsch “From Cold War to Detente in Outer Space: The Role of the United Nations in Outer Space 
Law Development” in Proceedings of the Fortieth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (International Institute 
of Space Law, Italy, 1997) at 45. 
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bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only.54 Some delegations expressed concern over 
this limitation,55 but the superpowers would not be dissuaded: the Soviet Union asked that the 
Committee “avoid being sidetracked into discussions of too general nature” regarding 
disarmament,56 while the United States noted that “a treaty should be drafted on which there 
was a genuine prospect of agreement”.57   
 
Cheng argues that during negotiations, the superpowers considered outer space as “militarily 
too important … to be demilitarised”.58 Given the negotiating history discussed above, this is 
a sensible view. During the time of the COPUOS negotiations and beyond, both superpowers 
had clearly found value in the military use of outer space: between 1958 and 1988, 75 per cent 
of all satellites launched were military in purpose.59 The final text of art IV can be read as a 
balance between peace and security: the States Parties wished to avoid conflict in outer space, 
but were not willing to give up the new advantages they had discovered by using outer space 
for military purposes.  
 
(b) Comparison with the Antarctic Treaty   
 
In the Antarctic Treaty chapter, I discussed the argument that Antarctica does not hold the same 
level of strategic relevance as other areas of the globe, like the Arctic. At the time the Outer 
Space Treaty was signed, the strategic use of outer space was still being explored, and its full 
                                               
54 United States Draft Treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, above n 27, arts 8 
and 9; Soviet Union Draft Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of 
outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies UN Doc A/AC.105/35 (16 September 1966) art IV. 
55 See for example Iran’s comments in Summary Record of the 66th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.66 (21 October 1966) at 7. India in particular fought for the 
expansion of peaceful purposes to include outer space; ibid, at 5-6, and appealed to the United States and Soviet 
Union to reconsider their position in Summary Record of the 65th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.65 (24 October 1966) at 11.  
56 Summary Record of the 66th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ibid, at 7. 
57 Summary Record of the 65th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 55, at 10.  
58 Bin Cheng Studies in International Space Law (Oxford University Press, USA, 1997), 246. 
59 Shannon Orr “Peace and Conflict in Outer Space” (1998) 30 Peace Research 52 at 54.  
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strategic relevance was not yet known. However, it was clear that outer space held the potential 
to be incredibly useful for military purposes, for reasons discussed above. This helps to explain 
the difference between the Antarctic Treaty’s sweeping peaceful purposes, demilitarisation and 
denuclearisation provisions, while the Outer Space Treaty’s equivalent provisions are far 
narrower. The negotiating parties, and in particular the superpowers, would not have been 
willing to let go of such strategic potential. As such, the Outer Space Treaty’s provisions 
provide a halfway measure, in the Treaty preserves certain areas for peaceful purposes, but 
remains silent in respect of other ways that outer space could be militarised.  
 
5. Article III: application of international law to outer space 
 
Article III provides that all activities in outer space shall be carried on “in accordance with 
international law … in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and 
promoting international cooperation and understanding”.60 Lifted directly from the Declaration 
of Legal Principles,61 art III provides assurance that where the Outer Space Treaty and its 
subsequent agreements are silent, States are able to apply general principles of law to outer 
space.62 Bogaert notes that as the intention of the UNGA and COPUOS was to “conclude a 
treaty on the basic principles of the conduct of States in outer space”, it was necessary for the 
Treaty to contain a provision which confirmed that international law, including the UN 
Charter,63 applied to outer space.64  
 
6. Articles IX and XIII: dispute resolution 
 
                                               
60 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art III. 
61 Declaration of Legal Principles, above n 14, principle 4. 
62 Gal, above n 30, at 41. 
63 Charter of the United Nations.  
64 Bogaert, above n 50, at 43. 
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There are two articles which potentially could be considered “dispute resolution” clauses: art 
IX and art XIII. I discuss part of art IX in the mutual distrust subsection, but the relevant part 
here states:65 
 A State Party which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by 
another State Party in outer space … would cause potentially harmful interference 
with activities in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space … may request 
consultation concerning the activity or experiment. 
 
Art XIII provides that where there is an international inter-governmental organisation carrying 
out activities in outer space, and where “practical questions” arise in connection with these 
activities, such practical questions shall be resolved by the States Parties “either with the 
appropriate international organisation or with one or more States members of that international 
organisation, which are Parties to [the Outer Space Treaty]”.66 The text does not elaborate on 
how a “consultation” would take place, nor does it provide a framework for reaching a 
“resolution”. Goh has noted that arts IX and XIII cannot accurately be described as dispute 
resolution clauses, claiming that “these provisions are more as a means of conflict 
avoidance”.67  
 
Articles IX and XIII of the Outer Space Treaty differ from the dispute resolution clause in the 
Antarctic Treaty, as they concern only the activities carried out: the Antarctic Treaty’s clause 
is related to the interpretation and application of the Treaty itself.68 
 
Goh goes on to note that the lack of a comprehensive provision for the settlement of disputes 
“could well be attributed to the political climate due to the Cold War at the time of [the Outer 
                                               
65 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art IX. 
66 Article XIII. 
67 Gerardine Meishan Goh Dispute Settlement in International Space Law: A Multi-Door Courthouse for Outer 
Space (BRILL, eBook ed, 2007) at 30. 
68 The Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1960), art XI(1). 
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Space Treaty]’s negotiation”.69 This observation is sound, especially when considering the 
other case studies of this thesis. The Antarctic Treaty’s dispute resolution clause is weak, and 
there is no such clause in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite the weakness of the Antarctic 
Treaty’s dispute resolution clause, however, it is the strongest out of the three case studies.  
 
7. Concluding notes 
 
The peace and security tension comes through strongly in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly 
in the disarmament provisions found in art IV. These provisions make it clear that there was a 
desire to avoid superpower conflict reaching outer space. However, the Outer Space Treaty 
only succeeds to partially demilitarise outer space: while the negotiating parties succeeded in 
setting aside the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the rest of outer space 
remains open for military use. The lack of compromise by the United States and the Soviet 
Union on this is unsurprising: in direct contrast to Antarctica, outer space already held a great 
deal of strategic relevance at the time of drafting.  
 
The ban on territorial appropriation aided in ensuring international cooperation in outer space, 
as this meant that there could be no argument over conflicting territorial claims. There remained 
a high risk of conflict reaching outer space before the Outer Space Treaty was concluded, owing 
to the relative lawlessness of the area. Article III, which provided that international law applied 
to outer space, is an important security measure – in theory, this means that when an activity 
arises outside of the Outer Space Treaty’s scope, it can still be considered within the 
international legal framework.  
 
                                               
69 Goh, above n 67, at 30, fn 66. 
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Overall, peace and security appears to be the dominant tension in the Outer Space Treaty. The 
strategic possibilities of outer space were rapidly growing at the time of drafting, and reaching 
an agreement on the law of outer space was a priority for both the space powers and 
international community at large. The desire to set aside outer space for peaceful purposes was 
fettered by the prior military activity in the area, meaning total demilitarisation was not 
possible. However, this failure is mitigated by the positive outcomes of the Outer Space Treaty, 
such as the nuclear ban on celestial bodies and the non-appropriation principle.  
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As I have discussed in previous chapters, mutual distrust ran deep between the superpowers; 
distrust regarding nuclear weapons was particularly prevalent. The new technology, 
particularly the ability of a State to use satellites to track another State’s activities, provided a 
new element to the Cold War – however, as I discuss below, this new element may have 
provided more reassurance rather than distrust.  
 
Mutual distrust is found in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly with regards to art X, which 
relates to the installation of tracking devices on another State’s territory. In addition to art X, 
in this subsection I will consider the information sharing and inspection provisions of the 
Treaty, provisions regarding international responsibility, and the administrative provisions. I 
will then come to a preliminary conclusion.  
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
One of the many reasons the launch of Sputnik instilled fear in the United States was the idea 
of an “eye in the sky capable of looking down on the United States at will.”70 This undoubtedly 
fuelled the tension of mutual distrust, with Wilson and Kaiser noting that there was a “boom in 
defence spending” by the United States government after Sputnik.71 However, it is arguable 
that Sputnik soon worked to alleviate mutual distrust, as both superpowers quickly adapted to 
                                               
70 Neal et al, above n 16, at 3. 
71 Benjamin Wilson and David Kaiser “Calculating Times: Radar, Ballistic Missiles, and Einstein’s Relativity” in 
Naomi Oreskes and John Krige (eds) Science and Technoogy in the Global Cold War, ed. (MIT Press, eBook ed, 
2014) at 294. 
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using satellites for intelligence on one another. Reynolds explains that the United States 
Discoverer satellite program’s first film “captured a million square miles of the Soviet Union”, 
and goes on to note that the intelligence gathered by the superpowers enabled them to “keep 
watch on the other, and provided essential reassurance for their more stable relationship after 
the Cuban crisis of 1962”.72  
 
Nevertheless, the more sinister capabilities of rockets in outer space could not be ignored,73 nor 
could the fact that outer space was a new, mostly lawless frontier. Regulating the activities of 
States in outer space was an important step towards managing the threat of the superpowers 
using outer space to continue, or escalate, their Cold War rivalry. The tension of mutual distrust 
both helped and hindered the drafting process of the Outer Space Treaty. Both superpowers 
wanted a legal regime to provide for surer footing in conducting activities in outer space, but 
as I explore below, the tension made it difficult to agree on key provisions which would 
strengthen the Treaty. 
 
3. Article X: tracking facilities 
 
Article X pertains to the establishment of tracking facilities on foreign territory. It provides that 
States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty:74 
… shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the 
Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched 
by those States.  
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which 
it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned. 
 
                                               
72 Reynolds, above n 8, at 387. 
73 As discussed in the peace and security subsection.  
74 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art X. 
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The genesis of this article can be found in art I of the 1966 Soviet draft treaty, which stated that 
“the parties to the Treaty undertake to accord equal conditions to States engaged in the 
exploration of outer space”.75 The American draft treaty contained no such provision. In 
essence, through art I of the Soviet Union draft treaty, the Soviet Union sought to establish a 
“most-favoured-nation” clause in the Outer Space Treaty regarding tracking facilities. Most-
favoured-nation clauses are most often found in international trade law.76 The International 
Law Commission (“ILC”) defines a most-favoured-nation clause as a treaty provision whereby 
a State accords most-favoured-nation treatment to the other State or States party to the treaty.77 
Most-favoured-nation treatment, according to the ILC’s definition, means:78  
Treatment upon terms not less favourable than the terms of treatment accorded by 
the granting State to any third State in a defined sphere of international relations 
with respect to determined persons or things. 
 
In the context of the Outer Space Treaty, the Soviet delegation to the COPUOS Legal Sub-
Committee elaborated on the draft art I, stating it meant:79 
that if State A permitted State B to build a tracking station on its territory, State C 
… should be given the opportunity to build a similar station on A’s territory. 
 
The rationale behind the inclusion of such a draft article is simple: at the time of negotiating 
the treaty, the United States had established tracking facilities in 23 States.80 The Soviet Union, 
while unwilling to allow foreign tracking facilities on its own territory, had a strong interest in 
establishing tracking facilities in the same States as the United States.81 A most-favoured-
nation clause would provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to establish tracking stations 
                                               
75 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Fifth Session to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space UN Doc A/AC.105/35 (16 September 1966) Annex I.  
76 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2014, online ed) Most-Favoured-Nation Clause. 
77 International Law Commission, third report on the most-favoured-nation clause UN Doc A/CN.4/257 (31 
March and 8 May 1972), at 162, draft article 2(1).  
78 Ibid.  
79 Summary Record of the 63rd Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 28, at 6. 
80 Cheng, above n 58, at 254. 
81 At 254.  
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in these States, on the basis that the States could not treat the Soviet Union less favourably than 
the United States in this regard.  
 
American delegate Arthur Goldberg noted that the provision “gave [the COPUOS Legal Sub-
Committee] a great deal of trouble. It required long negotiation to come out as it did”.82 The 
Soviet Union produced a revised art I, which merely clarified its provision and contained no 
concessions.83 In response to this revision, the United States took the position that the Soviet 
proposal “appeared to be for the benefit of the space Powers alone”, and that “the installation 
of tracking facilities in the territory of a host country raised many technical and political 
questions which could only be dealt with bilaterally”.84 American disagreement with the Soviet 
proposal was echoed by multiple delegations: it was noted that the proposal was not reciprocal, 
as the proposed article did not give other States the right to establish tracking devices on Soviet 
territory.85 
 
Dembling and Arons argue that disagreement over art X was “resolved essentially in favour of 
the United States’ position”.86 Article X places an obligation on States to consider on the basis 
of equality any requests by other States Parties to install tracking facilities, but there is no 
obligation to agree. Further, the final draft of art X specifically provides that any such 
agreement will be determined bilaterally between the relevant States. The negotiating history 
of art X expresses mutual distrust, but not strictly between the superpowers: instead, it showed 
                                               
82 United States Senate Treaty on outer space: hearings (90th congress, Washington, 1967) at 43. 
83 USSR: Revised text of the article contained in paragraph II of Working Paper No. 23 of 29 July 1966 UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/WP.29 (13 September 1966) Annex IV. The revised article read: States Parties to the Treaty will 
accord other States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities relating to the exploration and use of outer space 
equal conditions for observing the flight of space objects launched by those States.  
84 Summary Record of the 73rd Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.73 (19 October 1966) at 3; also note Australia’s comments in agreement with the United States 
at  9.  
85 Ibid: see for example the positions of Italy, Australia, Japan, Brazil and Canada.  
86 Paul G. Dembling and Daniel M. Arons “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty” (1967) 33 J. Air L. & Com. 
402 at 444. 
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distrust of the Soviet Union by many of the delegations which had United States tracking 
facilities on their territory.  
 
4. Articles XI and XII: information and inspection  
 
Articles XI and XII loosely form the verification methods of compliance with the Outer Space 
Treaty. Under art XI, States Parties agree to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public and 
the international scientific community of the “nature, conduct, locations and results” of their 
activities in outer space “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable”.87 This article expands 
on the obligation to facilitate and encourage international cooperation in scientific investigation 
in outer space, found in art I, placing a specific – but not absolute – obligation on States Parties 
to disseminate information about their activities.88  
 
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that all “stations, installations, equipment and 
space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other 
States Parties”.89 Such stations and installations will be open on the basis of reciprocity, and 
the representatives must give “reasonable advance notice” of their visits.90  
 
During negotiations, the United States took the view that the “principle of openness … was an 
essential feature for a treaty designed to promote international peace and co-operation”.91 This 
principle would be served by three means: international cooperation in scientific 
                                               
87 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art XI. 
88 Article I, paragraph 3. 
89 Article XII. 
90 Article XII. 
91 Summary Record of the 64th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.64 (24 October 1966) at 11. 
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investigations,92 freedom of inspection,93 and mandatory reporting of outer space activities to 
the UN Secretary-General (“UNSG”).94 The first of the United States proposals, regarding 
freedom of scientific investigation, encountered little resistance. When discussing the first three 
articles of the Outer Space Treaty, Dembling noted that the agreement on these articles was 
unsurprising, as they essentially codified much of the Declaration of Legal Principles, and were 
analogous to principles found in the already in force Antarctic Treaty.95 It is true that arts I – 
III resemble principles more than obligations, as they do not provide any means for practical 
implementation.96 The “freedom of scientific investigation” clause in the United States draft 
was as such accepted by the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee Working Group and became art I, 
paragraph 3, of the final Outer Space Treaty.97  
 
The draft provisions regarding mandatory reporting and inspections, which would provide the 
practical steps that were missing from art I, paragraph 3, did not encounter the same level of 
support. Mandatory reporting was vehemently opposed by the Soviet Union, which relied on a 
UNGA Resolution to claim that States Parties would report to the UNSG on a voluntary basis 
only.98 The United States argued that alongside helping to facilitate scientific cooperation, 
mandatory reporting would “give assurance that in their space activities States were pursuing 
exclusively peaceful ends”:99 in other words, the United States was attempting to insert a 
provision which would help to verify compliance with the principles of the Treaty.  
                                               
92 United States Draft Treaty governing the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, above n 27, art 3.  
93 Article 6. 
94 Article 4.  
95 Dembling and Arons, above n 86, at 429. I discuss the Antarctic Treaty further below.  
96 Bogaert, above n 50, at 42; Cheng, above n 58, at 252; Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and 
the United Nations (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 1999) at 176. 
97 Text of article I accepted by the Working Group at its Third Meeting on 29 July 1966, UN Doc A/AC.105/35 
(29 July 1966).  
98 Summary Record of the 64th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 91, at 12; 
International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space GA Res 1721(XVI) (1960).  
99 Summary Record of the 70th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.70 (1 October 1966) at 5. 
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Despite arguing that voluntary reporting would ensure “the purpose of the treaty would not be 
served”,100 as well as support from multiple delegations,101 the United States later produced a 
revised draft article 4 “to meet the objections raised by the Soviet Union”.102 This new article 
contained the phrasing of “to the extent feasible and practicable”, which is found in the final 
Outer Space Treaty.103 The revised article is a clear compromise between the opposing views; 
“to the extent feasible and practicable” is stricter than “voluntarily”, but still does not make 
reporting mandatory. As such, art XI cannot be said to provide an effective method of 
verification.  
 
The United States’ proposed inspection provision104 also encountered resistance by the Soviet 
Union. The inspection provision, as mentioned earlier, formed part of the United States’ 
proposed practical steps to ensure freedom in outer space. Freedom of access to installations 
and stations on celestial bodies would also form another method of verification that States 
Parties were adhering to the disarmament obligations under the Outer Space Treaty.105  
 
The Soviet Union accepted the general principle found in article 6 of the United States Draft, 
but wanted the phrase “at all times” to be removed, replaced with “on the basis of reciprocity 
under the condition that the time of the visit is to be agreed between the parties concerned”.106 
                                               
100 At 5.   
101 See for example the comments of Canada, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Italy and Brazil in Summary Record 
of the 65th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 55.  
102 Summary Record of the 73rd Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 84, at 3.  
103 Revision of Article 4 of the US Draft Treaty, Proposed by the Representative of the United States of America 
UN Doc A/AC.105/WP.31 (13 September 1966) Annex IV.  
104 Article 6: All areas of celestial bodies, including all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on 
celestial bodies, shall be open at all times to representatives of other States conducting activities on celestial 
bodies.  
105 Christopher M Petras “Space Force Alpha: Military Uses of the International Space Station and the Concept 
of ‘Peaceful Purposes’” (2002) 53 Air Force Law Review 135 at 161. 
106 Summary Record of the 63rd Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 28. 
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It objected to “at all times” on the basis that it was customary on Earth for a friendly visit 
between States “to be preceded by agreement between the guest and the host”;107 further, 
unannounced visits on celestial bodies could constitute a danger to the personnel in those 
stations.108 The United States argued that it had lifted the wording of its draft article directly 
from the successful art VII(3) of the Antarctic Treaty,109 as well as noting that there was no 
need to for a specific condition of reciprocity as it is already implied.110  
 
Despite the many similarities between the proposed Outer Space Treaty articles and the 
Antarctic Treaty, the Soviet Union appeared to reject the Antarctic analogy outright. In support 
of the United States, Australia noted that art VII(3) of the Antarctic Treaty “embodied the 
element of reciprocity, without specifically using that term”.111In response, the Soviet Union 
stated that “one could not automatically apply conditions which were appropriate to one set of 
circumstances to an entirely different situation.”112 Eventually, the Soviet amendments were 
accepted.113 
 
As with art VII of the Antarctic Treaty and art III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the inspection 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty highlight the tension of mutual distrust. The detailed UN 
records available for the Outer Space Treaty provide insight into how the tension was present 
during negotiations of arts XI and XII. The United States clearly wished to have some way to 
ensure other space powers were abiding by their treaty obligations, while the Soviet Union 
pushed back against providing such a degree of information and access to other States Parties.  
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113 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Fifth Session to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, above n 75. 
 121 
 
The United States’ push for an analogous inspections regime in outer space to the one in 
Antarctica was largely unsuccessful. This means that when comparing the Outer Space Treaty’s 
inspection and information sharing provisions with the Antarctic Treaty equivalent, the Outer 
Space Treaty’s provisions fall far short of ideal. The negotiating history shows a reticence of 
States Parties – in particular, of the Soviet Union and States under the Soviet sphere of 
influence – to submit themselves to a comprehensive regime which would aid in assessing and 
ensuring compliance with the Outer Space Treaty. Additionally, States Parties to the Outer 
Space Treaty must share information about their space activities to the greatest extent feasible 
and practicable, meaning the obligation is not absolute. It leaves a defence open to a State Party 
who does not share such information. In contrast, art VII(5) of the Antarctic Treaty is strict: 
the States Parties must share such information.  
 
The reason for the relative weaknesses in the Outer Space Treaty regime may tie into the fact 
that while Antarctica was completely demilitarised,114 both the Soviet Union and the United 
States had definite interests in using outer space for military purposes. This partial 
demilitarisation of outer space – including the division between celestial bodies and outer 
“void” space – is discussed in detail later in this chapter. These military interests likely 
impacted on the willingness of some States Parties to allow for the same transparency that 
exists in Antarctica, much like the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards regime does not touch 
NWS’s nuclear weapons held for military purposes.   
 
5. Art VI, VII and VIII: international responsibility  
 
                                               
114 Except for military personnel and equipment used for the purposes of scientific investigation.  
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Article VI provides for international responsibility of States and other organisations in outer 
space. It holds that States Parties shall bear “international responsibility for national activities 
in outer space … and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with [the 
Outer Space Treaty]”.115 This responsibility includes both governmental and non-governmental 
agencies. The article places a further obligation that activities carried out by non-governmental 
agencies must “require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State 
Party”.116 Where an international organisation is carrying out activities in outer space, 
responsibility is to be carried by both the organisation and “the States Parties … participating 
in such organisation”.117  
 
Articles VII and VIII further establish the rules on responsibility, liability and jurisdiction. 
Under art VII, a State Party which launches an object into outer space is internationally liable 
for any damage caused by that object,118 while art VIII ensures that a State Party retains 
jurisdiction and control over objects it launches into outer space.119 Articles VII and VIII have 
now been expanded upon by subsequent treaties: the Liability Convention and the Registration 
Convention, respectively.120  
 
6. Articles XIV(3), XV and XVI: administrative provisions 
 
Article XIV(3) states that the Outer Space Treaty will enter into force after five States have 
deposited instruments of ratification; these five states must include the Depositary 
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Governments.121 The Depositary Governments of the Outer Space Treaty are the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.122 
 
Article XV provides that any State Party can propose amendments to the Outer Space Treaty.123 
Once a majority of the States Parties have accepted the amendments, the amendments enter 
into force for those States Parties; they enter into force for the remaining States Parties once 
they have accepted the amendment.124 Under art XVI, a State Party may give notice of its 
withdrawal after one year after the Outer Space Treaty’s entry into force.125 This is the simplest 
withdrawal clause out of the three case studies. Under the Antarctic Treaty, withdrawal rights 
are only triggered by an attempt at amendment;126 under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a State 
Party can withdraw if “extraordinary events” have “jeopardised [the State’s] supreme 
interests”.127 
 
7. Concluding notes  
 
Mutual distrust can be found in the Outer Space Treaty, but it is particularly prevalent in the 
Treaty’s negotiating history. Disagreement over tracking facilities nearly brought negotiations 
to a standstill, as the Soviet Union made it clear that there would be no Outer Space Treaty 
without such provisions. The tracking facility dispute does not show mutual distrust, however, 
as much as it shows distrust by other States towards the Soviet Union. It was the States who 
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had United States tracking facilities on their territory that fought against the notion most 
strongly, as they would be the most affected by the clause.  
Mutual distrust severely affected the strength of the verification methods in the Outer Space 
Treaty. The United States pushed for mandatory reporting requirements, but the Soviet Union 
pushed back. The United States vied for inspection procedures similar to those found in the 
Antarctic Treaty, and again the Soviet Union pushed back. The United States desire for 
openness of outer space exploration found resistance when met with the Soviet Union’s 
unwillingness to bind itself to any compulsory measures. Despite support for United States 
proposals by other delegations, the United States made many concessions to the Soviet Union 
in this regard. This is understandable given the sense of urgency to have an established treaty 
before either superpower completed a successful moon landing; however, it resulted in a treaty 








The Outer Space Treaty was drafted at a time where the possibility of extracting resources from 
outer space seemed impossible. As such, the tension of resources is absent from the Outer 
Space Treaty. However, the fact that the Outer Space Treaty has declared outer space as “the 
province of all mankind” carries significance for future resource exploitation, and is worth 
exploring. Also worth noting is the increasing role of private organisations in outer space, and 
the argument that private property rights fall outside of the non-appropriation principle in art 
II. Attempts have been made to create a scheme for resource management in outer space, 
particularly by way of the Moon Treaty. While the Moon Treaty has not been signed by any 
spacefaring nations, it provides that outer space is the common heritage of mankind, furthering 
the original province of mankind principle found in the Outer Space Treaty; the implications 
of this are also worth discussing.  
 
2. Before the Treaty 
 
As with the Antarctic Treaty, the question of resources was largely omitted from the Outer 
Space Treaty. Outer space is even more remote than Antarctica: it is understandable that the 
limitations of resource exploitation faced by those in Antarctica would be mirrored by those in 
outer space. At the time of the Outer Space Treaty negotiations, the exploitation of outer space 
resources “was not considered feasible … therefore, [the Outer Space Treaty] did not contain 
any specific reference to exploitative activities”.128 A 1959 COPUOS Report considered that 
“problems relating to the … exploitation of celestial bodies did not require priority 
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treatment”.129 As late as 1997, Christol argued that “it is evident that States have not decided 
that the Moon’s resources are sufficiently valuable to establish an international legal regime 
governing their allocation”.130 However, Christol stated this when explaining the non-
ratification of the Moon Treaty; his assertion ignores the fact that the UNGA had specifically 
requested a regime on the exploitation of lunar and outer space resources.131 This request 
directly acknowledges the fact that existing outer space law is unequipped to deal with the 
question of resources. Interest in outer space resources is increasing, and specific issues have 
arisen regarding private organisations and their rights to resources in outer space. 
 
3. Articles I and II – resources and the CHM 
 
Articles I and II, which involve the province of all mankind and sovereignty, have been 
discussed in the peace and security subsection of this chapter. That is their key purpose. 
However, they are also highly relevant in the discussion of resources. Like the Antarctic Treaty, 
resources have been omitted from the Outer Space Treaty. In the previous subsection I 
discussed two of the three key issues facing the non-appropriation principle contained in art II 
of the Outer Space Treaty. The third issue, regarding resource exploitation, is better dealt with 
in this subsection. Also worth exploring is the concept of outer space as “the province of all 
mankind”. 
 
(a) Resource exploitation 
 
If it is established that art II prohibits appropriation by private entities as well as States, the 
next issue is whether this extends to resource exploitation.132 Specifically, are the resources 
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available on celestial bodies, separate from territory, also non-appropriable?133 Interest is 
steadily growing in outer space resources, but the question remains open.134  
 
Christol argues that the Outer Space Treaty “implicitly … authorizes the exploitation of 
resources from the outer space environment,”135 but does not explain how; Tronchetti, 
conversely, advances a strong argument for why resource exploitation is acceptable under the 
Outer Space Treaty. He argues that as outer space is open for exploration and use by all:136 
States are entitled to appropriate outer space natural resources so long as their 
activities do not involve any permanent claims to appropriation of, or exercise of 
authority over, the areas in which the resources are appropriated and until such 
activities do not prevent other states from doing the same. 
 
This argument holds merit, as it employs other the principles of equality and non-appropriation 
found in the Outer Space Treaty. Tronchetti is not alone in this view; Paliouras asserts that “the 
prevailing opinion on the subject” is that art II does not prohibit “the exercise of … sovereign 
rights such as the freedom to exploit natural resources”.137 Further, fear that the Outer Space 
Treaty could not appropriately regulate resource exploitation was one of the key factors in the 
drafting of the Moon Treaty,138 indicating that the Outer Space Treaty is not equipped to cope 
with the question of resources. As such, while art II prohibits private and State appropriation 
alike, it is unlikely that the non-appropriation principle can be used in order to prevent resource 
exploitation and extraction.   
 
(b) Common heritage of mankind 
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Any discussion of resource exploitation needs to be considered in light of art I of the Outer 
Space Treaty, which declares that the exploration and use of outer space (including the moon 
and other celestial bodies) “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries”.139 It further states that “the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies … shall be the province of all mankind”.140 
 
The phrase “province of all mankind” first appeared in art I of the Soviet Draft Treaty,141 and 
was an elaboration of the first principle of the Declaration of Legal Principles.142 The Soviet 
Union explained that the phrase was “a way of stressing the principle of equality between space 
and non-space Powers … and of showing clearly that the space achievements of the various 
countries were those of all mankind”.143 The Soviet delegation disagreed with comments that 
the phrase “province of all mankind” should be replaced with “irrespective of the state of their 
scientific development”, believing it would weaken the text of the treaty;144 however, the text 
accepted by the Working Group ultimately used both phrases.145  
 
Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation did not elaborate on the specific implications of outer 
space as the province of all mankind, making its precise meaning unclear.146 The wording bears 
resemblance to the common heritage of mankind principle (“CHM”), which I discussed in the 
                                               
139 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art I. 
140 Article I.  
141 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Fifth Session to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, above n 75, at Annex I, page 12. 
142 Declaration of Legal Principles, above n 14: “The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for 
the benefit and in the interests of all mankind”.  
143 Summary Record of the 64th Meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, above n 91, at 9. 
144 Suggested by Brazil, ibid, at 9; the Soviet Union’s disagreement is also at 9.  
145 Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of its Fifth Session to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, above n 75, annex II, at 4.  
146 Diederiks-Verschoor, above n 29, at 27. For interpretations of the “province of mankind concept”, see J E S 
Fawcett Outer Space: New Challenges to Law and Policy (Clarendon Press, Great Britain, 1984) at 3–19; see 
generally Carl Q Christol Space Law: Past, Present and Future (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Netherlands, 1991). 
 129 
previous chapter. Indeed, Christol explains that the CHM principle “has been influenced in its 
development by the ‘benefit of mankind,’ ‘province of all mankind,’ and res communis 
humanitatis concepts”.147 Specifically regarding outer space law Baslar notes that CHM is “a 
continuation of the … province and benefit of mankind clauses of the [Outer Space Treaty]”.148 
However, this does not mean that the province of mankind has the same meaning as CHM. 
Baslar further explains that the failure of most States to ratify the Moon Treaty is “inseparably 
entwined” with the CHM provisions in that Treaty,149 indicating that the non-ratifying States 
were unwilling to extend the CHM principle to outer space. This leaves the application of the 
province of mankind principle in doubt, particularly in regards to resource exploitation. States 
Parties to the Outer Space Treaty impliedly acknowledged this when the CHM principle was 
included in the final draft of the Moon Treaty.  
 
4. Moon Treaty 
 
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(“the Moon Treaty”)150 was produced to the UNGA after 7 years of work by the UNOOSA 
Legal Subcommittee.151 Bogaert argues that after the Moon Landing in 1969, “it became … 
clear that the general principles drafted in the [Outer Space Treaty] had become insufficient to 
regulate the future activities regarding the further exploration and … exploitation of the Moon” 
and “new … international drafts would be needed”.152 The need for a new treaty was generally 
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accepted.153 After COPOUS negotiations, the Moon Treaty was adopted by the UNGA in 
1979.154  
 
I have mentioned the Moon Treaty briefly in this chapter in relation to the CHM principle, and 
also used it as a point of comparison in my Antarctic Treaty chapter. The Moon Treaty largely 
reaffirms and reiterates the principles of the Outer Space Treaty, but it was the additions which 
caused the most controversy. The most relevant clause of the Moon Treaty for the purposes of 
this section is art 11. Among other things, art 11 declares that “the moon and its natural 
resources are the common heritage of mankind”;155 further, States Parties undertake to 
“establish an international regime … to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
moon”.156 Further, art 18 provides for conferences to review the Treaty, and in particular the 
implementation of art 11(5).157 
 
The Moon Treaty seemed promising, and it was originally greatly supported by the United 
States.158 However, when it came time to ratify the Treaty, the United States balked. Hearings 
on the Treaty were held in 1980.159 Reynolds notes that the key complaints about the Treaty 
concerned the ‘common heritage’ regime.160 Davis and Lee further note that “disagreements 
over the creation of new obligations and responsibilities … have meant that the Moon [Treaty] 
has not been accepted by most states”, specifically referencing the CHM and resource 
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management provisions in art 11.161 When the United States failed to ratify the Moon Treaty, 
the Soviet Union and other space-faring nations followed suit.  
 
Once again, there is a strong comparison here between the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space 
Treaty: specifically, the attempts to resolve the question of resources in later treaties. As 
discussed, analogies between Antarctica and Outer Space were used when the Outer Space 
Treaty was being negotiated. While there are differences between the two which need to be 
distinguished, there is another clear similarity here regarding resources. Neither treaties address 
the issue of resources; as technology and interest developed, so did a visible gap in the law. 
The Antarctic Treaty had the Minerals Convention; the Outer Space Treaty had the Moon 
Treaty.  
 
I have discussed the Minerals Convention in the Antarctic Treaty chapter, and it provides a 
telling comparison. The Minerals Convention aimed to regulate the exploitation of mineral 
resources in Antarctica, but it failed to come into force. The Moon Treaty is currently in force, 
but it is considered a “failed” treaty;162 as no space powers are parties, it is “of no real 
significance in establishing international space law”.163  
 
In comparing the Moon Treaty with the failed Minerals Convention, it is important to note that 
the Antarctic Treaty System has succeeded in an explicit, albeit temporary, moratorium on 
mineral resource exploitation: the Madrid Protocol has expressly prohibited such activities 
until an acceptable, binding legal regime is in place.164 By comparison, there are some who 
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argue that “use” in the Outer Space Treaty could extend to exploitation, and there is no binding 
legal document to overtly deny this school of thought – leaving the question of resources 
unanswered. 
 
5. Concluding notes 
 
As with the Antarctic Treaty, resources have been omitted from the Outer Space Treaty. Again, 
like Antarctica, there has been a growing interest in resource exploitation as appropriate 
technology develops. The question of resources will only become more relevant in the future, 
and the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty do not provide an adequate framework for 
regulating any form of resource exploitation. As outer space is the province of all mankind, 
does this mean that every State can exploit resources, or that no State can? Does the fact that 
many States are not spacefaring, because they are unable to be, mean that it would be unfair to 
let spacefaring States exploit resources?  
 
The Moon Treaty attempted to answer such questions and bridge this gap in the law, but the 
lack of ratification by any space power means its usefulness is limited. I will discuss this further 
in the “Future” chapter of this thesis, but as it stands, the Outer Space Treaty is unable to rise 






In this chapter, I examined how the three chosen tensions came through in the Outer Space 
Treaty. I found that all tensions were present in one way or another. By virtue of the non-
appropriation principle and the partial demilitarisation of outer space, peace and security 
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appears to be the strongest tension in the Outer Space Treaty. However, the tension of mutual 
distrust is significant in the way it shaped the Treaty’s verification provisions. Resources, 
whether consciously or not, were omitted from the Outer Space Treaty; alongside the emerging 
prevalence of private actors in outer space, they remain the biggest threats facing the Outer 
Space Treaty today.  
 
In this final section, I will briefly look at the status of the Outer Space Treaty today. I will go 
on to make a preliminary analysis of the Treaty as a whole, taking into account all of the 
tensions. Finally, I will use what I have discovered to see whether the Outer Space Treaty can 
“survive” in a post-Cold War world. The findings in this conclusion will be expanded upon in 
the final chapter of my thesis, where I analyse in more detail the threats facing the treaty today, 
and the treaty’s ability to respond to those threats.  
 
2. The Outer Space Treaty in the present day 
 
The Outer Space Treaty is still in force today, with 107 States Parties and a further 23 
signatories. It is considered the magna carta of the international law of outer space, and serves 
as a starting point for the development of the four subsequent treaties governing activities in 
outer space. 
 
While the Outer Space Treaty did not provide for any form of review conference, in 2018 the 
first United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(“UNISPACE”) was held in Vienna.165 It does not mention the Outer Space Treaty. Space law 
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is still being developed, but the Outer Space Treaty is not: although it may serve as the 
background instrument, it is quickly losing relevance as new agreements become necessary to 
combat modern day issues.  
 
3. A closer look at the Treaty as a whole 
 
As with the Antarctic Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty is a 
fairly short, sparse treaty. Many articles are directly lifted from the Declaration of Legal 
Principles with no development, leaving ambiguity as to the scope and meaning of the 
provisions. This may be at least partially attributed to the urgency felt by some of the 
negotiating parties, and in particular the United States: in 1966, President Lyndon B Johnson 
stated that the United States must “take action now” on concluding an international agreement 
on outer space.166 Over the course of this chapter, it can be seen that the United States made 
many concessions to the Soviet Union, particularly in negotiating verification provisions. The 
mandatory reporting requirements and open inspections were greatly approved by most other 
delegations in COPUOS; despite this support, the United States quickly relaxed the provisions 
to fall in line with the views of the Soviet Union. The reason for these concessions can be 
attributed to the desire to draft a treaty which, as the United States stated, there can be “a 
genuine prospect of agreement”.167 
 
In support of this view, Fawcett further notes that the Outer Space Treaty is “in essence a 
bilateral arrangement between the principal space-users”.168 The negotiating history certainly 
suggests this. The result was that the Outer Space Treaty is a treaty of principles more than a 
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practical guide on how a State should conduct itself in outer space; additionally, the weak 
verification measures make it difficult to measure State Party compliance with the Outer Space 
Treaty. Also like the Antarctic Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty, there are no enforcement 
provisions to sanction States Parties which breach the Outer Space Treaty, which further limits 
its force.  
 
4. Problems facing the Treaty today 
 
The Outer Space Treaty faces similar issues to the Antarctic Treaty: the key problems facing 
the Treaty today are territory and resources. While in this chapter I found that the non-
appropriation principle does not apply to private enterprises, there are many arguments to the 
contrary. This shows the Treaty’s age;  no State had managed to land on a celestial body at the 
time the Treaty was negotiated, and it was likely that the idea of a private entity having the 
ability to do so would have seemed, at best, fanciful.  
 
Resource exploitation, however, remains the biggest threat to the Outer Space Treaty today. 
The lack of any guidance in the Treaty as to if and how resource exploitation can take place on 
the Moon or other celestial bodies is a major detriment to the Outer Space Treaty. As with 
private enterprise, this is likely because technology was relatively rudimentary at the time of 
negotiation compared to now; as with Antarctica, the physical obstacles to any resource 
exploitation meant that the topic was not addressed.  
 
5. Can the Treaty survive in a post-Cold War world?  
 
The Outer Space Treaty’s status at the magna carta of space law all but ensures that it will 
survive; the main issue is whether it will be able to adapt to the post-Cold War landscape, or 
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whether it will become irrelevant for present day purposes. I noted earlier Fawcett’s assertion 
that in essence, the Outer Space Treaty is a bilateral arrangement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. This can only be to the Treaty’s deficit, considering that not only are 
there new State players in outer space – now private entities are making their way into the outer 
space sphere.  
 
There are already a number of subsequent instruments which expand on the Outer Space 
Treaty, where the Treaty’s provisions are inadequate to provide a practicable framework for 
outer space activities. This speaks to the Treaty’s main weakness: it is simply insufficient to 
truly guide States in their outer space endeavours, and the lack of review conferences or 
institutions means that it has little hope of rising to the challenge. Finally, the topic of resources 
needs to be resolved soon, before a State or private entity unilaterally decides to begin the 
process. There does not appear to be any legal method of stopping them at this stage. 
Antarctica, by contrast, has not solved the issue but has at least placed a temporary moratorium 
on mineral exploitation: a similar document would serve the Outer Space Treaty well.  
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1. Introduction  
 
With the case studies now concluded, I turn to the final stage of my thesis. In this chapter, I 
will first briefly summarise how the chosen tensions came through as a whole. I will then 
consider the threats facing each of the treaties today, and their ability to respond to these threats. 
In analysing the treaties’ ability to respond, I will study whether this ability is influenced by 
the chosen tensions and if so, how the tension influenced said ability. The next step is to look 
at the common themes found in the three treaties. Finally, I will consider what this means for 
treaties being negotiated today: namely, whether there are any steps that States should take to 
mitigate the presence of tensions during negotiations and in the treaty texts.  
 
2. Peace and security 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the peace and security tension had the strongest presence throughout 
all of the case studies. Of course, it was the driving reason to conclude the treaties in the first 
place: it is expected that it would also come through in the negotiating histories and final texts. 
The tension was most easily found in articles surrounding demilitarisation, denuclearisation, 
and non-proliferation. Again, this is reasonable considering the intense focus on nuclear 
weapons during the Cold War. Another place where peace and security came through strongly 
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was in the territory articles of the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties,1 where the States Parties 
were required to provide solutions for that problem to ward off any “rush” towards 
appropriation.  
 
There are restraints to these victories: for example, in Antarctica, the solution to territory was 
to freeze the status quo; the negotiating parties were unable to completely demilitarise outer 
space; and the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not go so far as to set out a process for 
disarmament. Overall, however, this tension was more of a help than a hindrance for the 
treaties: it helped to ensure that the main areas of contention were considered by the treaty 
texts. Future conflict was a real possibility in all of the case studies, and this risk helped drive 
the States Parties into negotiating an acceptable solution. 
 
3. Mutual distrust 
 
Mutual distrust was certainly present in all of the case studies, and had the greatest effect on 
the treaties’ strength. It was most clearly found in the verification methods of the case studies. 
In Antarctica, mutual distrust helped to strengthen these methods: the open inspections regime, 
alongside the information sharing provisions, keep Antarctica peaceful. Concerns about 
whether States would comply with the Antarctic Treaty’s provisions – and not trusting each 
other to keep the promises – reinforced the desire for the Treaty to contain robust verification 
measures.  
 
                                               
1 The Antarctic Treaty (opened for signature 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961), art IV; Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967), art II. 
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Mutual distrust had a more detrimental effect on the other two treaties. In the case of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, verification encountered resistance where 
States did not want to be bound by the terms – particularly when verification meant letting 
another State or non-State body into their territory. With the Non-Proliferation Treaty, though 
the safeguards system has been mostly successful, it still only applies to non-nuclear weapons 
states. However, it was in the Outer Space Treaty where mutual distrust impacted verification 
in the strongest way: the inspection and information sharing provisions are weak in contrast 
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s, and especially when compared to the Antarctic Treaty. 




Out of the three tensions, the tension of resources was the least present in the three treaties. 
There are three possible explanations for this: either resources were an oversight; there was not 
enough interest in resources at the time for the negotiating parties to attend to them; or that 
they were deliberately omitted from the treaties (particularly the Antarctic and Outer Space 
Treaties) as they raised too many complications. The latter two explanations are most likely; 
in the case of the Antarctic and Outer Space Treaties in particular, the States Parties did not yet 
have the ability to exploit resources, so the complex issue of how to deal with this future 
problem was less of a priority than the very real issues dealt with in the treaties. 
 
However, hints of Cold War approaches to resources could certainly be seen in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, particularly with regards to technology transfer and the common heritage 
of mankind. It is highly unlikely that the negotiating parties to the treaties simply did not 
consider resources; it is far more plausible that technology which could appropriately exploit 
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resources seemed too far in the future, with the respective situations too complex, meaning the 
negotiating parties chose to leave the questions they raised until they became more relevant. 
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The ever-present problem with the Antarctic Treaty is that it does not actually “solve” the issue 
of territory. This is particularly concerning as interest in Antarctic resources increases, and as 
more States develop their Antarctic programmes. It is a possibility that the States Parties will 
simply continue to abide by the Treaty as it stands, without attempting to change the status quo, 
as they have done for over 50 years. However, this seems like an unsatisfactory answer, and 
one which comes with great uncertainty; as Donald Rothwell notes, the problem of sovereignty 
“is never far from the considerations of many of the delegations attending [ATCMs], or from 
the decisions that are made within that forum and more broadly within the [Antarctic Treaty 
System]”.2 Jacob A. Reed takes a more urgent view, predicting that competing territorial claims 
were one of three reasons that the Antarctic Treaty System will “inevitably” end.3  
 
Another way that territory and sovereignty may threaten the Antarctic Treaty is through the 
growing school of thought that Antarctica either is, or should be treated as, the common 
heritage of mankind (“CHM”).4 Powell and Dodds note that there has been “miniminal 
codification within Antarctic Treaty instruments of emerging principles of international law 
                                               
2 Donald R. Rothwell “Sovereignty and the Antarctic Treaty” (2010) 46(1) Polar Record 17 at 20. 
3 Jacob A. Reed “Cold War Treaties in a New World: The Inevitable End of the Outer Space and Antarctic Treaty 
Systems” (2017) 42 Air & Space Law 463.  
4 Ellen S. Tenenbaum “A World Park in Antarctica: The Common Heritage of Mankind” (1990) 10(1) Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 109; Kemal Baslar The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1998) 243–76; Stephen A. Zorn “Antarctic Minerals: A Common 
Heritage Approach” (1984) 10(1) Resources Policy 2–18.  
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such as [CHM]”,5 implying that the Antarctic Treaty is falling behind in this regard. If this 
school of thought continues to gain popularity, it will encounter inevitable friction with the 
present legal status of Antarctica, where claims are frozen but undeniably still present. It is 
possible that the resistance of the Antarctic Treaty States Parties to the CHM principle 




The second threat to the Antarctic Treaty is the issue of resources. It is not a new threat, 
however, and has been the subject of great debate since at least the 1970s.6 As I outlined in the 
resources subsection of the Antarctic Treaty chapter, many attempts have been made to resolve 
this issue, with mixed success. The CCAMLR and CCAS were successful, which can be at 
least partially attributed to the fact that the Consultative Parties have an obligation under the 
Treaty to consider measures regarding the preservation and conservation of living resources on 
the continent.7 No such obligation exists for other resources, leaving the Treaty ill-equipped to 
deal with arguably the most pressing concern facing the continent it governs.  
 
The Madrid Protocol’s prohibition on mineral resource activities is not permanent, and allows 
the possibility of the ATCM putting a regime into place to deal with mineral resource 
management. Resources have been seen to have a divisive effect on the ATCM, however. The 
problem is inextricably linked with the previous threat, territory, which is acknowledged in the 
                                               
5 R C Powell and K Dodds (eds) Polar Geopolitics? : Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes, (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, eBook ed, 2014) at 65.  
6 Barbara Mitchell “Resources in Antarctica: Potential for Conflict” (1977) 1(2) Marine Policy 91–101; Frank 
Pallone “Resource Exploitation: The Threat to the Legal Regime of Antarctica” (1978) 12(3) The International 
Lawyer 547–61.  
7 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IX 1(f).  
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text of the Madrid Protocol.8 As such, there can be no workable solution to the resources threat 
without first considering the territory threat, but it is likely that the States Parties will need to 
find a solution soon. It is it is highly likely that any threat to the Treaty will come by way of 
interest in Antarctic resources increasing to the extent that States Parties will no longer be 
willing to accept the Treaty and the Madrid Protocol. 
 
(c) New players 
 
The final threat to consider is that of new players in Antarctica. Powell and Dodds note that the 
Antarctic Treaty “certainly was the ‘rich man’s club’ it was … accused of being by key players 
in the non-aligned movement and the G-77 … the immediate interests secured were those of 
the participant states, a small minority of ‘mankind’”.9 This exclusivism is changing. The 
number of States with interests on the continent has increased greatly since 1961, evidenced 
by the fact that there are over double the original number of Consultative Parties.10 This number 
is likely to grow; for example, a recent article indicates that Portugal, with its extensive 
Antarctic programme, is close to achieving consultative status.11  
 
As expressed earlier, the threat of new players is deeply connected with the other two threats: 
as more States develop an interest in Antarctica, it becomes more likely that discontent over 
territorial claims will rise, as will interest in the economic benefits of resource exploitation. A 
pertinent example is China, which acceded to the Treaty in 1983 and achieved consultative 
                                               
8 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 
January 1998), art 25(5)(a): any regime must “fully safeguard the interests of all States referred to in Article IV 
of the Antarctic Treaty”.  
9 Powell and Dodds, above n 5, at 55.  
10 It is a requirement that to become a Consultative Party, a State must demonstrate “its interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial scientific research activity there”; Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IX(2)).  
11 Jose C. Xavier “The Rise of Portugese Antarctic Research: Implications for Portugal’s Status under the 
Antarctic Treaty” (2018) 54 Polar Record 11. 
 144 
status in 1985.12 As noted in the Antarctic Treaty chapter, in 2010, China expressed “an 
increasing dissatisfaction with the current order” about the management of Antarctica and its 
resources.13  
 
Shirley Scott notes that “the consequences of the opening up of Antarctica to more countries 
… may include a growing convergence between the interests of leading internal nonclaimants, 
including the United States and Russia, and those external to the System not saddled by all of 
the obligations imposed by the [Antarctic Treaty System] instruments”.14 The introduction of 
new players into Antarctica also poses problems regarding the interests of existing Consultative 
Party members. As Scott correctly notes, the United States has long been a key player in 
Antarctic affairs; if the United States decided that “the [Antarctic Treaty System] no longer 
serves [its] interest, a major fault-line could open up to the detriment of the [Antarctic Treaty 
System]”.15 As discussed below, one of the issues in the Treaty’s ability to respond to threats 
is the tiered nature of Treaty membership, which runs the risk of decision-making being catered 
to the interests of a select few. With new players reaching Consultative Party status, there is an 
added threat of competing interests eventually bringing decision-making to a standstill.  
 




                                               
12 Wei-chin Lee “China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet so Near” (1990) 30(6) Asian Survey 576 at 576. 
13 Anne-Marie Brady “China’s Rise in Antarctica?” (2010) 50(4) Asian Survey 759 at 773.  
14 Shirley Scott “The Evolving Antarctic Treaty System: Implications of Accommodating Developments in the 
Law of the Sea” in Erik J Molenaar, Alex G Oude and Donald R Rothwell (eds) Law of the Sea and the Polar 
Regions : Interactions Between Global and Regional Regimes, (BRILL, eBook ed, 2013) 17 at 34. 
15 At 20.   
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In practice, the Antarctic Treaty has been successful in stabilising international relations in 
Antarctica. It is, however, a relatively sparse Treaty when it comes to institutions. The 
Antarctic Treaty sets up the ATCM, which is made up of the Consultative Parties,16 as the 
governing body of the Treaty. There is no institution set up at a higher level to observe the 
conduct of States and ensure Treaty obligations are being met; this falls on the States Parties 
themselves. However, the ATCMs take place annually, and each year the Consultative Parties 
produce a detailed report.17 It is through these meetings that the threats facing the Treaty can 
be considered. The regularity of the meetings helps to ensure that the pertinent issues are not 
neglected or ignored. Sune Tamm states:18 
The benefits of consensus as a basis for legal decisions include low risk to states 
wishing to join the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol, and wide participation makes 
a robust legal framework. The downside to a consensus-based legal regime is that 
the bar for compliant behaviour is low and changes are slow to take place. 
 
Tamm’s note on the downside of the ATCMs “consensus-based” regime leads into one of the 
problems faced by the ATCM, which is the growing number of Consultative Parties. The 
Antarctic Treaty has a two-tiered approach to States Parties to the Treaty: Consultative and 
Non-Consultative Parties. A Non-Consultative Party can reach Consultative Party status by 
demonstrating “its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity 
there”.19 As mentioned above, there are now over double the amount of original Consultative 
Parties, with this number likely to continue to grow.  
 
This may cause problems in terms of decision-making as more voices are added to the mix. 
Joyner notes that the introduction of new players to the ATCMs “could eat away at the 
                                               
16 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IX sets up the ATCM. 
17 These are published by the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat: “Meetings” Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (2011) 
<https://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_meetings.aspx?lang=e?>.  
18 Sune Tamm, “Peace vs. Compliance in Antarctica: Inspections and the Environment” (2018) 8(2) The Polar 
Journal 330 at 335.  
19 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art IX(2).  
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cooperative underpinning of the Antarctic Treaty regime, especially if the [Consultative 
Parties] opt to press for narrow-minded national interests at the expense of what is good for the 
whole Treaty membership”.20 Related to this is the higher risk of diverging opinions and 
interests between the Consultative Parties, which may make it more difficult to come to an 
agreement on contentious issues: indeed, Ferrada has noted that there are already difficulties 
in the Consultative Parties in “reaching agreements between parties with interests and visions 
that are often too far apart”.21 Ferrada predicts that the increase in States involved in Antarctica 
will mean that “the already consolidated powers, or others that emerge, will want to impose 
their political influence and interests. The seven claimants will seek to maintain their 
prominence and resist [this influence and interest], as far as they can”.22  
 
Another problem with the ATCMs was highlighted by Rothwell, who brought attention to the 
question of the legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System in general: in a UNGA debate on the 
question of Antarctica in the 1980s, it was “the view of many states at the time, especially 
developing states, [that] Antarctica should have been subject to some form of global 
management under the auspices of a body such as the United Nations …”23 This issue speaks 
directly to the ATCM system, wherein a small number of developed States have final say over 
the management of Antarctica. The requirement of “substantial scientific research” to reach 
Consultative Party status is prohibitive to many poorer, less developed States, leaving the 
governance of Antarctica in the hands of the few. This problem of legitimacy may become 
more prominent in the future, particularly in light of the abovementioned “common heritage of 
mankind” school of thought: if it is eventually accepted that Antarctica is indeed the common 
                                               
20 Christopher C Joyner “Challenges to the Antarctic Treaty: Looking Back to See Ahead” (2009) 6 Polar Journal 
25 at 30.  
21 Luis Valentín Ferrada “Five Factors That Will Decide the Future of Antarctica” (2018) 8(1) Polar Journal 84 
at 88. 
22 At 102. 
23 Rothwell, above n 2, at 19. 
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heritage of mankind, the two-tiered approach to Treaty membership becomes even less 
legitimate.  
 
The ATCM could be interpreted as a continuation of the cooperative spirit of the IGY; however, 
it is more indicative of a lack of willingness by the States Parties to be bound by the decisions 
of a non-State governing body, as it would remove much of the agency of States in continuing 
to develop a legal regime for Antarctica. The ATCM ensures that the States Parties continue to 
take an active role in the development of the Antarctic Treaty System, and that their word is 
final. The ATCMs remain a valuable defence against some of the threats facing the Treaty 
today, but somewhat paradoxically other threats – in particular, the threat of new players – 
directly attack the viability of the ATCM decision-making regime in general.  
 
(b) Dispute resolution and enforcement  
 
The Antarctic Treaty contains a dispute resolution clause in the case of dispute over the 
interpretation or application of the Treaty.24 As I mentioned in the Antarctic Treaty chapter, 
the dispute resolution provisions of the Treaty are weak, and do not include any real deterrent 
if a State breaches the Treaty. There are no enforcement techniques which could be utilised if 
a dispute is not resolved, just as there are no enforcement provisions for breaches of the Treaty 
as a whole. On the topic of enforcement, Jacobssen has noted that States Parties to the Treaty 
are generally “cautious not to take enforcement measures against other State Parties.”25 It can 
be argued that the lack of enforcement measures in the Antarctic Treaty has led to an overall 
                                               
24 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art XI.  
25 Marie Jacobsson “The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and Environmental Issues - Future Challenges for the 
Antarctic Treaty System” in Gillian Triggs and Anne Riddel (eds) Antarctica: Legal and Environmental 
Challenges for the Future (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Great Britain, 2007) at 14. 
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unwillingness by the States Parties to implement other measures at their disposal, which is 
concerning for future attempts at including enforcement measures in subsequent instruments. 
In the case study, I included art XI in the peace and security subsection, as it is a method of 
mitigating future conflict over the interpretation or application of the Treaty. Given that the 
Antarctic Treaty negotiations took place in private, it is impossible to ascertain the reasoning 
of the negotiating parties for drafting art XI in such a way; however, insight can be gleaned 
from the Treaty as a whole. As I have already discussed, the Treaty did not provide for a higher-
level institution to oversee the Antarctic Treaty: that power rests with the States Parties 
themselves. This indicates that the States Parties desired that they retained control over the 
workings of the Treaty. Additionally, the verification measures of the Treaty are undertaken 
by observers designated by States Parties themselves – again, ensuring the States Parties retain 
control over operations.26  
 
It is reasonable to extrapolate from this that the States Parties also wanted control over dispute 
resolution: if the disputing Parties do not consent to taking the argument elsewhere, they must 
endeavour to resolve it amongst themselves.  
 
If this conclusion – that the States Parties wanted control, and would not relinquish control to 
another body to resolve disputes – is true, then it is likely that the peace and security tension 
influenced this ability to respond. It was necessary for the States Parties to work together to 
establish peace on the continent, and given the other relevant provisions of the Treaty, the 
States Parties decided the way to do this was to maintain collective control over the Treaty’s 
implementation.  
                                               




The Antarctic Treaty can be modified by unanimous agreement of the Consultative Parties,27 
meaning the threats of territory and resources could be addressed through amendment of the 
Treaty. However, it is unlikely the Consultative Parties will opt for this method. Firstly, 
unanimous agreement of the Consultative Parties will only become less likely as the number 
of Consultative Parties grows, making it all the more difficult for the threats to be addressed 
through amendment. 
 
Secondly, the Antarctic Treaty has never been amended; instead, the States Parties appear to 
prefer implementing new instruments to deal with the issues that arise.28 This may be attributed 
to the consequences of not ratifying an amendment: any State Party who does not ratify the 
amendment within two years will be deemed to have withdrawn from the Treaty.29 Further, if 
an amendment has not entered into force within two years, any State Party may give notice of 
its withdrawal from the Treaty.30 These provisions may be a deterrent to attempting 
amendment, as there is a risk of losing parties to the Treaty.  
 
This was likely deliberate: in conjunction with the ATCM and dispute resolution provisions, 
art XII provides further evidence that the negotiating parties desired continuing control over 




                                               
27 Article XII(1)(a).  
28 See discussion of subsequent instruments below.  
29 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, art XII(b). 
30 Article XII(c).  
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Aside from the ATCMs, the main method of ensuring compliance with the Antarctic Treaty is 
the open inspections regime, which I examined in the ‘mutual distrust’ subsection of the 
Antarctic Treaty chapter.31 Knowing that at any time another state could elect to exercise its 
rights under art VII would likely make a State hesitate if it were contemplating breaching the 
Treaty in some way. Also relevant are the information sharing provisions, where States have 
an obligation to share information about their Antarctic activities “to the greatest extent feasible 
and practicable”.32 As mentioned above, the Antarctic Treaty does not contain any enforcement 
measures to deal with breaches of its provisions; the States Parties appear to operate on the 
principles of openness and cooperation, in the spirit of the IGY, which encourages compliance 
with the Treaty.  
 
Out of the three case studies, the Antarctic Treaty’s verification measures are the strongest. 
The inspections regime is detailed, and has been well utilised by the States Parties to the 
Treaty.33 This bodes well for the Treaty’s ability to manage threats: inspections can be used to 
monitor the activities of new players in Antarctica, with a view to ensuring they are conforming 
with both the provisions of the Treaty, as well as the prohibition on resource exploitation found 
in the Madrid Protocol.34  
 
The strength of the open inspections regime relative to the equivalent provisions in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and Outer Space Treaty can be attributed to both mutual distrust and peace 
and security. As explored in the Antarctic Treaty chapter, the original rationale behind an 
inspections regime was to make sure the superpowers complied with the demilitarisation and 
                                               
31 Article VII. 
32 Article III.  
33 “Inspections Database” Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (2011) 
<https://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_governance_listinspections.aspx>. 
34 Madrid Protocol, above n 8, art 25(5)(a). 
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denuclearisation provisions of the Treaty.35 Because of the lack of trust and the focus on 
Antarctica as a continent of peace, the States Parties were pushed to develop robust verification 
methods, making art VII a fitting example of the Cold War tensions working in the Treaty’s 
favour.  
 
That said, however, the verification methods of the Antarctic Treaty are not perfect, and fall 
short when it comes to measures that can be taken if a breach is discovered. While no direct 
breaches of the Antarctic Treaty have been uncovered under the inspections regime, breaches 
of environmental Codes of Conduct and protocols have been found.36 As the inspections are 
undertaken by observers from a State Party, a problem with the regime is that the States Parties 
may be unwilling to report a breach. In the early 1980s, France constructed an airstrip at the 
Dumon d’Urville station, which “violated the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Fauna 
and Flora and French law by destroying bird habitat”.37 Despite this, Australia inspected the 
station and considered that no breach had occurred, casting doubt onto the credibility of the 
inspections system.38 Tamm notes that while “inspections provide access and are a tremendous 
tool … there is no independent inspectorate”39 – an institution which would help to avoid 
circumstances where a State Party does not want to challenge another State Party on their 
breach. Additionally, the Treaty “does not furnish any guidance on what sanctions or 
procedures should be followed if an inspection should reveal violations”.40 These issues again 
speak to the original signatories’ unwillingness to hand over control to an independent authority 
for governance, inspection and enforcement measures.  
                                               
35 Antarctic Treaty, above n 1, arts I and V.  
36 Francis M Auburn “Aspects of the Antarctic Treaty System” (1988) 26(2) Archiv des Volkerrechts 203 at 205; 
Tamm, above n 18, at 341. In 1985, the US discovered violations regarding waste disposal and sewage treatment.  
37 Tamm, above n 18, at 341. 
38 At 341. 
39 At 337. 
40 At 337.  
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(e) Subsequent instruments   
 
The Antarctic Treaty is further bolstered by the subsequent instruments which form part of the 
Antarctic Treaty System: the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,41 the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,42 and the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (“Madrid Protocol”).43 It is clear that 
environmental concerns remain a focus for the Consultative Parties.  
 
Also relevant is the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (“the Secretariat”), which was set up through 
an ATCM Measure.44 The purpose of the Secretariat is to provide secretariat support to the 
ATCM and the Committee for Environmental Protection45 as required, with tasks such as 
facilitating and coordinating communications amongst the States Parties,46 disseminating 
information to the States Parties about activities in Antarctica,47 and maintaining and 
publishing the records of the ATCMs.48 The Secretariat maintains an important role in the 
Antarctic Treaty System, particularly as Antarctic affairs become more complex with the 
addition of new players: it helps to maintain order in the gathering, recording and dissemination 




                                               
41 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (signed 1 June 1972, entered into force 11 March 1978). 
42 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (opened for signature 1 August 1980, 
entered into force 1 April 1982). 
43 Madrid Protocol, above n 8.  
44 Measure 1 (2003): Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty (ATCM XXVI, Madrid, 2003). 
45 Set up by art 11 of the Madrid Protocol.  
46 Measure 1 (2003), above n 44, art 2(2)(c). 
47 Article 2(2)(f). 
48 Article 2(2)(g). 
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It does not appear that the Antarctic Treaty is in immediate danger. Despite its faults and 
criticism, there seems to be a continued commitment by the Consultative Parties to ensure that 
Antarctica remains stable and peaceful. The Antarctic Treaty is an example of Cold War 
tensions working in a way which benefitted the international community as a whole. Putting 
aside for a moment the issues which I have examined at length in the Antarctic Treaty chapter 
and this section, the Treaty contains important concessions by the superpowers in order to 
establish a place of peace. The superpowers at least temporarily forfeited their right to make a 
claim; they agreed on a nuclear test ban, and they agreed to subject themselves to the open 
inspections regime. The Treaty was an admirable attempt to ease Cold War rivalries in at least 
one area of the globe, and it was ultimately successful. In the late 50s and early 60s the 
superpowers’ relationship was unfriendly at best; the importance of the Treaty should therefore 





C. Non-Proliferation Treaty 
1. Threats 
 
(a) Safeguards and new players 
 
In a 1992 article, Lawrence Scheinman stressed the importance of a strong safeguards system 
following the end of the Cold War.49 Scheinman explained that during the Cold War, the 
superpowers could “control the threat of proliferation among their allies or clients … The 
security guarantees they provided through their alliance systems made it unnecessary for those 
states to acquire nuclear weapons”.50 The end of the Cold War brought an end to this layer of 
security; Sheinman goes on to note that other States “may see nuclear weapons as a means of 
promoting [their] policies and interests”.51 In the decades since this article, it can be seen that 
very few States have taken advantage of the new geopolitical situation brought on by the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. However, the possibility of proliferation, and the adequacy of the safeguards 
regime to mitigate proliferation, remains a clear threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was dealt a major blow in the early 1990s, when it was discovered 
that Iraq and the DPRK, both parties to the Treaty and subject to safeguards agreements, had 
been working on secret nuclear weapons programmes.52 The discovery of these secret 
programmes shed light on the shortfalls of the Treaty’s safeguards system – the only 
verification measure contained in the Treaty. As I discussed in the mutual distrust subsection 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty chapter, the IAEA responded to these events with the 
                                               
49 Lawrence Scheinman “Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World Order” (1992) 23(4) 
Security Dialogue 37–50. 
50 At 38–39. 
51 At 39. 
52 David Fischer History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (IAEA, Austria, 1997) 
at 2. 
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introduction of an optional Additional Protocol; this could be employed by States to provide 
more stringent safeguards requirements.53 The core issue, however, remains: the verification 
measures are reliant on agreements between a State Party and the IAEA. It has been established 
that these agreements are able to be circumvented. 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is also threatened by new nuclear weapons holding States which 
are not party to the Treaty. In 2003, the DPRK announced its immediate withdrawal from the 
Treaty.54 It did this by invoking the withdrawal clause contained in art X, stating that its 
sovereignty and security was being threatened by “the United States’ vicious, hostile policy 
toward the [DPRK]”.55  
 
The Treaty also faces an issue in its distinction between NWS and non-NWS, which is relevant 
to the threat of new players: the definition of a NWS in the Treaty is a State “which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 
January, 1967”.56 States which possess nuclear weapons in the present day are not treated as 
NWS under the Treaty. India provides a pertinent example. It possesses nuclear weapons, and 
is not a party to the Treaty. If it chose to become a party, it would be considered a non-NWS 
under the Treaty; this is likely to be a deterrent to accession.  
 
(b) Disarmament obligations 
 
                                               
53 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards IAEA Doc INFCIRC/540 (May 1997). 
54 For full text of the DPRK’s withdrawal, see “Full Text: North Korea’s Statement of Withdrawal” (10 January 
2003) New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/asia/full-text-north-koreas-
statement-of-withdrawal.html>. 
55 Ibid.   
56 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 1 July 1968, entered into force 5 
March 1970), art IX(3). 
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Disarmament obligations are a key source of concern. Sangillo argues that “the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and other arms control agreements have forced, or allowed, the nuclear 
states to reduce their arsenals since the treaty went into effect in 1970”.57 However, the goal of 
“general and complete disarmament” has not yet been met. The other two pillars of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, non-proliferation and peaceful uses, have encountered a decent amount of 
success, but the obligations found in art VI remain largely unfulfilled. This is at least in part a 
result of differing approaches to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the NWS and NNWS. Harald 
Muller noted that for the NWS, “the Non-Proliferation Treaty is first and foremost a non-
proliferation treaty”, meaning the pillars of peaceful uses and disarmament are less relevant; 
but for the NNWS, “all undertakings are of equal weight”.58 Thränert goes as far to say that 
“the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a nuclear disarmament treaty. On the contrary, nuclear 
security guarantees prevented proliferation in many cases”.59 His reasoning is that by NWS 
pledging to use their nuclear capabilities to protect non-NWS in their spheres of influence, 
those non-NWS did not see the need to develop their own nuclear weapons programmes.  
 
In 2017, Timerbaev noted that “up until 2010, [disarmament] negotiations were fairly regular, 
and a lot of work had been done on reducing nuclear arsenals. But seven years ago, that process 
ground to a halt”.60 This leads into a matter of great concern to which Muller has drawn 
attention: a “multipolar arms race” with the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan and India 
as key players.61 An arms race seems to contravene the obligation on States Parties to undertake 
                                               
57 Gregg Sangillo “Is the Nonproliferation Treaty in Tatters?” (2003) 35(8) National Journal 2268 at 2270. 
Sangillo provides statistics of NWS nuclear arsenals from their peak to now, which do indicate a general 
downwards trend.  
58 Harald Müller “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World 
Politics” (2017) 52(1) The International Spectator 12 at 16. 
59 Oliver Thränert “Would We Really Miss the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?” (2008) 63(2) International 
Journal 327 at 335. 
60 Roland Timerbaev “Rolan Timerbaev: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Has Largely Achieved Its Goals” 
(2017) 47(7) Arms Control Today 39 at 40. 
61 Müller, above n 58, at 19. 
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disarmament negotiations in good faith, and plainly casts doubt on the ability of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty States Parties to fulfil the disarmament obligations. This is further 
complicated by the fact that India and Pakistan are not signatories to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Another issue with art VI is the fact that its exact scope remains uncertain: while there 
is good authority for suggesting that art VI requires States Parties to both negotiate and 
conclude an agreement, a different interpretation suggests that States Parties are merely 
required to undertake good faith negotiations. Under either interpretation, however, it is 
difficult to view this arms race as falling in line with the text or the spirit of art VI.  
 
2. Ability to respond  
 
(a) Review Conferences 
 
Paul Meyer notes that:62  
… an underappreciated problem with the Non-Proliferation Treaty is its institutional 
deficit … Between the review conferences once every five years, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty lacks an institutional persona … The treaty lacks any provision 
for the convening of an emergency meeting of the states-parties to respond to 
developments that may threaten the treaty’s authority.  
 
The Review Conferences provided for in art VIII(3) have taken place at five year intervals 
since the Treaty came into force, although they seem to encounter various levels of success. It 
is often the case that the States Parties are unable to reach agreement on a final document. The 
next Review Conference is currently in the preparatory stage, and is set to take place in 202063 
– coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty.64 Disarmament obligations are a key 
                                               
62 Paul Meyer, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Fin de Régime?” (2017) 47(3) Arms Control Today 16 at 
20. 
63 “NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees” (no date) United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt-review-conferences/>. 
64 Andrey Baklitskiy “The 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the Future of the 
Nonproliferation Regime” (2015) 45(6) Arms Control Today 15 at 18. 
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source of concern, as evidenced by comments in previous Review Conference reports.65 The 
Review Conferences could theoretically be used to address the threats facing the Treaty today; 
however, this is unlikely given how often the States Parties fail to reach a final agreement. 
Review Conferences are an important peace and security measure, which is the reason the 
Treaty provides for them, but they are not utilised to their fullest extent by the States Parties.  
 
(b) Verification  
 
Article III is both a strength and a weakness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: a small number 
of States have managed to create or hold nuclear weapons without detection from the IAEA. 
As I discussed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty chapter, the safeguards provisions in art III are 
the only verification measure of compliance with the Treaty. Importantly, the Treaty contains 
no penalties for violations of the Treaty. This is a major shortfall given that the potential 
consequences of violation – namely, a non-NWS becoming a nuclear power – are so severe. 
There is nothing in the Treaty to address this; this shortfall became especially apparent with 
the discovery in the 1990s of Iraq and the DPRK’s secret nuclear weapons programmes. The 
question of how to appropriately penalise diversions from the Treaty remains unanswered, 
which is of serious concern when the verification measures fail. Kittrie argues that sanctions 
should be put into place for Non-Proliferation Treaty violations, and should be widely 
implemented; his argument is that “sanctions implemented by a small number of states become 
increasingly ineffective, while universally implemented sanctions become increasingly 
powerful”.66 It is difficult to envisage a scenario of sanctions being used so effectively in line 
                                               
65 See generally 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NPT/CONF.2010/50; 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons NPT/CONF.2015/50. 
66 Orde F Kittrie “Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing is Deterrence 
Capacity and how to Restore it” (2007) 28(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 337 at 416. 
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with the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, simply because the Non-Proliferation Treaty lacks 
the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. The Non-Proliferation Treaty verification measures 
lack teeth, as there is no guidance as to the appropriate steps to take in the case of a breach.  
 
In contrast with the Antarctic Treaty, the tensions of mutual distrust and peace and security 
worked against the formulation of a strong verification system in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
NWS are not subject to art III; as I explained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty chapter, the likely 
reason for this was the Soviet Union’s refusal to accept mandatory safeguards on its own 
territory.67 While the Soviet Union and the United States did eventually negotiate safeguard 
agreements with the IAEA, those agreements apply only to peaceful nuclear facilities. 
However, it must be remembered that the new nuclear weapons states are not defined as NWS 
under the Treaty, and therefore remain subject to the safeguard requirements in art III.68  
 
The key issue lies in the fact that the safeguard requirements have failed more than once, as 
they cannot guard against a State Party developing a secret nuclear weapons programme. 
Kittrie considers that the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s “mechanisms for detecting violations are 
dangerously weak … Under the current arrangements, an Non-Proliferation Treaty member 
state weighing whether to develop nuclear weapons would inevitably calculate the likelihood 
of getting caught cheating as slim”.69 This argument holds merit, especially in light of the fact 
that some States were successful in hiding their nuclear weapons programmes from the IAEA 
for a number of years.70 
 
                                               
67 Mohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979 (Oceana 
Publications, Inc., USA, 1980) vol II at 666. 
68 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 56, art XI(3) defines a NWS for the purposes of the Treaty. 
69 Kittrie, above n 66, at 415.  
70 At 415.  
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There is an argument that the Non-Proliferation Treaty assisted in reducing the total number of 
nuclear weapons states today. There are at least three more nuclear-weapons States in 2019 
than there were in 1970;71 however, the increase is small when contrasted with pre-Non-
Proliferation Treaty predictions. In a 1963 report to the President, the United States Department 
of Defence listed eleven States with nuclear weapons capabilities; Bunn claims this was a 
conservative list, which did not take into account many Latin American and East European 
countries.72 Whether this is directly attributable to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is questionable. 
Oliver Thränert, for example, opines that it is unrealistic to assume the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty is the reason States have “rejected going nuclear”, arguing that “the overwhelming 
majority of states … continue to lack the technological, financial, and bureaucratic base to 
conduct a nuclear weapons program”; further, States with nuclear capacity would still hesitate 
to do so because of their “non-nuclear identities”.73 Finally, while the IAEA serves an 
important role in the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, “there is no agency with responsibility 
to oversee compliance [with the Non-Proliferation Treaty] in general”.74 This adds to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty’s “institutional deficit” – a problem all three of the case studies seem to 
face.  
 
(c) Amendment  
 
                                               
71 India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) are confirmed to have detonated 
atomic bombs. It is widely believed that Israel also has nuclear weapons in its arsenal, but the State has neither 
confirmed nor denied this. South Africa also has detonated a nuclear weapon, but destroyed its nuclear weapons 
facilities and acceded to the Treaty in 1991.  
72 George Bunn Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford University 
Press, USA, 1992) at 68.  
73 Thränert, above n 59, at 329. 
74 Meyer, above n 62, at 20. 
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The Non-Proliferation Treaty contains an amendment provision,75 but it is improbable that it 
will be used to address the challenges facing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Firstly, the Review 
Conferences often fail to produce a final report due to disagreement between the States Parties; 
Kittrie argues that the “near-impossibility of formally amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
is due in part to this contentiousness, which has beset the treaty’s formal review mechanism”.76  
Secondly, the amendment provisions have been drafted in such a way that makes the Non-
Proliferation Treaty virtually unamendable,77 as an amendment needs to be agreed upon by all 
of the NWS as well as all States Parties which are members of the IAEA Board of Governors.78 
Kittrie notes that in 2007 there were “thirty-five members of the IAEA Board of Governors, 
including several countries with questionable commitment to non-proliferation”.79 These two 
factors make the potential amendment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty an unlikely goal; despite 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty providing for such a procedure, the text of the treaty is stymied 
by the difficulties in achieving consensus between the many States Parties.  
 
(d) Subsequent instruments 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a landmark Treaty, and was generally very successful. It 
paved the way for numerous arms control discussions and agreements in later years, which 
were likely in part encouraged by art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.80 I briefly outline the 
most relevant of these agreements. 
 
                                               
75 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 56, art VIII. 
76 Kittrie, above n 66, at 419.  
77 Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years, 112. 
78 Non-Proliferation Treaty, above n 56, art VIII(2).  
79 Kittrie, above n 66, at 419.  
80 Perhaps the most notable are the Strategic Arms Control Talks, which were integral in slowing down the arms 
race between the superpowers.  
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Firstly, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty81 (“INF Treaty”) is a bilateral Treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, which required them to “eliminate [their] 
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles [and] not have such systems thereafter”.82 In 
February 2019, the United States confirmed its withdrawal from the INF Treaty, alleging that 
Russia was not complying with the Treaty.83 This recent withdrawal does not bode well for 
future arms control agreements between key powers, and indicates that Non-Proliferation 
Treaty States Parties are even further away from their art VI obligations than they once were.  
The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (“START I”), while now expired, helped to limit 
and reduce the respective nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.84 Its complementary treaty, 
START II, established limits on the number of ICBMs and other nuclear weapons either State 
could hold.85 However, START II never entered into force. Also relevant are the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks, which took place before the START treaties and consisted of in-depth 
negotiations between the superpowers regarding arms control.86  
 
Following the START treaties was the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (“SORT”), 
where the United States and Russia again agreed to set limitations on their nuclear arsenals.87 
SORT was superseded by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (“New-START”), which 
goes further than SORT with its verification provisions.88 New-START expires in 2021.89 
                                               
81 The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, USA-USSR (December 8 1987).  
82 Article I. 
83 Donald J Trump “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union” (Washington, 5 
February 2019).  
84 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, USA-USSR (signed 31 July 1991, entered into force 5 
December 1994).  
85 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, USA-Russia (signed 3 January 1993, entered into force 14 April 2000). 
86 See generally Matthew J Ambrose The Control Agenda: a History of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Cornell 
University Press, USA, 2018).   
87 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
USA-Russia (signed 24 May 2002, entered into force 1 June 2003).  
88 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, USA-Russia (signed 8 April 2010, entered into force 5 February 2011), 
art IX.  
89 Article XIV.  
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None of these agreements or negotiations have succeeded in general nuclear disarmament, but 
they are an important consideration: whether fuelled by art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
or not, they are proof that the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are not ignoring 
the issue of arms control and disarmament.  
 
In 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (“Prohibition Treaty”) was opened 
for signature.90 As of October 2018, it has 69 signatories and 19 Parties.91 It is not yet in force: 
it will come into force when 50 States have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.92 The Prohibition Treaty, among other things, requires States Parties to 
never “under any circumstances” acquire, make, or transfer nuclear weapons.93 No States 
claiming to hold nuclear weapons have signed the Prohibition Treaty, a fact which is 
unsurprising considering its strict, absolute wording, but signing this Treaty could very well 
fulfil the States Parties’ art VI obligations. Nevertheless, the Prohibition Treaty is new, and its 
possible impact is not yet known. It could be that the Prohibition Treaty eventually renders the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty defunct; however, this could not happen unless nuclear-weapon 




Overall, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been reasonably successful regarding the non-
proliferation pillar. The number of nuclear weapons states today is far less than pre-Non-
Proliferation Treaty predictions – but as discussed, whether this can be directly attributed to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty is debateable. However, there are threats to its longevity, namely 
                                               
90 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 20 September 2017, not yet in force).  
91 Per art 14, the Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory States. It is also open for 
accession. As at October 2018, the Cook Islands have acceded to the Treaty, and 18 States have ratified it.  
92 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, above n 90, at art 15(1).  
93 Article I.  
 164 
in the form of disarmament. The obligations found in art VI have yet to be fulfilled, and 
competing interpretations over the true meaning of art VI inspires little hope. Beyond this 
article, however, the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not contain any other disarmament 
provisions: its focus was, clearly, non-proliferation. It is likely that further agreement on 
disarmament was not possible at the time.  
 
This makes the Non-Proliferation Treaty less relevant today, where disarmament is a far more 
pressing concern than non-proliferation: it may be that a newer Treaty, better fitted to the 
current geopolitical situation and with clearer language, is set to take over. That being said, this 
requires nuclear weapons States to agree; as it stands, an “ambiguous” obligation in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty may be preferable to a precisely-worded obligation to disarm as soon as 
possible. The Non-Proliferation Treaty will survive, as it was extremely influential and remains 




D. Outer Space Treaty 
1. Threats 
 
(a) Territory and new players  
 
While the non-appropriation principle in the Outer Space Treaty means that no State can 
appropriate territory in outer space, there are some scholars who consider that private property 
rights are not precluded by the Outer Space Treaty;94 as the ability of private enterprises to 
explore outer space grows, this is likely to become a more urgent problem. Gabrynowicz 
identifies that “the intertwining of public and private functions in space activities is a space law 
subject that will continue to require further development”.95 Further, Abigail Pershing argues 
without a more absolute interpretation of the non-appropriation principle, “it is entirely possible 
that States will use legal arguments … to reinterpret Article II to serve the commercial interests 
of their domestic companies”.96  
 
Given that space exploration was at a rudimentary stage at the time the Outer Space Treaty was 
drafted, COPUOS did not consider private property claims as a pressing issue, if it was 
considered at all. John Adolph considers that the language of the Outer Space Treaty “makes 
it clear the drafters never imagined space would be developed by commercial entities”. 97  No 
State had managed to land on a celestial body at the time, and the possibility of a private entity 
being able to do so seemed slim. As Blount explains, “while future commercial activities were 
                                               
94 See generally Ricky J Lee “Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: Prohibition of State Sovereignty, Private 
Property Rights, or Both?” (2004) 11 Australian International Law Journal 128.  
95 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz “Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization” 
(2004) 37 Suffolk University Law Review 1041 at 1057. 
96 Abigail D. Pershing “Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty’s Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary 
International Law from 1967 to Today Note” (2019) 44 Yale Journal of International Law xiii at 170. 
97 John Adolph “The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and the Necessity of an International 
Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to Encourage Investment” (2006) 40(4) The International Lawyer 
961 at 963. 
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to a small extent envisioned, international space law was built on the principle that space 
activities are uniquely state controlled activities”.98 Now, companies like SpaceX and Blue 
Origin are making forays into outer space exploration; SpaceX, for example, aims to send a 
crew to Mars in 2024.99  
 
Connected to this is the proliferation of new State players in outer space since the Outer Space 
Treaty was concluded. As Johnson-Freese succinctly explains:100 
Space went from being a two-player game with both players starting from the same 
point and nearly equally matched, to a multiplayer game with one leading player 
[the United States] and many others along various points of a spectrum of 
capabilities. 
 
Asian States in particular have increased their interest and involvement in space activities.101 
As with the Antarctic Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the introduction of new players 
increases the risk of a State challenging the current order. The threat is particularly strong with 
the Outer Space Treaty when considering the Treaty through the lens of a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union:102 the provisions were drafted in a way to 
fulfil the interests of “diametrically opposed symmetric superpowers”,103 instead of the world 
at large. 
 
(b) Military use of outer space 
 
                                               
98 P.J. Blount “Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law” (2011) 40(1) Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 40 at 518. 
99 “Mars” (2017) Space Exploration Technologies Corp. <https://www.spacex.com/mars>. 
100 Joan Johnson-Freese Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, eBook ed, 2009) at 4. 
101 Blount, above n 98, at 519. 
102 J E S Fawcett International Law and the Uses of Outer Space (Manchester University Press, Great Britain, 
1968) at 15. 
103 Blount, above n 98, at 519. 
 167 
An ongoing concern is the military use of outer space. I discussed in my Outer Space Treaty 
chapter that the Outer Space Treaty does not completely demilitarise or denuclearise outer 
space, and that technologies – such as satellites – have been widely used for military purposes 
since their conception. Isaak Dore notes:104   
The Treaty’s drafters, no doubt concerned about the Treaty’s long-term viability, 
had no intention of instituting a radical regime of non-militarisation in disregard of 
present realities and the internal dynamics of the world power balance.  
 
The dichotomy created between the moon and other celestial bodies (which must be used for 
peaceful purposes only) and outer “void” space (to which the same restrictions do not apply) 
has resulted in modern day issues regarding military use of outer space.  
 
Adam Quinn considers that in addition to the ways in which States already use outer space for 
military purposes, “the weaponisation of space is inevitable because it is in every nation’s best 
interest to weaponise space”.105 He argues that “while no state wants to be the first to openly 
weaponise space, many are investing in dual-use technology”, being weapons designed for self-
defence, but which have “potent offensive capabilities” – he believes that these will soon make 
their way into outer void space.106 Whether the weaponisation of space is truly inevitable is up 
for debate; however, Quinn’s argument sheds light on the half-way measures adopted by the 




                                               
104 Isaak I. Dore “International Law and the Preservation of the Ocean Space and Outer Space as Zones of Peace: 
Progress and Problems” (1982) 15 Cornell International Law Journal 1 at 58. 
105 Adam G. Quinn “The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space Note” 
(2008) 17 Minnesota Journal of International Law 475 at 494. 
106 At 494. 
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Resource exploitation remains the biggest threat to the Outer Space Treaty today. The drafters 
of the Outer Space Treaty either did not consider resource exploitation possible, or did not 
think it was a pertinent enough issue to include in the Treaty: the result is that no provision has 
been made for such activities. Resource exploitation has a high likelihood of impacting on the 
“province of all mankind” principle currently embedded and adhered to in outer space law, as 
“even without making territorial claims, appropriation of resources could restrict access to 
resources for others and potentially encourage environmentally risky exploitation of the Moon, 
planets and asteroids”.107  
 
As I explored in the case study, the current provisions of the Treaty cannot be relied on to 
prohibit resource exploitation. The Moon Treaty attempted to deal with the problem,108 but as 
no space powers are signatories, it also cannot be used to prohibit exploitation. If the Moon 
Treaty remains unsupported, it is likely that a new treaty will be necessary to govern resource 
exploitation in outer space. Reed supports this view, but argues that States will most likely 
develop new, smaller treaties to deal with the issue of space resource regulation, “[creating] a 
more capitalist system in which certain countries and companies could acquire property or use 
rights to directly profit from space exploration and exploitation”.109 If this prediction were true, 
it would be a sad departure from the principle of outer space as the province of all mankind. 
However, the argument holds some merit in considering that it was the common heritage of 
mankind principle which deterred the United States from signing the Moon Treaty,110 and that 
                                               
107 Joan Johnson-Freese “Build on the Outer Space Treaty” (2017) 550 (7675) Nature 182 at 183. 
108 For an overview, see Sylvia Maureen Williams “The Law of Outer Space and Natural Resources” (1987) 36(1) 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 144–50.  
109 Reed, above n 3, at 485. 
110 Glenn Harlan Reynolds “The Moon Treaty: Prospects for the Future” (1995) 11(2) Space Policy 115 at 116. 
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the exploitation by commercial entities would be further complicated if a common heritage of 
mankind regime were established.111 
 
2. Ability to respond 
 
(a) Verification measures 
 
There are two key verification measures in the Outer Space Treaty: information sharing under 
art XI and inspection under art XII. States Parties must provide information about their space 
activities “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable”, while space installations are open to 
representatives of other States Parties, provided reasonable advance notice is given. The 
verification measures were directly influenced by the tensions of mutual distrust and peace and 
security. Similarly to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the tension of mutual distrust weakened the 
verification provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: the United States’ desire to confirm 
compliance with the treaty had to be balanced against the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to 
allow invasive verification techniques. Out of the three case studies, the Outer Space Treaty’s 
verification measures are the weakest, as they are almost entirely voluntary. Additionally, these 
measures only apply to areas “where total non-militarisation is prescribed: i.e., on celestial 
bodies but not in outer space … Significantly, the [Outer Space Treaty] does not provide for 
verification at all with respect to its ban on nuclear and mass destruction measures under Article 
IV”.112 
 
                                               
111 Michael E. Davis and Ricky J. Lee “Twenty Years after the Moon Agreement and Its Legal Controversies” 
(1999) Australian International Law Journal 9 at 20: “It is crucial to recognise that the doctrine requires any 
benefits derived from the exploitation of natural resources to be shared internationally. As a result, exploitation 
by commercial entities would be deemed inappropriate unless their efforts contributed to the common benefit of 
all mankind.” 
112 Dore, above n 104, at 46. 
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As explored in the Outer Space Treaty chapter, the Soviet Union balked at the idea of the more 
stringent mechanisms suggested by the United States, unwilling to bind itself to such strict 
information sharing and inspection provisions. It is likely that mandatory reporting of planned 
and actual activities in outer space could become a security concern with regards to non-
peaceful uses of outer space. As outer “void” space is able to be used for military purposes 
such as the placement of reconnaissance satellites, an obligation on a State to report this could 
impact negatively on its operations. That being said, this issue has been largely resolved by the 
subsequent Registration Convention,113 which requires a State Party to register objects 
launched into outer space.  
 
Finally, the reason that the United States conceded to the Soviet Union’s position can again be 
traced back to peace and security. A treaty was necessary, and with both superpowers inching 
closer to a lunar landing, a treaty had to be negotiated quickly to ensure the Cold War would 
not extend to outer space. Strengthening future peace and security with strong verification 
measures was sacrificed by the more immediate need to negotiate an agreement that would lead 
to peace in outer space, at least in the moment.  
 
(b) Dispute resolution and enforcement 
 
Quinn argues that “the absence of an international court to adjudicate conflicts means that the 
first time the [Outer Space Treaty] is tested, it will become apparent that it has no teeth”.114 
The Outer Space Treaty’s “dispute resolution” clauses will be of limited assistance when 
dealing with the threats facing the Treaty today,115 particularly as they do not concern the 
                                               
113 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (opened for signature 14 January 1975, 
entered into force 15 September 1976). 
114 Quinn, above n 105, at 495. 
115 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, arts IX and XIII.  
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interpretation or application of the Treaty. However, they are not completely without merit. 
The clauses provide an opportunity for States Parties to discuss their planned activities in outer 
space, facilitating the principle of openness found in the early articles of the Treaty.  
 
As with the other two case studies, the Outer Space Treaty contains no method of enforcement 
– there are no provisions for sanctioning States Parties which breach the Treaty. In considering 
the difficulties faced by the States parties in negotiating the verification methods, this is likely 
to be connected to the tensions of mutual distrust and peace and security. The Soviet Union 
had already fought strongly against the verification methods; it is highly probable that it would 




The Outer Space Treaty frustratingly does not provide for any form of review conference, 
unlike the Antarctic Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.116 This makes it difficult to 
evaluate States Parties’ opinions on the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty, and 
creates a roadblock towards other methods of managing threats, like proposing amendment. It 
is unknown whether this omission was deliberate or an oversight. 
 
However, while the Outer Space Treaty did not provide for any form of review conference, in 
1968 the first United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(“UNISPACE”) was held in Vienna.117 UNISPACE considers space law as a whole, which is 
perhaps more relevant than a specific Outer Space Treaty review conference because of the 
                                               
116 Sandeepa Bhat and Kiran Mohan V. “Anti Satellite Missile Testing: A Challenge to Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty” (2002) 2 NUJS Law Review 205 at 212. 
117 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UN Doc A/73/20 (June 2018) at 5.  
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subsequent instruments agreed upon after the Outer Space Treaty. 2018 marked the fiftieth 
anniversary of this conference, and UNISPACE convened for a fourth time.118 Interestingly, 
the extensive report makes no specific mention of the Outer Space Treaty. It appears that the 
Outer Space Treaty continues to serve as the guiding document on which future negotiations 




The Outer Space Treaty contains a provision for amendment, which could potentially be 
implemented to deal with the threats.119 Any State Party can propose amendments, which must 
be approved by a majority of the States Parties; however for those who do not approve the 
amendment, the amendment will not come into force for them until they have accepted it.120 
This has the potential to create a disjointed treaty, where States Parties have different rights 
and obligations to one another. Further, the Outer Space Treaty is unlikely to be amended given 
its history: as with the other case studies, it has never been amended, and as with the Antarctic 
Treaty, the States Parties prefer to negotiate and implement subsequent instruments in lieu of 
amending the Treaty text.  
 
(e) Subsequent instruments  
 
The Outer Space Treaty is still in force today, with 107 States Parties and a further 23 
signatories. It is considered the magna carta of the international law of outer space, and serves 
as a starting point for the development of the four subsequent treaties governing activities in 
                                               
118 At 5.  
119 Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, art XV. 
120 Ibid. 
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outer space. The 1968 Rescue Agreement elaborates on arts V and VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty, regarding the rescue and return of astronauts.121 The Space Liability Convention 
expands art VII of the Outer Space Treaty, and provides for absolute liability to pay for 
compensation for damage caused by space objects falling from outer space.122 Importantly, the 
1974 Registration Convention helps to mitigate the weakness of art XI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, which concerns the sharing of information about space activities. Under the 
Registration Convention, when a State Party launches a space object into space, that State must 
register the space object in “an appropriate registry”, and inform the UNSG of such registry.123 
Finally, the 1984 Moon Treaty elaborates on and expands the Outer Space Treaty; however, it 
currently has limited force. 
 
These subsequent instruments are highly important for outer space law generally, and help to 
mitigate the threat of new players by providing more detailed instructions on how to conduct 
activities in outer space. Aside from the Moon Treaty, they provide limited assistance for the 
threats of territory and resources, but their existence is generally promising: it shows that States 




After analysis of the Outer Space Treaty’s ability to respond to threats, it becomes clearer than 
ever that it truly is a “treaty of principles”. The Outer Space Treaty somewhat expands upon 
the Declaration of Legal Principles, but many articles are almost entirely lifted from these 
                                               
121 The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (signed 19 December 1967, entered into force 3 December 1968).  
122 The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (opened for signature 29 
march 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972).  
123 Registration Convention, above n 113, art II.  
 174 
Principles without further elaboration, making their precise application and meaning 
ambiguous.124 Fawcett suggests that this was a deliberate move on the part of the superpowers, 
with the main purpose being to have a treaty, “but to give it the smallest possible force and 
effect beyond the General Assembly Resolutions”.125 This interpretation seems accurate when 
recalling the urgent need for a treaty on outer space,126 and contrasting this with the extensive 
superpower disagreement over the more practical articles of the Outer Space Treaty. The end 
result means that it is currently unable to deal with the biggest threats facing it today. However, 
given its status as the magna carta of international law, it is unlikely that the Outer Space Treaty 
is in grave danger: it will continue to be used as the basis for subsequent agreements.  
 
  
                                               
124 See for example Outer Space Treaty, above n 1, arts I and II.  
125 Fawcett, above n 102, at 15. 
126 Fabio Tronchetti The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: A Proposal 
for a Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 2009) at 19. 
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E. Final Conclusion  
 
In my thesis I examined the treaties with reference to three Cold War geopolitical tensions. 
These tensions have shifted in terms of key players and spheres of influence, but similar 
tensions can still be identified. Peace and security will always be a concern in international 
law, and as such is a tension which transcends the Cold War. The tension of mutual distrust is 
less present, as the world is no longer “divided” in two the way it was during the Cold War: 
however, general distrust between States is certainly still a concern. The tension of resources 
is perhaps more relevant than ever, especially with the rise of new players in the international 
field: this is evidenced by the ever increasing interest of States in resource exploitation in 
Antarctica and outer space. A relatively new tension is the environment: issues such as climate 
change have become intensely politicised at both a domestic and international level,127 which 
raises problems for attempts to mitigate environmental damage and to set up regimes for 
environmental protection. 
 
When looking at the three case studies together, it becomes clear that each of them held up the 
“status quo” of their particular areas of application. The Antarctic Treaty froze territorial claims 
as they were and encouraged the use of Antarctica for peaceful and scientific use; the NWS 
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty were able to retain their nuclear weapons; and the Outer 
Space Treaty attempted to find a balance between reserving outer space for peaceful uses while 
catering to the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, which had already begun to 
use outer space for military purposes. As I examined in this chapter, the problem with 
                                               
127 See, for example, how a change in administration at the domestic level led to the withdrawal of the United 
States from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change: Donald J Trump “Remarks Announcing United States 
Withdrawal From the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement” (Washington, 
1 June 2017). 
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preserving the status quo means that the treaties run the risk of becoming irrelevant as situations 
change and novel issues arise.  
 
The common theme of the treaties is that they are sparse, with few institutions set up, no 
enforcement methods, and – except for the Antarctic Treaty – weak verification mechanisms. 
This was deliberate: more detailed treaties, which imposed more explicit obligations on States 
Parties and provided for punishment in the case of a breach, would not have been ratified by 
the negotiating parties. The negotiating parties for all of the treaties faced time pressure, with 
the subject of the treaties requiring urgent attention. The treaties needed to exist, but they also 
needed to be successful; this contributed to the treaties’ sparse texts.  
 
All three of the treaties hold a great deal of historical importance, which makes compliance 
more likely. They are all highly regarded as essential pieces of international law, and are 
therefore treated with gravitas by the States Parties. The fact that they were negotiated during 
a time of such intense international conflict gives them further weight: even during the Cold 
War, the States Parties knew that the treaties’ subjects required attention and agreement.  
 
That said, historical importance cannot protect a treaty from becoming out of date, or from 
failing to respond to new challenges. In my analysis of each of the treaties, I did not consider 
that any of them were in direct danger. However, new threats and circumstances have already 
arisen which were beyond the contemplation of the original negotiating parties, and it is likely 
that this will continue as world politics, environmental concerns, and new technologies 
continue to shift and develop. None of the treaties are likely to ever be amended – this means 
their texts are not dynamic, and cannot adapt. This is concerning not only in the face of new 
challenges, but also in situations where ambiguity exists. The most pertinent examples here are 
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art II of the Outer Space Treaty and art VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (relating to non-
appropriation and disarmament, respectively). Ambiguity over the precise meaning and scope 
of these articles have led to States Parties developing interpretations which best suit their own 
interests. A lack of consensus over the actual meaning of treaty provisions makes them all the 
more difficult to enforce.  
 
The lack of institutions is a detriment to all three of the treaties. The Antarctic Treaty and the 
Antarctic Treaty System is the strongest in terms of addressing new threats, as the ATCM 
regime ensures that States Parties regularly attend to Antarctic matters, but the consensus-based 
decision making model and lack of external institutions means that even if threats are 
addressed, there is no certainty that they can be resolved.  
 
Even when the threats facing the treaties are classified as direct breaches of the treaties, they 
do not provide for appropriate avenues to remedy these breaches, or to ensure future 
compliance. The treaties rely on either States Parties’ goodwill, or the assumption that the 
treaties still align with a State Party’s individual interests enough that they will continue to 
comply with the treaties’ provisions. There is the potential for some States Parties to encourage 
compliance or punish breaches through sanctions, for example. A lack of a comprehensive 
regime for applying such sanctions means that such efforts may not be effective, and again 
relies on the will and interests of individual States Parties. Institutions which are set up to 
manage the treaties and administer enforcement measures would result in a more streamlined 
and functional treaty management process – but again, this is unlikely under the framework of 
each of the treaties.  
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In this thesis I aimed to find out the extent to which the Cold War affected the negotiation, 
development and implementation of the three case studies. By applying my three chosen 
tensions to the case studies, I have found that the Cold War certainly had an impact in all three 
of the treaties. Surprisingly, in some ways  (namely in the inspection provisions of the Antarctic 
Treaty) the Cold War tensions worked to the negotiating parties’ benefit. However, after 
analysis of how the treaties are able to respond to modern challenges in their jurisdiction, it can 
be seen that the effects that the geopolitical tensions had on the treaties was generally to the 
treaties’ detriment.  
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VIII. Appendices  
 
A. Appendix I: The Antarctic Treaty  
 
 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, 
 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international 
discord; 
 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from 
international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; 
 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of 
such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied 
during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress 
of all mankind; 
 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the 
continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
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Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article I 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any 
measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the 
carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. 
 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purposes. 
 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied 




1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as 
provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest 
extent feasible and practicable: 
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged 
to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations; 
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and 
stations; 
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made 
freely available. 
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2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to the establishment of 
cooperative working relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other 
international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica. 
 
Article IV 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
nonrecognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica. 
 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis 
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. No new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty shall be asserted while the 
present Treaty is in force. 
 
Article V 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material 
shall be prohibited. 
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2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear 
energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which 
all of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall 
apply in Antarctica. 
 
Article VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60o South latitude, 
including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect 
the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the 
high seas within that area. 
 
Article VII 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observation of the provisions of the present 
Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out 
any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the 
Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of the observers shall be communicated 
to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall 
be given of the termination of their appointment. 
 
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, 
and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in 
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Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this Article.  
 
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any 
of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 
 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, 
inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of 
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships of nationals, and all 
expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory; 
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica 
subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty. 
 
Article VIII 
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all 
other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and 
scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1(b) of Article III of the Treaty, and 
members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction 
of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect to all acts or omissions occurring 
while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions. 
 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption 
of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned 
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in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately 
consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 
 
Article IX 
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present Treaty shall 
meet at the City of Canberra within two months after date of entry into force of the Treaty, and 
thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, 
consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating 
and considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Treaty including measures regarding: 
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
(c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; 
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of 
the Treaty; 
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; 
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 
 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by accession under 
Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred 
to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such time as the Contracting Party demonstrates 
its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the 
establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition. 
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3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be 
transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings 
referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when approved 
by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings 
held to consider those measures. 
 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from the date 
of entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such 
rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article. 
 
Article X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica 
contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
 
Article XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult 
among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, 




2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all 
parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure 
to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the 
dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful 
means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
 
Article XII 
1. (a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of 
the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when 
the depositary Government has received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have 
ratified it. 
 
(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting 
Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government. Any 
such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two 
years from the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with 
the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the 
present Treaty on the date of the expiration of such period. 
 
2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty, 
any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary 
Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to 
review the operation of the Treaty. 
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(b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved at such a 
Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a majority of 
those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties 
immediately after the termination of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
 
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date of its 
communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the 
expiration of that period give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the 
present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice 
by the depositary Government. 
 
Article XIII 
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be open for 
accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which 
may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the 
Treaty. 
 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by each State in 
accordance with its constitutional processes. 
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3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government. 
 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each 
deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the present Treaty 
shall enter into force for those States and for States which have deposited instruments of 
accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit 
of its instrument of accession. 
 
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian, and Spanish languages, each version 
being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United 
States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the 
signatory and acceding States. 
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed the present 
Treaty. 




B. Appendix II: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, 
 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the 
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures 
to safeguard the security of peoples, 
 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of 
nuclear war, 
 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, 
within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the 
principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use 
of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, 
 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from 
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the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all 
Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, 
 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone 
or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes, 
 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, 
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all 
time and to continue negotiations to this end, 
 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between 
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation 
of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons 
and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, 
 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
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political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and 
security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and 
economic resources, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, 
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 
 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from 
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive 
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  
 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set 
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
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the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of 
its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy 
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the 
safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special 
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear 
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied 
on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory 
of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
  
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use 
or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful 
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards 
required by this Article. 
 
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological 
development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear 
activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for 
the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with 
the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the 
Treaty. 
 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either 
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individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days 
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of 
ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall 
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not 
later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information 
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also 
co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to 
the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due 
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 
 
Article V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance 
with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate 
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear 
explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-
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discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be 
as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a 
special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with 
adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall 
commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 




Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in 
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all 
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the 
Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all 
the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 
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2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties 
to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other 
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each 
Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such 
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments 
of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on 
the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party 
upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 
 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty 
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view 
to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being 
realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, 
by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further 
conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. 
 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to 
it at any time. 
 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and 
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of 
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Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 
 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of 
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty 
and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-
weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 
 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the 
entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or accession. 
 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the 
date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the 
date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening 
a conference or other notices. 
 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 
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other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. 
Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened 
to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an 
additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to 
the Treaty.  
 
Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified 
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments 
of the signatory and acceding States. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight. 
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C. Appendix III: Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
 
 
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION 




The States Parties to this Treaty, 
 
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer 
space, 
 
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of 
outer space for peaceful purposes, 
 
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all 
peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, 
 
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal 
aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
 
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding 
and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, 
 
Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space," which was adopted 
unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963, 
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Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around 
the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted 
unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963, 
 
Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, 
which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned 
resolution is applicable to outer space, 
 
Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes 
and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
Have agreed on the following: 
 
Article I 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of 
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. 
 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and 
use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance 
with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 
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There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other 




Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. 
 
Article III 
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including 
the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security 
and promoting international co-operation and understanding. 
 
Article IV 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying 
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on 
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the 
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall 
be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful 
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful 




States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and 
shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency 
landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such 
a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space 
vehicle. 
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party 
shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties. 
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or 
health of astronauts. 
 
Article VI 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by 
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities 
are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities 
of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the 
Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be 
borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating 




Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory 
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to 
the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the 
Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
 
Article VIII 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried 
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in 
outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including 
objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected 
by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such 
objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish 
identifying data prior to their return. 
 
Article IX 
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States 
Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and 
shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States 
Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also 
adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of 
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extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it 
or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause 
potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall 
undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or 
experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request 
consultation concerning the activity or experiment. 
 
Article X 
In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, 
the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States 
Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects 
launched by those States. 
 
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be 
afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned. 
 
Article XI 
 In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the Moon and 
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other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as 
the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the 
said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to 
disseminate it immediately and effectively. 
 
Article XII 
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies 
shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. 
Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that 
appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure 
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. 
 
Article XIII 
The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such 
activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, 
including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international 
intergovernmental organizations. 
 
Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international inter-
governmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the 
appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international 




1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to 
it at any time. 
 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification 
and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 
 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five 
Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this 
Treaty. 
 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the 
entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or accession. 
 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the 
date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to 
this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices. 
 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of 




Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter 
into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance 
by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party 
to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it. 
 
Article XVI 
Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after 
its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal 
shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification. 
 
Article XVII  
This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified 
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments 
of the signatory and acceding States. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this twenty-seventh day 
of January one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven.  
 
